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Executive summary 
Reforming state and local government taxes that apply to property can contribute 
to creating a fairer and more sustainable housing system as well as delivering 
additional economic and social dividends. 
The politics of subnational property tax reform is challenging and requires support 
and commitment from all levels of government if it is to be realised. Reflecting on 
these challenges this report proposes a nationally coordinated incremental strategy 
with clearly defined short, medium and long-term objectives. 
 Short-term administrative reforms. These include the further integration of 
state and local property tax collection, enhanced data sharing between state and 
national revenue authorities and, over time, the establishment of a nationally 
consistent valuation regime and property register 
 The creation, short to medium-term, of a simpler and fairer revenue 
neutral transfer duty regime as a foundation for more substantive reforms. 
New modelling reveals that a flat 6 per cent transfer duty rate with a carefully 
designed threshold would result in over 60 per cent of property buyers at the 
bottom of the price distribution paying less transfer duty. 
 A medium to long-term strategy (10–20 years) to replace transfer duties 
with a broad-based recurrent property tax. This report models a range of 
scenarios using 2015–16 Corelogic data of all residential property in Australia. 
This analysis reveals that a modest annual property tax of between $47 and 
$130 per annum on median value properties could fund a 10 per cent reduction 
in transfer duties. This annual property tax could gradually be increased over a 
period of 10 to 20 years to offset the revenue currently sourced from existing 
transfer duties on residential property. 
The incremental yet nationally coordinated reform strategy with clear long-term 
objectives outlined in this report provides a practical pathway to reform Australia’s 
subnational property tax regime which will create a more efficient and equitable 
housing outcome. 
Key findings 
This report has been designed to develop a pragmatic pathway to subnational housing tax 
reform. In addition to the specific policy proposals, the report provides a commentary on the 
political and administrative challenges that can undermine any reform initiative. These 
challenges are especially important in the case of subnational property tax reform where a lack 
of intergovernmental coordination has been identified as a major barrier to policy change. 
The report highlights the need to set national reform priorities and to develop a coordinated 
approach to property tax reform while still granting state and local governments the right to 
determine policy settings and the trajectory of reform. 
AHURI report 291 2 
Having established the need to set long-term goals for reform, the report identifies four stages 
of a subnational property tax reform agenda to achieve these goals (see Figure 1 below). 
Figure 1: A pathway to subnational property tax reform 
Source: Authors. 
1 The immediate focus is on implementing administrative reforms designed to provide a 
foundation on which future property tax reforms can be built: 
 developing nationally consistent valuation methods for residential property 
 establishing a national register of property valuations and ownership 
 further integration of state and local tax collection and enhanced data sharing between all 
levels of government. 
2 In the short term, the focus should be on creating a simpler and fairer transfer duties regime 
as a foundation for more substantive reform. The benefits of establishing a simplified transfer 
duty regime identified in the report include:  
 that a simplified transfer duty regime provides a foundation for more substantive reforms 
designed to address housing policy objectives 
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 that a single rate transfer duty with a carefully designed duty-free threshold applied to all 
residential property transactions would cut transfer duty for a majority of home buyers 
with the greatest benefits accruing to buyers of low value properties (see Table 1 below). 
 modelling of the distributional implications by property value for each state demonstrates 
how a simplified transfer duty regime can be applied across diverse property markets 
 building on this simplified framework by presenting modelling across a range of options 
shows that the transfer duty rate and threshold can be adjusted to determine the 
incidence of the transfer duty burden. 
Table 1: Tax-free thresholds and break-even points for a flat transfer duty rate of 6 per 
cent 
State 
Median 
property price 
($) 
Threshold Break-even points 
Value ($) 
Proportion of 
median (%) 
Value ($) 
Purchasers 
(%) 
NSW 653,697 245,529 37.6 682,500 62.3 
VIC1 635,872 110,905 21.1 303,000 17.6 
QLD 424,966 220,983 52.0 468,000 58.6 
WA 481,605 213,351 44.3 546,000 63.3 
SA 381,059 127,274 33.4 397,500 61.8 
TAS 283,886 143,078 50.4 327,000 60.6 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
1Note: All properties below the break-even point in a given state would pay less transfer duty relative to the current 
regime. As explained in greater detail in Chapter 6, the Victorian case is complex due to the interaction of PPR 
concessions. 
The following two subsequent goals for subnational property tax reform will also contribute to 
creating a fairer and more sustainable housing system. 
3 A medium-term shift in the mix of transfer duties: 
 This element of the overall reform strategy focuses on shifting the tax incidence of 
transfer duties on residential property from owner-occupiers purchasing lower value 
properties toward investors and those purchasing high-value properties. 
 Shifting the costs incurred by transfer duties from owner-occupiers to investors will help 
meet housing policy goals by dampening demand for investment properties and 
increasing home ownership rates. Because the quantum of transfer duties raised is 
unchanged under this scenario, the reforms are not dependent on the states introducing 
a new broad-based property tax. 
4 A long-term pathway to a broad-based recurrent property tax: 
 The report concurs with the significant body of research which finds that replacing 
property-related transfer duties with a broad-based recurrent property tax would 
contribute to housing policy goals and deliver a range of economic and social dividends. 
 The report highlights the political barriers to a transfer duty to property tax transition and 
recommends a nationally coordinated incremental approach in which broad-based state-
level residential property tax is gradually increased to fund the abolition of transfer duties 
over a 10 to 20 year period. This ‘phase out, phase up’ model is similar to the approach 
that has already been adopted in the ACT. 
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 The recurrent residential property tax should be levied on the same base as local 
government rates using a capital improved value, highest and best use (CIV + HBU) 
method. The administrative reforms outlined above will enable the effective 
implementation of this new residential property tax. Existing state land taxes, as they are 
applied to residential investment properties, should be integrated into the broad-based 
property tax. 
 Detailed modelling presented in this report (see summary in Table 2 below) suggests that 
an annual property tax of between $47 and $130 per annum for a median value dwelling 
would be required to reduce a reformed transfer duty by 10 per cent (e.g. from 6.0% to 
5.4%). 
 With appropriate deferral provisions, this tax could gradually be increased to fund further 
reductions in transfer duties. 
 Despite the benefits of reform, the report acknowledges that the implementation of a new, 
broad-based tax on households will be challenging and will only be achievable if the 
wider benefits for housing affordability, intergenerational equity and economic efficiency 
are widely promoted.  
 The Commonwealth Government therefore has a key role to play in coordinating and 
supporting subnational housing tax reform. In addition to providing national leadership the 
Commonwealth can provide administrative support, incentive payments and eliminate 
any disincentives associated with introducing a state-level broad-based property tax. 
Table 2: Recurrent property tax rate required to fund 0.6 per cent reduction in transfer 
duty rates and annual property tax paid on median value properties, all states 
State 
Threshold 
(baseline1 
reform, 6 per 
cent rate) 
Required rate of 
recurrent property 
tax to reduce transfer 
duty rate by 0.6 
percentage points. 
Median ($) 
Annual recurrent 
property tax paid on 
median-priced 
property ($) 
NSW 245,529 0.0317 653,697 129.24 
VIC 110,905 0.0306 524,872 126.64 
QLD 220,983 0.0383 424,966 78.12 
WA 213,351 0.0248 481,605 66.61 
SA 127,274 0.0342 381,059 86.88 
TAS 143,078 0.0335 283,886 47.28 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
1Note: The ‘baseline’ reform scenario is described more fully in Chapter 4. It involves applying a 6 per cent transfer 
duty on residential property above a specific duty-free threshold (see above). The threshold has been calculated 
for each state to ensure quantum of revenue raised equals that raised by the 2015–16 schedule in a particular 
state. 
Policy reform process  
The potential benefits of subnational property tax reform, both in terms of improving housing 
outcomes and its capacity to deliver more general economic and social dividends, are well 
understood. This report documents and analyses key political barriers to reform before 
presenting a reform agenda that balances short-term political imperatives with longer term 
policy goals. 
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Fiscal and market objectives 
A major political barrier to tax reform for governments is the fiscal impacts of revenue changes 
and distributional consequences for households which have the potential to create political 
difficulties or mobilise taxpayer and stakeholder resistance to government policy. The reforms 
presented in this report give close consideration to these issues, and are designed to minimise 
the risk of significant budget or market disruption. Objectives include: 
 a revenue neutral reform pathway for each of the states  
 a layered reform framework with inbuilt flexibility designed to reflect and respond to current 
government policy environments, and minimise political disruption or adverse market 
consequences—for example, the incremental reform strategy advocated in this report will 
enable governments to avoid making sudden policy changes during periods of high market 
volatility 
 enhancing the fairness of the property tax system over the medium to long-term by reducing 
the relative transfer duty paid by purchasers of low value properties 
 minimising the impact of tax redistribution by ensuring that under almost any scenario most 
property owners (and would-be owners) would be better off relative to the status quo; while 
reflecting the broader goals of property tax reform and ensuring that the majority of tax 
increases falls on the owners of higher value and/or investment properties 
 contributing to housing affordability, residential mobility and the efficiency of the national tax 
system by replacing transfer duties on residential properties with a broad-based recurrent 
property tax. 
A national strategy to address housing affordability 
The taxation of housing and housing-related income is only one factor contributing to poor 
housing outcomes for a growing number of Australians. Given the complexities of housing 
markets, a national approach that includes all levels of government and key stakeholders will be 
required if reform is to be achieved. The challenges to achieving the political cooperation and 
coordination required may be formidable, but there are historic precedents, such as the 
introduction of the National Competition Policy in the 1990s.  
The steps required to reform the subnational property tax arrangements include: 
 adopting common valuation methods, joint administration and data sharing 
 securing a commitment from the Commonwealth Government to facilitate reform and 
redistribute some of its economic dividends 
 establishing a credible intergovernmental forum to facilitate deliberation and joint decision-
making. 
Establishing a commitment to high-level objectives including administrative 
reforms 
The prospects of reform will also be enhanced if state and national leaders commit to achieving 
high level goals as a national priority. These goals will be challenging, but evidence gathered for 
this report suggested that community concerns about housing access and affordability are 
growing. The broad direction of housing policy can no longer be shaped by narrow concerns 
about the distributional equity of tax policy changes or their likely impact on property values. 
High-level objectives include: 
 promoting the wider community benefits of more accessible and sustainable housing for all 
Australians in national political discourse 
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 focusing on actions for which there is multi-party support—this report demonstrates that 
some structural and administrative reform is possible without significant redistribution 
between households 
 adopting a staged and gradual approach to those reforms that have distributional 
consequences and only once the broad principles of reform are accepted. 
Institutionalising a pathway to reform 
Whether there is a nationally coordinated approach to reform or states are incentivised to act 
unilaterally, any long-term reform agenda must be institutionalised. Governments have to set 
and report against regular targets and develop a clear framework for reviewing progress and 
adapting to changing circumstances. This has been the approach adopted in the ACT. Reform 
pathways include:  
 beyond establishing an intergovernmental forum to promote reform, individual governments 
need to make clear commitments to reform including short, medium and longer-term targets  
 reform progress should be evaluated regularly and a clear framework for reviewing reform 
strategy must be established—specifically, governments must commit to clear timeframes for 
implementing administrative reforms, simplifying transfer duty bases and starting the transfer 
duty to land tax transition 
 ideally this monitoring embraces a nationally coordinated effort. 
The incremental and staged strategy proposed in this report represents the most pragmatic 
pathway to subnational tax reform. The risk is that governments’ priorities will change and they 
won’t achieve prior commitments. Institutionalising reform by implementing the processes and 
procedures described above offers a feasible political strategy to ensure that long-term policy 
objectives are achieved. 
The study  
This study is part of a wider AHURI Inquiry into pathways to housing tax reform. The study has 
two elements—a review and empirical analysis, each with distinctive methods. The report 
begins with an overview of the study in Chapter 1 which sets out the reasons for the study in the 
context of the broader Inquiry and outlines the methodology used to conduct the review and on 
which the modelling of the reform proposals is based. The first element of the study, the review, 
follows in Chapter 2 and 3. Chapter 2 sets out in detail the existing subnational residential 
property tax regime in Australia and in particular investigates these in reference to historical and 
current policy directions, including current reform proposals. Chapter 3 builds on this detail and 
establishes its relevance to the study from a political economy perspective. In this context, the 
chapter sets out the rationale for the short, medium and long-term reform strategies presented. 
Chapters 4 to 6 provide in-depth descriptions of the empirical analyses and their findings, with 
the chapters structured to reflect the layered and incremental approach to reforms. Chapter 4 
starts with the foundations of reform found in addressing administrative inefficiencies in state 
and local land taxes. Chapter 5 builds on these reforms and develops revenue neutral 
strategies for a simpler and fairer transfer duty regime for residential property. Together these 
provide a strong foundation for comprehensive reform, outlined in Chapter 6 through a series of 
pragmatic long-term strategies for progressive transfer duty reforms as well as the mix between 
transfer duties and recurrent property tax. Chapter 7 concludes by setting out the tax design 
advantages and contributions of the proposed reform in current policy context. 
The reform proposals presented in the report are based on an extensive review of the relevant 
technical and policy literature as well as coverage of associated political debates. Reform 
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proposals have been discussed with a range of stakeholders over the period of the study. In all 
cases proposals seek to balance political and policy considerations with a view to developing a 
politically viable pathway to reform. 
The empirical analysis of the distributional and revenue implications of the reform proposal is 
informed by new modelling using Corelogic’s database of all residential dwellings in Australia. 
This is arguably the most comprehensive and contemporary dataset on residential property in 
Australia and this study has used data from 2015–16 on residential dwelling sales as well as 
data on the value of all residential dwellings using their most sophisticated automated 
valuations. For the purposes of modelling the 9.6 million dwellings in the Corelogic dataset, 
dwellings have been grouped by property value sets while differentiating between houses and 
units. 
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  Introduction 
Despite a sustained period of economic growth in Australia, housing affordability 
and accessibility has declined significantly. This resulting shortage of affordable 
housing is having an adverse effect on the housing needs and aspirations of many 
low and middle-income Australians. 
There is growing recognition that Australia’s tax system, in particular its property 
taxation system, is a significant contributor to the problem. Reform of the system 
has the potential to form part of the solution. 
This report presents the findings from one of three projects undertaken as part of 
AHURI’s Panel Inquiry into pathways to housing tax reform.  
It describes and presents analysis of three distinct but related elements which, 
when combined, provide a long-term pathway to subnational property tax reform in 
Australia. These are: national and subnational administrative reforms, a simpler 
and fairer system of transfer duties, and options for an incremental tax mix shift in 
the property tax regime. 
If implemented, these reforms can contribute to the creation of a fairer, more 
efficient and more sustainable property tax system. 
Housing affordability and accessibility has declined significantly in Australia over the past two 
decades and now poses a number of social and economic challenges (Birrell and McCloskey 
2015, 2016; Rowley, Leishman et al. 2017; Yates 2008). Australia’s system of property taxation 
is one of the many factors contributing to this decline in affordability. Calls to reform state and 
local government property taxes in Australia are growing. However, the political barriers have 
been formidable, with distribution challenges, the possibility of short-term impacts on housing 
markets, and federal relations hindering progress.  
This study is one of three project reports within a broader Australian Housing and Urban 
Research Institute Evidence-based Policy Inquiry on pathways to housing tax reform. It 
proposes a nationally coordinated, incremental strategy for the reform of state and local taxation 
of residential property. These reforms are consistent with a fairer and more sustainable housing 
system, and are also designed to be revenue neutral for each state and to improve the 
efficiency of the national tax system. The analysis is informed by a political economy approach 
which seeks to achieve housing and tax policy aims while addressing the political barriers to tax 
reform.  
In doing so, the report addresses the overarching Inquiry research question: 
 What are the best pathways for the development of an integrated housing tax reform 
package which is financially sustainable, politically viable, and addresses tax-related 
distortions in the Australian housing market? 
The project responds to this overall Inquiry question by specifically addressing the following: 
1 What is the most appropriate base on which to levy a recurrent property tax (both in terms of 
valuation methods and exemptions)?  
2 To what extent can increased broad-based recurrent property taxes reduce state and 
territory dependence on property transfer duties over the longer term?  
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3 What revenue-neutral transition strategies (drawing on and expanding the ACT model) can 
be developed to ensure the equitable treatment of taxpayers (such as limiting double 
taxation) when moving from transfer-based to recurrent property taxes?  
4 Can the Commonwealth Government promote state and territory property tax reform through 
quarantining from Commonwealth Grants Commission calculations, and using efficiency 
dividends to fund compensation?  
In answering these four questions, the report advocates a nationally coordinated approach to 
the broad design and administration of subnational residential property taxes while ensuring that 
state and local governments have wide discretion over the levels and incidence of such taxes. It 
draws on the broad analysis undertaken throughout the inquiry, including discussions in Inquiry 
Panel workshops, to contextualise the project within the wider tax and housing policy regimes. 
1.1 Why this research was conducted  
Housing affordability in Australia is declining according to a number of measures, and analysis 
of the future sustainability of the Australian housing system has highlighted how the taxation of 
residential property (both direct and indirect) contributes to housing problems faced by many 
low and middle-income Australians. Detailed accounts of the pathologies of the Australian 
housing tax system (Disney 2006; Wood, Ong et al. 2014; Worthington 2012; Yates 2008) sit 
alongside wider critiques of the national tax system (Commonwealth Government 2015; Henry, 
Harmer et al. 2009; Evans and Krever 2009). These critiques identify how the tax treatment of 
real property and the income derived from it interacts with other factors to accentuate 
problematic housing market outcomes. For example, tax policy influences the provision of new 
housing supply and land use, consumer demand for housing, the level of investment in housing 
relative to other asset classes, methods of financing such investment, labour mobility and the 
capacity for owner-occupiers to move house in response to changing needs (Commonwealth 
Government 2015; Wood, Stewart et al. 2010).  
The significant debates around the relationship between tax policy and housing markets tend to 
pivot on three specific housing-tax relationships, each of which provide the context for the 
respective sub-projects in this Inquiry: the extent to which housing-related income tax 
concessions distort investment decisions, with implications for the distribution of housing assets 
and affordability (see Duncan, et al. 2017, forthcoming); the extent to which retirement income 
policy encourages excessive investment in primary residences (see Whelan, et al. 2017, 
forthcoming); and how the direct taxation of residential property by state, territory and local 
governments impedes residential mobility and affects housing affordability. This report 
addresses the last of these issues.  
Stakeholders, policy-makers and academics argue that state government reliance on transfer 
duties is inefficient and, alongside a shortage of housing supply, constitutes the second-largest 
barrier to mobility and homeownership in Australia (Ingles 2016; Mangioni 2016; Davidoff and 
Leigh 2013; Bateman 2011; Yates 2012). Those arguing for state property tax reform almost 
universally recommend a reconfiguration and broadening of the existing narrow land tax base 
so that it can be used as an efficient and stable revenue alternative to transfer duties. The aim 
of this report is to identify a politically viable pathway to such a reform. 
In this report: 
 We propose administrative reforms focusing on developing nationally consistent valuation 
methods and systems for use by state and local government as well as a national register of 
property owners. There should be further integration of state and local property tax collection 
and enhanced data sharing between state and national revenue authorities (Chapter 4). 
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 We detail a framework for a simpler and fairer transfer duty regime as a foundation for 
more substantive reform. The report models a revenue neutral single rate transfer duty 
regime with a duty free threshold to ensure progressivity by property value (Chapter 5). 
 Having set out a short-term agenda for reforming the administration and design of 
subnational property transfer duties, we propose and model two incremental strategies for 
subnational property taxes which will contribute to creating a fairer and more sustainable 
housing system (Chapter 6): 
 The first reform strategy focuses on shifting the burden of transfer duties on residential 
property from owner-occupiers purchasing lower value properties toward investors and 
those purchasing high value properties.  
 The second (and complementary) reform strategy is a gradual transition from transfer 
duties to broad-based recurrent tax on residential property. Any revenue raised from this 
new property tax would be used to fund reductions in the transfer duty rate.  
Consistent with the broader aims of the Inquiry, the reforms outlined here are intended to 
provide a pathway to property tax reform that balances political imperatives against technical 
policy objectives as a means to address both declining housing affordability and tax reform 
goals.  
In summary, this pathway will: 
 improve the simplicity and consistency of the property tax system 
 provide a revenue-neutral reform pathway for each of the states  
 establish an incremental, adaptable framework designed to minimise political disruption and 
problematic market consequences 
 improve the fairness of the property tax system over time by gradually reducing the relative 
transfer duty paid by purchasers of low value properties 
 contribute to gradually increasing home ownership rates by shifting liability for transfer duty 
from owner-occupiers to investors  
 contribute to housing affordability, residential mobility and the efficiency of the national tax 
system by replacing transfer duties on residential properties with a broad-based recurrent 
property tax. 
The pathway is one element of a broader national strategy to improve the fairness and 
sustainability of the national housing system, but the agenda is an important one that can 
deliver significant economic and social dividends. 
1.2 Policy context  
1.2.1 Housing affordability challenges 
Australia faces a number of significant challenges with respect to housing, including shortfalls in 
some types of housing supply (e.g. low-cost rental), and declining affordability for many 
households which is contributing to rising household stress and an associated decline in home 
ownership rates. Since 2001, those experiencing housing stress across all households has 
remained consistent (in line with overall household growth) at around seven per cent (Rowley 
and Ong 2012)1. Current housing need in Australia is estimated to be 1.3 million households 
                                               
 
1 Housing affordability is often defined in terms of the ‘30/40 rule, based on the measure of a low income 
household (those in the bottom 40% of the needs adjusted or equalised disposable income distribution), paying 
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(just under 14% of households)2. This need is estimated to rise to 1.7 million households by 
2025, revealing a significant ongoing and future shortage in affordable housing, and placing 
increasing pressure on government housing assistance budgets, especially as growing 
numbers of households seek assistance in the private rental market (Rowley, Leishman et al. 
2017). Households more likely to experience housing affordability stress include low-income 
households, renters in the private rental market and home purchasers, particularly first home 
purchasers, single person households and households with children, those under 65 years of 
age, and those who dwell in larger capital cities (Yates and Gabriel 2006; Yates, Milligan et al. 
2007). 
However, housing affordability challenges are more than the financial stress or risk faced by 
households through housing consumption. The reality is that housing affordability is the sum of 
a range of issues including accessibility to affordable housing (housing formation), quality and 
location trade-offs (choice verses constraint) and the range of costs associated with housing 
consumption such as taxes and bill payments (Rowley and Ong 2012). 
For example, housing affordability challenges include the inability to access home ownership. 
Structural support for home ownership (along with ownership-investment) continues to be an 
enduring focus of Australian housing policy (Jacobs 2015). However, in reality, from 2001–10 
house prices have increased well above incomes, and for first home buyers mortgage loans and 
existing home owners have doubled (Rowley and Ong 2012). Home ownership rates are in 
long-term decline across all age groups under 65 years of age, and is particularly salient for the 
25–34 and 35–44-year old cohorts with implications for generational inequality (Wood, Ong et 
al. 2014; Grattan Institute, see ABC 2017)3. One of the constraints for first home buyers is the 
‘deposit gap’4 which is now more than double annual household income (Yates 2016). 
Therefore, unable to buy a dwelling, more households have little option but to rent privately. 
However, affordable private rental too has steadily declined in supply over the last 25 years and 
is increasingly sequestered to locations poorly located in terms of employment options or 
access to services (Yates 2016). 
Housing affordability challenges such as these have increasingly played a role in housing being 
perceived as a social policy tool because it plays a vital role in both shelter and non-shelter 
outcomes. These include access to employment and educational attainment (Burke, Pinnegar 
et al. 2007; Dockery, Feeny et al. 2008) and outcomes across multiple dimensions of wellbeing 
(Smith 2009); the costs of which are also borne by society, not only the individual. Further, 
housing affordability factors play an important role in the creation of spatial wealth polarisation 
(e.g. gentrification), mobility constraints and access to labour markets, as well as the increasing 
disparities between those who can access home ownership and those who can’t, multiplying 
intergenerational inequities (Yates, Milligan et al. 2007). Concurrently, housing policy has been 
implicated in shaping a policy rhetoric inconsistent with government budget commitments. 
Imputed subsidies to home owners through tax expenditures are estimated to be around 
                                               
 
no more than 30 per cent of its gross household income on housing costs. Those exceeding 30 per cent of 
income on household costs are in housing ‘stress’’ (Yates and Gabriel 2006). 
2 Housing ‘need’ is defined as households unable to access market-provided housing or requiring some 
assistance in the private rental market to avoid housing stress. 
3 For example, the 25–34 age cohort dropped from 58 per cent home ownership in 1986 to below 45 per cent in 
2016 (Grattan Institute, see ABC 2017), with proportionately greater declines among lower income households 
(Yates 2016). 
4 The gap between the cost of a median-priced dwelling and what bank finance would cover for a middle-income 
household. 
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$8,0005 per year, $4,000 for investors, around $1,300 in concessions to private renters and 
$1,000 to public housing renter households. This serves to underscore that housing policy is 
primarily oriented towards the more well off, not the disadvantaged. Consequently, there is a 
disconnection in current housing policy between the rhetoric that it serves to assist those on low 
incomes with the reality that it is home owners and private rental investors that government-
directed expenditures actually benefit in practice (Jacobs 2015). 
1.2.2 Tax policy influence on housing markets 
Implicated in housing affordability challenges are housing market dynamics, which are complex 
due to both supply and demand being influenced by a combination of prevailing policy 
instruments, market conditions and structural economic and demographic factors. On the 
demand side, migration and population growth, tax and other financial incentives, the price and 
availability of credit, access to infrastructure and employment as well as broader market 
conditions all impact on housing markets. Similarly, on the supply side, land availability and 
construction costs, existing infrastructure and planning frameworks as well a host of tax and 
financial variables all impact on the availability of residential property.  
Significantly, all three levels of government and a range of statutory and commercial actors 
have an influence on housing markets, highlighting the need for a nationally coordinated 
approach to housing policy. Reforms to state and local government property taxes only 
represent one dimension of a broader agenda to achieve more equitable and sustainable 
housing outcomes. However, it is clear that subnational reforms are integral to a national reform 
agenda. 
In Australia, there are currently three forms of subnational tax on land and residential property: 
transaction duties, state land tax and local government rates which, for the purpose of this 
report, are defined as ‘subnational property taxes’:  
 Transfer duties are levied on the transfer of residential properties in all states and 
territories, although levy systems vary widely across the federation and the rates generally 
vary depending on the value of the property. Most states and territories provide for limited 
exemptions, such as for transfers within a family or personal relationship, but some also 
extend exemptions or concessions to particular groups such as first home buyers or 
charities, or charge premium duties for foreign purchasers. Transaction duties are 
collectively currently worth approximately $16 billion per annum in Australia (Ingles 2016).  
 Land tax is levied by states and territories (except the Northern Territory), although each 
state defines the tax base differently, employing a range of different valuation regimes 
(Mangioni 2016b, 2016c). Most land tax is levied on the ‘unimproved’ or ‘site’ value at 
progressive rates, with some jurisdictions aggregating the value of all land held by an owner 
while others tax each property as a separate entity. States also apply a range of exemptions 
including for primary production, owner-occupied residential housing, and child and aged 
care uses. The exemption of owner-occupied housing excludes approximately 60 per cent of 
land by value (and 75% of residential land) from the tax base.  
 Rates are levied by local government and generally include both land tax and user charge 
components. The land tax (or general rate) component of local government rates are also 
calculated using a mix of valuation methodologies, but are subject to a narrower set of 
exemptions. Concessions are available to certain groups, although the assessment of 
eligibility may not itself be undertaken at the local level. For example, in Tasmania, owner-
                                               
 
5 The primary reason home owners benefit from these subsidies is that imputed rent and capital gains are not 
liable for income tax (Jacobs 2015: 2). 
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occupiers are eligible for a 30 per cent reduction on their council rates bill if they hold a 
Pension Concession Card, Health Care Card or DVA ‘Gold’ card, all of which are 
administered at the national level. 
1.2.3 Arguments for reform  
Subnational property taxes in their various forms raised over $40 billion in 2014–15 which 
represent 10.1 per cent of all taxes collected in Australia (see Section 2.2). These taxes are an 
increasingly important source of revenue for state and local governments yet, despite their 
significance, there is a consensus that they are poorly designed and reform would deliver a 
number of dividends. Analysis of the existing subnational property tax regime presented in 
recent Australian inquiries and reviews, outlined in more detail in Chapter 2, can be summarised 
as follows: 
Transfer duties on residential properties: 
 regarded as one of the least efficient taxes in Australia 
 consensus that transfer duties should, in the longer term, be abolished and replaced with a 
broad-based recurrent property tax 
 abolition would deliver significant economic dividends and enhance residential mobility and 
put downward pressure on housing prices as future tax liabilities are capitalised 
 justifications for retaining the status quo are premised on claims that transfer duty is a 
significant source of state revenue, easy to collect and concealed in property transaction 
costs and that in booming markets it may deter property speculation. 
Recurrent state land and property taxes: 
 an efficient and stable source of revenue 
 depending on design, captures unearned economic rent and can function as a wealth tax 
 current state land taxes are imposed on a narrow base and should be broadened to include 
principal place of residence 
 yield from a broad-based recurrent property tax should be increased to fund the abolition of 
state transfer duties 
 justifications for retaining the status quo include the arguments that a broad-based recurrent 
land tax represents a new impost on many households, is a relatively visible tax and, given 
the tax liability is based on property value rather than income, may disadvantage asset-rich 
and income-poor households in the absence of an appropriate deferral regime (Productivity 
Commission 2017b). 
Local government rates: 
 a broad-based and efficient revenue base 
 there is scope to improve administration through consistent valuation methods and shared 
administration 
 the collection of a state property tax and local government rates could be integrated. 
1.2.4 Political barriers to reform 
Although it is widely acknowledged that there would be significant housing, fiscal and wider 
economic benefits from reforming Australia’s system of subnational property taxation, there are 
three broad challenges to reform as follows. 
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Fiscal and housing market impacts: 
The primary purpose of tax systems is to raise revenue, but taxation also affects markets and 
commercial decision-making. Given that the residential property sector is a large component of 
the Australian economy and that housing is a significant store of private wealth, the potential 
impact of changes to housing tax policy on state budgets or broader market conditions is a 
significant barrier to reform. As discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3, one of the major 
barriers to a switch from transfer duties to a recurrent property tax is the revenue shortfall that 
would have to be absorbed by state governments under some transition models. Policy-makers 
are also very sensitive to the possibility that tax policy changes will produce significant short-
term decline in housing markets. The aim of policy is to achieve a gradual reduction in real 
property prices over an extended period—a ‘soft landing’ rather than a ‘crash’. The incremental 
reform strategies proposed in this report are designed to minimise the risk of significant budget 
or market disruption. 
Distributional impacts on households: 
The politics of tax reform is notoriously difficult because it inevitably has distributional 
consequences. As the academic literature identifies, those who face a higher tax burden are 
more likely to mobilise against reform than the beneficiaries of tax policy change (Eccleston 
2007). There is also a temporal dimension in that the costs of higher taxes become apparent 
immediately, whereas the benefits of reform often take years to eventuate. The property tax 
reforms proposed in this report are not immune to these challenges. Indeed, the revenue-
neutral design of the reforms presented inevitably means that the existing tax liability will be 
redistributed among property owners. However, the reforms are designed to ensure that the 
redistribution is relatively minor and that under almost any scenario most property owners (and 
would-be owners) would be better off relative to the status quo. Finally, reflecting the broader 
goals of property tax reform (Chapter 3), the majority of tax increases falls on the owners of 
higher value properties. In short, the reforms proposed in this project can claim to be enhancing 
the fairness and sustainability of the subnational property tax system. 
Intergovernmental coordination: 
Australia’s federal system introduces a further layer of complexity to the subnational property 
tax reform agenda. In particular, financial relations between the Commonwealth Government 
and the states have significant implications (Eccleston, Woolley et al. 2013; Eccleston and 
Smith 2015; Smith 2012; Warren 2010; Wood, Stewart et al. 2010b). Some of the challenges 
posed by Australia’s federal system include: 
 the limited fiscal means states have to fund the abolition of transfer duties without increasing 
other property taxes 
 the absence of a nationally coordinated approach to the administration of state and local 
property taxes 
 risks that some states may be penalised for implementing property tax reforms due to the 
operation of Australia’s fiscal equalisation regime.  
Finally, given the considerable political sensitivities associated with housing-related tax policy 
(Evans 2011), a number of powerful lobby groups advocate in favour of the policy status quo 
(Gurran and Phibbs 2016) and the prevailing paradigm and cultural norms that structure the 
discourse of tax reform (Blunden 2016; Khoury 2015; Marriott 2010; Passant 2014; Worthington 
2012). These dynamics have historically been reinforced by institutionalised relations between 
major political parties and commercial interests which corrode institutional capacity to implement 
reform proposals (Eccleston and Marsh 2011).  
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1.3 Existing research  
Most of the academic literature on state tax reform seeks to address issues related to policy 
criteria, such as equity, efficiency, simplicity, and sustainability (Wood, Stewart et al. 2010), or 
the question of the economic viability of changes to the tax mix. In Australia, this literature is 
underpinned and informed by a number of key national reviews and reports, particularly the 
Henry review of Australia’s future tax system (Henry, Harmer et. al. 2009); the National 
Commission of Audit report (Commonwealth Government 2014) and the Re:think tax discussion 
paper (Commonwealth Government 2015). Similarly, state level reviews have also informed key 
debates for over a decade, including in the ACT (ACT Treasury 2012), Tasmania (Government 
of Tasmania 2010) and Western Australia (Government of Western Australia 2007), the New 
South Wales review of the local government rating system (IPART NSW 2016), Homes for 
Victorians (Government of Victoria 2017) and Taking on tax: reforming NSW property taxes 
(NSW Business Chamber and NSW Council of Social Service 2016). 
Three key issues emerge from these reviews regarding subnational property taxation which 
have been instrumental in shaping the policy context noted above. These reports and the 
associated literature are marked by a notable degree of consensus among policy-makers and 
academic researchers. In particular, there is agreement that: 
1 Transaction duties on property transfers are an inefficient tax, subject to housing market 
volatility, and responsible for under-utilisation of housing stock and constrained housing 
mobility. This noted, there is less consensus with respect to how the revenue lost to state 
governments by abolishing transfer duty would be replaced, even if a broad-based recurrent 
property tax was introduced. 
2 Introducing a recurrent property tax on a broad base with few exemptions would bring 
Australia into line with the more efficient and stable tax bases used in other OECD countries. 
However, again, despite consensus on the net benefits of a recurrent property tax, questions 
of how property is valued and applied evokes a variety of responses, with arguments put in 
favour of levying tax based on land value, land size, capital improved value or even land 
amenity (e.g. Ingles 2016; Evans 2011; Wood, Stewart et al. 2010b; Mangioni and Warren 
2014).  
3 Regardless of the repeated and rational arguments for the abolition of transfer duty and the 
introduction of recurrent property taxes, political economy drivers will shape how the reform 
agenda unfolds. Beyond the question of transitional arrangements, and as flagged in Section 
1.2 above, improving intergovernmental cooperation is increasingly seen as an important 
prerequisite for change.  
There is less consensus on housing tax policy generally among policy stakeholders, which 
perhaps reflects their proximity to the politics of reform. However, there is common ground 
among most parties with respect to state tax reform, especially with regard to transfer duty 
abolition, but also the application of a broad-based property tax—although predictably support 
for abolishing transfer duty is stronger than support for increasing recurrent property taxes (e.g.  
Property Council of Australia 2015; Real Estate Institute of South Australia and Real Estate 
Institute of Australia 2015). There is also more support for ‘reform’ in the abstract than there is 
for concrete policy proposals with clear winners and losers. The positions taken by various 
stakeholders—the community sector, business groups, and property development and real 
estate industries—underline the point made by Winter and Wood (2012: 25), that carefully-
designed and appropriate transition arrangements are critical to containing the impact of tax 
reform.  
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1.4 Research methods  
The methods used in this report included an extensive review of policy developments, collation 
of stakeholder views, and detailed modelling of housing market data.  
1.4.1 Policy review 
The reform proposals are based on an extensive review of the relevant technical and policy 
literature as well as the associated political debates. Reform proposals have also been 
discussed with a range of stakeholders over the period of the study, including as part of the 
Inquiry Panel meetings. 
1.4.2 Scope, data and modelling methodology 
Reform proposals are subject to detailed modelling in Chapters 5 and 6. In all cases our 
sampling frame includes all residential properties in the six Australian states. The modelling 
excludes the ACT and the Northern Territory because, as detailed in Chapter 2, the former is 
already on the path towards phasing out transfer duties while the subnational property tax 
regime in the latter differs significantly from that found in the states. The absence of territory-
level land tax and a complex duty schedule makes it difficult to model subnational property tax 
reforms in the Northern Territory. 
The modelling presented in Chapters 5 and 6 focuses on the taxation of residential property as 
the report’s focus is on housing policy. Comprehensive and contemporary data on non-
residential property (commercial property and agricultural land) transactions is in any case not 
available.  
1.4.3 Data 
Data on Residential Property 'Sold' and 'Stock' in 2015–16 was extracted and made available by 
CoreLogic. The format of this data (residential property in fiscal year 2015–16) is detailed in 
Appendix 1. The dataset includes the value of all residential property transactions and an 
automated valuation of all residential properties in the Australian states. Property values are 
grouped in $25,000 sets from $0 to $600,000; $50,000 sets from $600,000 to $2 million; 
$100,000 sets from $2 million to $3 million; $250,000 sets from $3 million to $4 million, and one 
set for $4 million and over. These data form the basis of all modelling presented in this report. 
The structure of these data are outlined in Appendix 1 and the parameter assumptions 
informing the modelling presented in the report are presented in Appendix 3. It should be noted 
that the CoreLogic property transaction and value dataset on which modelling is based is not 
publically available but was provided to the research team, under licence, free of charge. 
Data on transfer duty schedules is detailed in Appendix 2 and was obtained from NSW Treasury 
(2016: TRP 16-01). 
Residential property in the CoreLogic data relates to 'Houses’ or 'Units’. Generally, a house is 
defined as any dwelling situated on a single title. A unit is any property that shares a title with 
another property or a number of other properties. Property types are derived based on the land 
use description which varies from state to state. Vacant land is not included. 
The transfer duty model constructed using the CoreLogic data only includes residential property 
even though state transfer duties are much broader in scope in terms of their base, as 
demonstrated for the New South Wales case in Table 3 below. Moreover, modelling the New 
South Wales transfer duty system approximates but does not fully capture New South Wales 
residential land-related transfer duty as reported by Revenue NSW. This difference is because 
the Revenue NSW dataset has a different scope to the CoreLogic data. For example, the 
estimate of transfer duty on residential properties using CoreLogic data is $5,238 million for 
2015–16 while the Revenue NSW reported revenue from residential land-related transfers was 
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$6,470 million. This is also at a time when the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has 
reported New South Wales’ total transfer duty in 2015–16 as $8,367 million, which contrasts 
with the Revenue NSW figure of $8,736 million (see Table 4 below). 
Table 3: NSW Office of State Revenue figures on transfer duty, 2015–16 
Property type Number of 
transactions 
Total duty 
paid ($m) 
Average duty 
paid ($) 
All land 223,676 8,417 37,629 
Non-residential land 16,344 1,947 119,119 
Residential land 207,332 6,470 31,205 
Other: sale of business, 
superannuation and nominal duty 
44,795 320 7,134 
Total 268,471 8,736 32,541 
Source: Revenue NSW (2017). 
Similarly, the modelling presented in Chapters 5 and 6 is focused exclusively on residential 
property as opposed to all properties (including commercial and primary production) which are 
subject to state transfer duties. Table 4 below shows the proportion of transfer duty estimated in 
our model using CoreLogic data relative to the total quantum of transfer duty reported by the 
ABS for each state. The modelling conducted in this report therefore focuses on a significant 
subset of all properties and provides detailed insights into the feasibility and impact of reforms 
as they apply to residential property only. 
Table 4: Benchmarking of CoreLogic (modelling) data against ABS data on transfer 
(conveyancing) duty revenue, 2015–16 
State 
Transfer duties 
on conveyances: 
ABS data (cat. no. 5506) 
Transfer duties: 
own estimates 
(using CoreLogic data) 
Percentage of transfer 
duties estimated 
(using CoreLogic 
data) 
NSW 8,367 5,238* 62.6 
VIC 6,008 3,950 65.7 
QLD 3,005 2,014 67.0 
WA 1,743 841 48.3 
SA 868 660 76.0 
TAS 216 127 58.7 
NT 114 64 56.6 
ACT 286 172 60.0 
All 20,607 13,066 63.4 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017 [5506]; CoreLogic data (supplied); authors’ own estimates. 
*Average is estimated to be $33,457 which contrasts with the Revenue NSW average of $31,205. 
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Transfer duty and land tax modelling method 
Modelling of transfer duties in 2015–16 for the various states involves a direct application of the 
state data on the transfer duty schedule (see NSW Treasury 2016: TRP 16-01) to the CoreLogic 
data on Residential Properties 'Sold' over that same period.  
The modelling presented is revenue neutral for individual states in that the reform scenarios are 
designed to deliver the same quantum of revenue as existing 2015–16 transfer duties 
schedules applied to the CoreLogic data set (see discussion above). In other words, reforms 
are designed so they have no net impact on state budgets. This modelling also assumes that 
there is no related behavioural response and our proposed rate schedule is applied directly to 
each state’s CoreLogic data on residential properties ‘stock’ over that same period.  
It is our view that this is reasonable because by assuming no behavioural response, we are 
clarifying the question of whether such a change would be feasible prior to considering 
behavioural responses (which might not emerge for some time). Once a case is made for reform 
independently of positive behavioural responses, it will be possible to undertake further work to 
establish likely behavioural responses and their potential impact on policy. 
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  Taking stock of Australia’s property tax regime 
‘Property taxes’ encapsulate a range of taxes on property, wealth and associated 
transactions. This chapter focuses on recurrent taxes on residential property, 
including state land taxes and levies, local government rates and transfer duties on 
the sale of residential property. 
Australia and its states and territories are more reliant on property taxes than the 
OECD average. More importantly, our existing system is disproportionately 
dependent on transfer duties, which in their current form are inefficient and 
contribute to problems in the housing system. 
A number of other countries are reforming their property tax regimes to promote 
greater affordability and stability in their housing markets.  
There is considerable variation across the different Australian states and territories 
with respect to the way in which land tax, transfer duty and municipal rates are 
designed, levied and administered.  
These variations complicate the prospects for reform, but there is an emerging 
consensus on appropriate policy directions, including the adoption of a ‘layered’ 
approach to transfer duties, described in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
2.1 Defining property tax 
In this chapter, we describe in detail the existing subnational residential property tax regime in 
Australia. Reflecting international practice, we use the term ‘property taxes’ to refer to all taxes, 
duties, rates and charges (e.g. emergency services levies) that are applied on the basis of land 
and property, while noting there is a degree of conceptual ambiguity between land taxes and 
associated user charges. In addition, as noted in Chapter 1, we are specifically concerned with 
the taxation of residential property as opposed to the taxation of land and property used for 
commercial purposes or primary production. This emphasis arises from our primary aim of 
contributing to the housing policy evidence base and from the limited availability of consistent 
data across different classes of property. The application of specific terms used throughout the 
report is clarified in Box 1 below. 
Box 1: Terminology 
To denote specific taxes, we use terms accepted in the international literature including 
‘recurrent taxes on land’ or ‘land tax’, and ‘transfer duties’ on land (rather than the everyday 
‘stamp duty’ or ‘conveyancing duty’). In Chapter 4 we argue for the implementation of a 
recurrent property tax on a broad base and using Capital Improved Value (CIV) as the 
valuation method. To distinguish this proposal from the more narrowly-based existing state 
land tax, we use the term ‘property tax’ or ‘recurrent property tax’ to refer to it. 
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Most analysis of subnational property taxes in Australia draws a distinction between the taxes 
levied by state governments and the rates charged by local governments. However, we argue 
that it is important to consider the combined impact of local government rates and state-level 
recurrent taxes on property. Australia is unusual in this regard; it is one of the few countries 
where two levels of government impose a tax on the same tax base (Mangioni 2016c). As well 
as adding administrative complexity, this characteristic also complicates an assessment of the 
likely impact of reform: ultimately housing markets and the decisions people make within those 
markets will be shaped by the combined impact of both levels of taxation on households. The 
administrative case for greater integration of state government land and property taxes and 
local government rates is presented in Chapter 4. 
Another important distinction is that between recurrent taxes on property based on their 
assessed value, and non-recurrent duties and charges on property-related transactions. This 
distinction is central to the current debate about reforming the Australian property tax system as 
it produces the most complex implementation issues. It is also central to the OECD framework 
(OECD 2016) for classifying sources of taxation, which establishes six distinct categories within 
an overall property tax classification code of 4000: 
 recurrent taxes on immoveable property (4100) 
 recurrent taxes on net wealth (individual and corporate) (4200) 
 estate, inheritance and gift taxes (4300) 
 taxes on financial and capital transactions (4400) 
 non-recurrent taxes on property (net wealth and other property) (4500) 
 other recurrent taxes on property (excluding those already listed in the classification) (4600). 
This conceptualisation is reflected in the overview of national property taxes in Section 2.2. This 
report does not include consideration of estate, inheritance and gift taxes; although Australia’s 
lack of these has been criticised (Stilwell 2011; Henry, Harmer et al. 2009: Chapter A3), they sit 
outside the scope of this research. Our analysis focuses on revenue sources that fall within the 
4100 and 4400 categories within the OECD framework. 
2.2 Australia and other countries compared 
Housing price inflation and its associated policy challenges are being experienced to varying 
degrees across a wide range of international property markets. While there are common drivers, 
such as historically low interest rates and a strong credit supply (Turner 2015), there is also a 
good deal of variation between different nations and regions, highlighting the extent to which 
residential housing markets are influenced by a host of domestic and local factors. Yet the 
common policy challenges facing a number of countries, combined with the wide range of 
responses that have been implemented, provide a useful baseline for comparing Australia’s 
property tax regime with other jurisdictions, and an opportunity to assess relevant recent trends 
in property tax policy in these countries. 
2.2.1 International comparisons 
Using the definitions of property taxes outlined above (Section 2.1) we can see from Figure 2 
below that, when tax is considered as a proportion of GDP, Australia has a relatively high 
dependence on property taxes (40% above OECD average) although the UK, France and 
Canada are higher still. When property tax is considered as a proportion of all taxation revenue, 
as in Figure 3 below, Australia’s overall reliance on property tax is further above the OECD 
average, in part because overall tax to GDP in Australia is well below the OECD average. 
Perhaps of greater significance is the unusual mix of taxes in Australia’s property tax regime: 
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Australia’s reliance on non-recurrent taxation on transactions is far in excess of the other 
comparison countries. These comparisons underscore the point made in various reviews 
(Henry, Harmer et al. 2009; Commonwealth of Australia 2015; ACT Treasury 2012) that while 
Australia is not undertaxed, it is poorly taxed and overly dependent on transaction-based taxes 
on property (Mangioni 2016c). 
Figure 2: Selected property taxes as a proportion of total GDP, selected countries and 
OECD average, 2014 
Source: OECD 2016. 
Figure 3: Selected property taxes as a proportion of total tax revenue, selected countries 
and OECD average, 2014 
Source: OECD 2016a. 
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Australia’s existing regime of transaction taxes is problematic for a number of reasons. First, in 
terms of economic efficiency, taxing transactions acts as a disincentive for owners wanting to 
move to more appropriate accommodation, hindering labour mobility and acting as a barrier to 
‘downsizing’. Second, evidence suggests that shifting the property tax mix to a recurrent tax on 
property values will put downward pressure on property prices improving housing affordability. 
Finally, revenue from transaction-based property taxes can be extremely volatile given its 
dependence on the volume and price of property transactions (Henry, Harmer et al. 2009: 253–
254; Productivity Commission 2017b). As reproduced in Figure 4 below, modelling undertaken 
as part of the Commonwealth Government’s Re:Think tax review found that of the taxes 
modelled, transfer duties imposed the highest level of marginal excess burden on the economy, 
meaning that the impact of raising revenue from these taxes on the consumption of goods and 
services by households is considerable and detrimental (Commonwealth Government 2015: 
24–25). By contrast, municipal rates and land tax (on the existing narrow base) both imposed a 
negative marginal excess burden (Commonwealth Government 2015: 25). 
Figure 4: Analysis of marginal excess burden of key Australian taxes 
Source: Reproduced from Commonwealth Government (2015: 25). 
A further important complication arises from the sharing of the property tax base between local 
government (rates) and state government (land tax). These two revenue sources are designed 
and levied differently and billed separately, and this duplication results in higher compliance and 
administrative costs than would otherwise be the case. It therefore has the potential to hinder 
the broadening of more efficient recurrent taxes in the Australian property tax regime. 
2.2.2 International trends in property taxation 
Although there is a technical consensus that transaction duties should be phased out in the 
longer term, transaction-based taxes are being used in some international property markets to 
curb speculation and investor demand in the hope of curbing rapid price growth. This 
international evidence is of direct relevance to the current housing tax debate in Australia 
highlighting the potential role of well-designed transfer duties in the short to medium term.  
For example, the Smith Institute, a UK think tank, has advocated the introduction of a property 
speculation tax modelled on existing taxes applied in Germany and Malaysia, as well as China, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. It would be directed primarily at overseas investors and short-term 
buyers (those selling properties within a set period of purchasing them), with the revenue 
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hypothecated into affordable housing provision (Heywood and Hackett 2013). Such a tax, it is 
argued, would not need to be a permanent or ubiquitous feature of the national tax regime, but 
could be used when and where appropriate or necessary to dampen investor demand and 
reduce the risk of housing bubbles (Haywood and Hackett 2013: 14). More recently, analysis of 
the London market has highlighted the role of increasing transfer duties on high-value 
properties and second or subsequent homes with removing some, though not all, of the heat 
from the market, particularly that coming from domestic buyers (Miller 2017). 
In Hong Kong, transfer duty rates depend on the value of the property, but a special additional 
duty is charged on properties that are resold within 36 months of being purchased (Government 
of Hong Kong 2017). The provincial government in British Columbia has recently introduced a 
15 per cent tax on foreign buyers of properties in metropolitan Vancouver, and the city of 
Vancouver has added a 1 per cent tax on vacant properties. Media commentary has drawn 
attention to the unintended consequences of these latter measures, especially the displacement 
of speculative investment into other Canadian markets (Middleton 2017)—although it is worth 
noting this claim has been attributed to a real estate firm specialising in luxury properties, which 
has depicted the policies as unwarranted government interference in the market (see Sothebys 
International Realty Canada 2016: 6).  
More generally, the European Commission has argued that taxation policies are not the best 
mechanism with which to control the risk of an over-valued housing market. However, the 
Commission also notes that ‘it is important the structure of property and housing taxation does 
not contribute to such increases in asset prices or bubbles’ (Eurostat 2015: 43). 
2.3 Australian states and territories compared 
2.3.1 Transfer duties 
Australia’s reliance on volatile transfer duties is clearly evident in the data presented in Figure 5 
below. While land tax and municipal rates follow a consistent trajectory, revenue from transfer 
duties fluctuates significantly, most notably during the global financial crisis of 2008, when it fell 
abruptly and substantially. Although all three types of tax are levied in some way on property 
values, the volatility in the transfer duty yield highlights how transaction taxes are linked directly 
to sales prices and volumes that vary significantly across the economic cycle.  
The close relationship between transfer duty revenue flows and volatility in the housing market 
is further highlighted when differences between the states are considered. Figure 6 below 
illustrates how transfer duty revenue has grown significantly in recent years in the booming 
housing markets of New South Wales and Victoria, while growth since the GFC has been more 
subdued in Queensland and Western Australia and unremarkable in South Australia, Tasmania 
and the territories. 
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Figure 5: Taxation revenue from selected sources, all states and territories (state and 
local government), 1998–99 to 2014–15 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009, 2016. 
 Note: Where there were discrepancies between data cubes, the later figures are shown. 
Figure 6: Transfer duty revenue, all states and territories (state and local government), 
1998–99 to 2014–15 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009, 2016. 
Note: Where there were discrepancies between data cubes, the later figures are shown. 
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Figure 6 highlights the differences in the extent to which each state relies on transfer duty. 
Table 5 below shows revenue from land tax, municipal rates and transfer duties, as well as total 
taxation, on a per capita basis for the six Australian states. It indicates the range of tax mixes 
used in different jurisdictions and also the different levels of reliance on state taxation more 
broadly. It also draws out evidence of substitution—for example, in Tasmania and Queensland, 
where transfer duties and land tax both deliver less per capita, municipal rates per capita are 
relatively higher. The differences in state tax regimes are explored more fully in Section 2.3.2 
below. 
Table 5: Taxation revenue ($ per capita) from selected sources, all states and territories 
(state and local government), 2014–15 
 NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT ACT All 
Land taxes 324 295 204 329 285 163 0 246 281 
Municipal rates 520 752 704 808 770 703 462 962 673 
Transfer duties 970 853 565 534 651 374 1,083 553 775 
Total taxation 
revenue 
3,949 3,885 3,357 3,394 4,148 2,635 3,385 3,524 3,754 
Source: Calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015, 2016. 
2.3.2 Differences between and among states and territories 
The political economy of property taxation in Australia is characterised by significant variation 
between states and territories and across local government areas. This variation is a 
consequence of differences in tax rates and structures, combined with different administrative 
mechanisms, and different patterns of property use, land values, markets and broader 
economic conditions across the federation. These variations have implications for reform 
pathways as they can lead to highly localised and politically problematic distributional issues 
and, in the case of policy design and administration differences, add to the implementation 
challenge of reform.  
Transfer duties 
As noted earlier, the revenue quantum raised by each type of property tax varies widely across 
the federation. However, variations in policy design and rate structures also play a part, with the 
states and territories each their own regime for calculating the amount payable. The different 
approaches to transfer duties are summarised in Table 6 below. From this summary, it can be 
seen that, with the exception of the Northern Territory, a similar approach to pricing duties exists 
across jurisdictions (noting that the ACT Government is currently engaged in a long-term 
strategy to phase out transfer duties completely in favour of a broad-based land tax, which 
means their system is ultimately directed at a different policy goal). Although the transfer duty 
schedules in each of the states vary widely, they nonetheless apply a progressive scale 
(Victoria is a partial exception), by which the marginal transfer duty rate increases with the value 
of the property. That is, the underlying principle of how to levy transfer duty remains consistent, 
but the rates and values differ according to the local housing market and state revenue 
requirements. There is considerable variation at a technical, legal level with respect to 
definitions of concepts such as ‘dutiable value’.  
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Table 6: Structure of transfer duty regimes (summary), all states and territories, 2015–
2016 
NSW VIC 
State-wide median: $653,697 State-wide median: $635,872 
Value Duty Value Duty 
$0–14,000 1.25% of total $0–25,000 1.40% of total 
$14,001–30,000 $175+1.50% $25,001–130,000 $350+2.40% 
$30,001–80,000 $415+1.75% $130,001–440,000 $2,870+5.00% 
$80,001–300,000 $1290+3.50% $440,001–550,000 $18,370+6.00% 
$300,001–1,000,000 $8990+4.50% $550,001–960,000 $28,070+6.00% 
$1,000,001–3,000,000 $40,490+5.50% $960,001+ 5.50% of total 
3,000,001+ $150,490+7.00% Figures include concession provided on PPR 
purchases valued at less than $550,000 
QLD WA 
State-wide median: $424,966 State-wide median: $481,605 
Value Duty Value Duty 
$0–5000 Nil $0–120,000 1.90% of total 
$5001–75,000 1.50% of total $120,001–150,000 $2,280+2.85% 
$75,001–540,000 $1,050+3.50% $150,001–360,000 $3,135+3.80% 
$540,001–1,000,000 $17,325+4.50% $360,001–725,000 $11,115+4.75% 
$1,000,001+ $38,025+5.75% $725,001+ $28,453+5.15%. 
SA TAS 
State-wide median: $381,059 State-wide median: $283,886 
Value Duty Value Duty 
$0–12,000 1.00% $0–3000 $50 
$12,001–30,000 $120+2.00% $3,001–25,000 $50+1.75% 
$30,001–50,000 $480+3.00% $25,001–75,000 $435+2.25% 
$50,001–100,000 $1,080+3.50% $75,001–200,000 $1,560+3.50% 
$100,001–200,000 $2,830+4.00% $200,001–375,000 $5,935+4.00% 
$200,001–250,000 $6,830+4.25% $375,001–725,000 $12,935+4.25% 
$250,001–300,000 $8,955+4.75% $725,001+ $27,810+4.50%. 
$300,001–500,000 $11,330+5.00%   
$500,001+ $21,330+5.50%   
Source: NSW Treasury TRP 16-01. 
Note: A more detailed version of this table can be found in Appendix 2. 
The most noticeable variation in transfer duty regimes occurs with respect to concessions 
(detailed in Appendix 2). Beyond statutory exemptions to particular groups (e.g. changes in 
ownership within relationships or charitable purchasers) which are relatively standard across the 
states and territories, most jurisdictions also provide more specific concessions, exemptions and 
special rates to particular categories of purchasers. In particular, first home buyers in many 
states qualify for a reduction in or an exemption from paying transfer duties. A number of states 
have also extended first home buyer concessions to other categories of owner-occupiers, 
although these are generally limited to properties below a particular threshold. Some states 
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provide concessional rates to purchasers of off-the-plan apartments, while other states charge 
foreign purchasers an additional duty, and in others, multiple purchases by the same person 
can be aggregated into one for the purposes of calculating the transfer duty payable. In New 
South Wales, transactions involving ‘premium’ properties valued at over $3 million attract a 
higher rate of duty.  
The use of these concessions suggest that states and territories are trying to use transfer duty 
policy to achieve a range of goals, including responding to political pressures around housing 
affordability. Thus, low-income owner-occupiers and first home buyers are granted concessional 
transfer duties, while foreign purchasers are charged more.  
Land tax 
It is important to note that ‘land tax’ as it is currently applied is only paid on investment 
properties, rather than on principal places of residence. As with transfer duty, most of the states 
and territories adopt an approach that is broadly similar (tax is payable based on the value of 
the land, according to a progressive scale), but again, as with transfer duty, the precise rates 
and thresholds applied vary widely. Table 7 below indicates for each jurisdiction the valuation 
methods and tax-free thresholds (i.e. the land value at which land tax becomes payable) that 
apply. 
Table 7: Land tax valuation methods and tax-free thresholds, all states and territories, 
2015–16 
State Valuation method (summary) 
Tax-free threshold for 
residential properties ($) 
NSW Three-year average of unimproved land values  432,000 
VIC Aggregate value of land owned 250,000 
QLD Three-year average of land values 600,000 
WA Aggregate unimproved value of land 300,000 
SA Aggregate value of land 323,000 
TAS Aggregate value of land 24,999 
NT Not applicable (land tax not applied)  
ACT Rolling three-year average of unimproved land 
values 
None 
Source: New South Wales Treasury 2016. 
In addition, a wide range of exemptions are applied in all states and territories that significantly 
reduce the base and thus the revenue that can be derived. In the Northern Territory, no land tax 
is levied at all. In all other states and territories, principal places of residence and land used for 
primary production are exempt from land tax (with some caveats for residential properties 
owned by certain types of trusts or companies or, in relation to some productive land, providing 
certain conditions are met), and conditional exemptions also apply to properties owned by 
charities, religious groups or educational bodies. It is also important to note that most states 
aggregate the value of multiple properties held by the same owner for the purposes of 
calculating land tax liabilities. As a result, ‘mum and dad’ investors with a single property face a 
lower average land tax liability relative to larger or institutional investors, a bias which may deter 
institutional investment in residential property. States also impose other types of exemptions, 
although these are not necessarily identical from state to state. Most commonly, aged care 
centres, caravan parks and similar types of property are exempted (New South Wales Treasury 
2016). These exemptions are relatively consistent, in contrast to the array of concessional 
arrangements in relation to transfer duties, but the breadth of property types that are exempt 
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means that they also pose major political barriers to the introduction of any reform that sought to 
widen the land tax base due to the large number of households and organisations that would be 
affected. 
Municipal rates 
The variability in municipal rates regimes across Australia’s 537 or so local government areas is 
even more pronounced than the differences between the states with regard to land tax and 
transfer duty. Much of this variation, however, arises from the range of valuation methods in use 
for determining rates payments rather than the structure of exemptions or concessions (see 
Table 8 below) as the tax base itself is broad and there are minimal exemptions. There is a 
broad consensus on the need for a more consistent approach to valuations and thus rate setting 
across the country (IPART 2016).  
Table 8: Municipal rates valuation methods, all states and territories 
 State Valuation methods 
NSW Unimproved value 
VIC Permitted: 
Unimproved value 
Capital improved value 
Annual rental value 
In use: 
Capital improved value 
Annual rental value 
QLD Unimproved value 
WA Rural land and mining and petroleum interests: 
Unimproved value 
Non-rural land: 
Annual rental value 
SA Permitted: 
Unimproved value 
Capital improved value 
Annual rental value 
In majority use: 
Capital improved value 
TAS Permitted: 
Unimproved value 
Capital improved value 
Annual rental value 
In use: 
Annual rental value (most 
widely used) 
Capital improved value 
NT Permitted: 
Unimproved value 
Capital improved value 
 Annual rental value 
In use: 
Unimproved value 
ACT Unimproved value 
Source: IPART (2016). 
As noted above, Australia is also unusual for having both state and local governments imposing 
recurrent taxes on property, and there is an argument for a more centralised approach to 
administration, while still allowing local control over actual charges (Mangioni 2016c; Passant 
and McLaren 2011).  
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As well as differences in valuation methods, local government itself varies widely across 
Australia, with considerable contrast in the size of municipalities (both in area and in 
population), the range of responsibilities taken on by local government with some councils 
confining themselves to rates, rubbish and roads, while others have taken on broader 
responsibilities, such as recreational infrastructure, affordable housing provision and human 
service delivery. Predictably there is a clear relationship between the scope of service delivery 
and the revenue-raising capacity of a local government. 
2.4 The integration of state and local property taxes 
The tax base used as the basis for local government rates is significantly broader than the base 
used for state land taxes and, as is outlined in greater detail in Chapter 4, a number of reports 
and commentators have outlined the economic and administrative dividends that would result 
from the integration of local government rates and state land taxes (Passant and McLaren 2011; 
Henry, Harmer et al. 2009; Mangioni 2016c). This integration has been occurring for over a 
decade with state governments using the local government rates base and collection system to 
collect a growing number of hypothecated levies (see Table 9 and Box 2 below). This strategy 
has been effective both politically and in terms of achieving technical policy goals, but is not 
without risks. This was demonstrated by the NSW Government’s May 2017 decision to scrap a 
proposal to impose a new fire and emergency service levy using the local government rates 
base (ABC 2017). The NSW case highlights the need to be transparent about the objectives of 
reform and attentive to the distributional consequences. 
Table 9: Municipal rates valuation methods and additional levies, all states and territories 
State 
State levies on 
property base 
Levy details 
NSW Fire and 
Emergency 
Services Levy  
Announced as applying from 1 July 2017 but subsequently deferred 
indefinitely 
Hypothecated to emergency, fire and rescue services 
To be collected as part of municipal rates 
Level was to be determined once July 2016 property values and 
emergency services agency budgets for 2017–18 were known 
VIC Fire Services 
Property Levy 
Applied from 1 July 2013 
Collected as part of municipal rates, based on capital improved value 
Hypothecated to fire services 
Provides 87.5% and 77.5% respectively of Metropolitan Fire Brigade 
and Country Fire Authority budgets 
QLD Emergency 
Management 
Levy 
Collected as part of municipal rates 
Hypothecated to fire and emergency services 
WA Emergency 
Services Levy 
Applied from 1 July 2003 
Collected as part of municipal rates 
Hypothecated to emergency, fire and rescue services 
Budgeted so as to raise $338,891,000 in 2016–17 
SA Emergency 
Services Levy 
Applied since 1998; Billing by Revenue SA 
Levied on fixed and some moveable property 
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State 
State levies on 
property base 
Levy details 
Hypothecated to dedicated fund for use by emergency, fire and 
rescue services 
TAS Fire Service 
Contribution/Rate 
Collected as part of municipal rates on behalf of Tasmania Fire 
Service 
Levied on all rateable land with a $39 minimum payment 
NT None Emergency services funded from consolidated revenue 
ACT Fire and 
Emergency 
Services Levy 
Collected as part of municipal rates on all rateable properties 
Hypothecated to fire and emergency services 
Safer Families 
Levy 
Applied from 1 July 2016 
Flat levy of $30 on all rateable residential and rural land to fund reform 
to family violence programs 
Source: Compiled by the authors from state government websites. 
Box 2: State government access to local government rates 
2.5 Current reform proposals 
Given the challenges facing Australia’s housing system combined with numerous critiques of 
the subnational property tax regime, it is not surprising that there have been persistent and 
growing calls for reform. Generally specific proposals have been informed by the prevailing 
fiscal orthodoxy and have advocated policy change designed to enhance the neutrality and 
efficiency of the property tax base by gradually replacing transfer duties with broad-based 
recurrent property or land taxes.  
There is a clear technical consensus on the desirability of such an approach in the academic 
literature (Chapter 3). This is reflected in the type of reforms proposed in national and state tax 
policy reviews, such as the Australia’s Future Tax System (‘Henry’) review (see Table 10 below) 
and those by state governments and a wide range of research institutes and think tanks (ACT 
Government 2012; Bentley and D'Cruz 2016; Daley and Coates 2015; Government of South 
Australia 2015; Government of Tasmania 2010). However, with the exception of the ACT, 
political barriers have prevented state governments committing to a long-term strategy of 
There is evidence that state governments are starting to seek access to the local 
government rates base to raise revenue that can be hypothecated to particular purposes 
(see Table 9 above). Most obviously, levies which either contribute to or cover the cost of 
funding emergency, fire and rescue services are applied in all state jurisdictions, apart from 
the Northern Territory, using the same base as municipal rates, and with the exception of 
South Australia, the same billing system—that is, residents receive a single bill, with their 
council rates component and emergency services levy itemised separately. More recently, 
the ACT has introduced a ‘Safer Families Levy’, which is collected on all rateable land, with 
the revenue to be used to fund reforms to the domestic and family service system. Notably, 
in New South Wales the Fire and Emergency Services Levy was to be implemented on 1 
July 2017, but its implementation has been deferred indefinitely to ensure that some small to 
medium businesses are not subjected to unreasonable levels of tax through their 
contribution. 
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replacing transfer duties of residential properties with a broad-based property tax. The ACT’s 
more ambitious policy stance has been facilitated by the fact that, unlike the states, there is no 
sharing of the land tax base between two levels of government because there is no municipal-
level government in the ACT. In other states, however, the political and fiscal barriers to a 
transition seem to be prohibitive in the short run.  
Nonetheless, given growing political concern about housing affordability, the majority of state 
governments are implementing incremental changes such as providing transfer duty relief for 
low value properties while imposing surcharges on other purchasers. 
Table 10: Recommendations on state property tax reform from the 2009 Henry review 
Goal Remove stamp duty and replace with a broad-based land tax. 
Specific 
recommendations 
Levy land tax according to an increasing, marginal rate schedule with 
the lowest rate being zero and thresholds determined by per-square-
metre, highest-and-best-use value. 
Work towards the extension of the land tax base to all land, including 
agricultural land (i.e. value-based application, not use-based). 
Specifically remove transfer duties from commercial and industrial 
properties and replace with a lower land tax threshold that 
encompasses those properties.  
Levy land tax on individual land holdings rather than aggregate 
portfolios. 
Other suggestions Investigate transitional mechanisms that minimise impact on existing 
exempt landowners and maintain revenue flows to government.  
Investigate deferral of land tax options for low-income earners. 
Align local government and land tax bases, with a single billing 
system, supported by a more robust and consistent valuation 
system. 
Source: Henry, Harmer et al. (2009). 
There is also evidence of an interest in greater harmonisation of the land tax and local 
government rates bases, including through the widespread adoption of the practice of using the 
municipal rates base to collect emergency service levies across states (see Table 9 above). 
Although this may provoke resentment on the part of some local councils, it points to the 
administrative efficiencies possible with a more integrated approach to property tax collection. 
The political risks are significant however, as the fallout surrounding the New South Wales’ 
Government’s failed introduction of a Fire and Emergency Services Levy demonstrates (Raper 
2017; Nicholls 2017).  
In the following chapters, we argue that, given the current trajectory of subnational property tax 
reform in Australia, the short-term objective should be to simplify the administration of property 
taxes across the federation (Chapter 4) and the structure of existing transfer duties (Chapter 5) 
prior to embarking on a more ambitious transition to a broad-based recurrent property tax 
(Chapter 6). Before describing and modelling these reforms in greater detail, the next chapter 
(Chapter 3) provides a detailed account of the principles underlying the reforms we propose. 
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 Reform objectives and strategy 
This chapter describes the broad aims of the reforms proposed in this report and 
their relationship to the wider objectives of the overarching ‘pathways to housing 
tax reform’ Inquiry.  
The proposed approach is pragmatic and incremental. It begins with a short-term 
objective of improving subnational property tax administration by developing 
nationally consistent valuation methods, a national register of property owners and 
further integration of state and local property tax collection.  
Having established this administrative foundation, the focus should be to simplify 
the transfer duty regime followed by a broadening of the recurrent property tax 
base to fund the gradual reduction of transfer duties on residential properties. 
Subnational property taxation in the Australian federation has become increasingly complex 
with consequences for administrative and economic efficiency. However, reflecting both the 
barriers to housing tax reform and the diversity and complexity of housing markets across the 
federation, it is essential that any reform agenda is sufficiently flexible to enable individual state 
governments to adapt the reform framework to their particular policy objectives. This flexibility is 
achieved through the development of a layered and incremental model in which state 
governments can choose, within a simplified framework, transfer duty and land tax rates and 
thresholds which are consistent with prevailing preferences and conditions. Providing state 
governments with the discretion to adapt their transfer duty and land tax schedules within a 
nationally agreed framework reconciles the necessity of improving consistency and 
administrative efficiency in Australia’s subnational housing tax system with the need to protect 
the interests and autonomy of individual states. 
3.1 Project objectives from a political economy perspective 
As already noted, a wide range of variables influence the dynamic of housing markets. Over the 
longer term, subnational property tax reform will play an important role in promoting broader 
housing policy goals. Recurrent property taxes are widely acknowledged as an efficient and 
equitable tax by economists because property is immobile and represents a tangible store of 
wealth. Recurrent property taxes also contribute to housing affordability because future property 
tax liabilities are capitalised into prices putting downward pressure on home prices. Empirical 
analysis of the impact of ACT reforms on Canberra housing prices confirmed that the prospect 
of increasing land taxes curbed property price growth and potentially saved average purchasers 
$1,000 to $2,000 in mortgage repayments (Murray 2016). Moreover, given that the benefits of 
public and infrastructure investments are reflected in land values, property-based taxation is an 
efficient means to tax these windfall gains. For these reasons, recurrent taxes on the value of 
residential property are regarded as a desirable form of taxation for state and local governments 
(Slack and Bird 2015). However, achieving these reforms is about more than just the principles 
of good tax design, it is also about the constraints imposed by prevailing political and economic 
circumstances.  
The political and economic barriers to property tax reform are significant. In addition to the 
general, well-documented barriers to tax reform, there are a number of specific challenges 
associated with changing the taxation of residential property: 
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 Intergovernmental barriers to reform: all three levels of Australian government tax residential 
property (either directly or indirectly) demanding high levels of coordination between 
governments (Smith 2012; Warren 2010). 
 Inefficient transfer duty-based taxes are concealed in one-off transaction costs whereas 
recurrent taxes are highly visible (Slack and Bird 2015). 
 Recurrent taxes on residential property are a tax on wealth and low-income, asset-rich 
households may not have the cash flow to pay recurrent taxes. 
 Attempts to broaden Australia’s narrow property tax base will result in more Australian 
households being subject to direct property taxation (Slack and Bird 2015). 
Residential property is the most important form of wealth for many Australian households and 
there are significant political risks associated with policy changes that may affect residential 
property values. Eslake (2013) argues, for example, that some of the longest-standing, 
significant interventions by the Commonwealth Government in the housing market (such as 
grants or cash incentives for first home buyers and negative gearing) have proven to be the 
most difficult policies to shift, even in the face of consistent critique and clear evidence that they 
are contributing to poor housing outcomes. 
Taken together, these obstacles mean that reform can be ‘more a political exercise than a 
technical one’, and strategies must also pay close attention to processes by which taxpayers 
come to view reform as ‘necessary and desirable’ (Slack and Bird 2015:17).  
As a means of managing this political economy of housing tax policy, we have identified short, 
medium and longer-term objectives for subnational residential property tax reform that seek to 
address current political and economic challenges.  
3.2 Short-term reform objectives 
In the short term, we propose two objectives. First, underpinning the broader property tax 
reform agenda with necessary changes to the administration of property tax systems in 
Australia. Second, we propose simplifying transfer duties as they apply to residential property 
transactions across the federation by developing a single rate with a significant duty-free 
threshold to ensure the incidence of transfer duties is progressive by property value. This 
simplified transfer duty base provides a foundation for longer-term reforms. 
3.2.1 Short-term administrative reforms: the foundation for effective subnational 
property taxation 
A tax system is only as effective as the administrative regime on which it is built, and all too 
often administrative considerations are overlooked in the tax policy process. There are few 
forms of taxation whose success is more dependent on effective administration than property 
taxes. Poor property tax administration has a number of consequences including the cost and 
effectiveness of compliance (Slack and Bird 2014:14). In Australia, the administration of 
subnational property taxation is made even more complex because—as shown in Chapter 2—
there are multiple jurisdictions each with their own distinctive approach to property tax design 
and administration. Moreover, state and local government both impose different recurrent 
property taxes on the same base. 
However, as Almy (2014: 24) notes, the complexities or costs involved in re-designing current 
valuation systems are not sufficient grounds to ‘tolerate indefinitely’ clear inequities and 
inefficiencies that continue to plague property taxation. As such, any effective subnational 
property taxation reform must be founded in a robust administrative system, without which 
reform will not be viable or productive in the longer term.  
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There are a number of key features central to reforming the land and property tax base and its 
administration. This includes the adoption of a harmonised tax base applying to residential 
property between states, as well as with their local government constituents, which could be 
used to develop a national database of property valuations and a comprehensive registry of 
beneficial owners. Administrative efficiency and compliance would be further enhanced by more 
comprehensive data sharing among all three levels of government and the integration of billing 
for local government rates and state property taxes.  
The harmonisation of the bases should also include the use of a consistent valuation based on 
a Capital Improved Valuation (CIV) method based on the Highest and Best use (HBU) across all 
Australian jurisdictions. Currently, as noted in Chapter 2, state jurisdictions differ in their use of 
valuation methods, making consistency and integration in the administration of tax regimes 
difficult to achieve. A CIV + HBU valuation regime has the advantage that it closely 
approximates the market value for most residential properties and, as outlined in Chapter 4, has 
a number of advantages over a tax on unimproved land values. We also argue for a shift to 
valuations based on automated valuation models (AVMs) which would not only enhance the 
contemporaneity and reliability of market valuations, but an AVM is increasingly sophisticated 
and can account for detailed differences between property types and uses. We also propose 
that the aggregation of properties held by the same owner for the purposes of assessing land 
taxes be abolished in order to encourage institutional investment in residential property. 
Detailed discussion of our proposal for harmonising base and valuation methods is found in 
Chapter 4. 
Creating a nationally consistent and integrated administrative regime in relation to property 
ownership, valuation and taxation will deliver significant compliance and efficiency dividends to 
Australian governments. We advocate building on and improving wider administrative reforms to 
maximise such efficiency dividends. This includes, for example, the creation of a national 
property register and stronger purchase provisions for foreign investors/purchasers (as in NZ). 
Currently, each state and territory has a central register of all land that also details the owner of 
the land (based on land title). Australia’s current national land register pertains only to foreign 
investors required to report their existing agricultural landholdings and any acquisitions or 
disposals to the Australian Tax office (ATO) (FIRB 2017). We also advocate for stronger 
administrative cooperation and data sharing between state and federal governments. This 
would also require more robust purchaser proof of ID and residency claims (as found in New 
Zealand). This is necessary to establish whether a property is being used as a principal place of 
residence (PPR) which becomes important should governments choose to impose differential 
taxation based on property use (Chapter 6).  
3.2.2 Short-term transfer duty reforms 
Beyond improving property tax administration, the focus of reform should be on restructuring 
transfer duties to create a simplified and progressive (by value of property) duty regime raising 
the same revenue as the systems being replaced. This will be achieved using a single transfer 
duty rate with a single duty-free threshold creating a rate schedule which is progressive in its 
impact (with average duty rates increasing with property value) and in which, depending on the 
rate and threshold selected, properties in the lower 60 per cent of the price distribution would be 
subject to lower levels of transfer duty. 
This approach means that the ‘basic’ transfer duty schedule can be adapted to address housing 
policy goals. It allows state governments to introduce or ‘layer’ additional concessions or 
surcharges to specific classes of property based on ownership, value or use. For example, first 
home buyers could be provided with concessional treatment while investors, non-resident 
foreigners or those purchasing premium properties, could be subjected to additional surcharges.  
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The focus on short-term, revenue neutral transfer duty reform is motivated by a number of 
factors.  
 It acknowledges the significant short-term budget challenges associated with cutting or 
abolishing transfer duties (see Chapter 2; Wood, Ong et al. 2012).  
 It acknowledges that well-designed transfer duties can play an important role in a wider 
property tax regime. Recent international research shows that alongside other measures, 
placing higher taxes on speculative activity (where property is held for short duration and 
sold for capital gain) can influence the behaviour of investors, and has been successfully 
implemented in other countries such as Germany (Heywood and Hackett 2014). Relatedly, 
transfer duty reforms are unlikely to affect rental markets in the short term as the cost of 
holding existing investment properties will not increase. Over the longer term, and especially 
if properties purchased by owner-occupiers receive concessional treatment (see Chapter 6), 
then the duty regime should dampen speculation and relative demand for investment 
properties. 
Box 3: What impact will transfer duty cuts have on housing markets? 
3.3 Medium to long-term reforms: a new transfer duty/recurrent 
property tax mix 
While there would be many political and administrative benefits from a nationally coordinated 
approach, the two reform strategies described below are designed such that they could be 
implemented unilaterally by individual states.  
3.3.1 Shifting the transfer duty mix 
Reducing state governments’ reliance on property-based transfer duties is an important long-
term policy objective. However, there are formidable barriers to a transition from transfer duty to 
recurrent property tax that have prevented state governments from committing to this policy 
objective (although, as noted, the use of property-based service levies has increased). Given 
the political-economy of a transfer duty-recurrent property tax transition, a less ambitious reform 
agenda is to reduce transfer duty for owner-occupiers while increasing it for investors. Section 
6.1 describes and models two revenue neutral strategies for increasing the relative transfer duty 
paid by investors. We argue that this reform would support the aims of housing tax reform by 
granting preferential tax treatment to owner-occupiers relative to investors which, over the 
longer term, should help boost home ownership rates. Also, increasing transfer duty on 
investors should encourage landlords to hold properties for longer, thereby increasing tenant 
security. From a political perspective, revenue from increasing transfer duty rates on investors 
can be used to fund further reductions in transfer duty for owner-occupiers purchasing lower-
 There is mixed evidence as to whether the costs of transfer duty fall on buyers or sellers, 
and much depends on price elasticity. In a rising market the costs fall on sellers, but 
under other market conditions it is less clear (Davidhoff and Leigh 2013). 
 Reducing transfer duty on lower-value housing will improve residential mobility for those 
purchasing lower-value homes. 
 The schedule proposed in this report is designed to avoid imposing high marginal 
transfer duties at certain price points (as in recent Victorian reforms) which create 
threshold effects. 
 A revenue neutral switch in the distribution of transfer duty liability, from owner-occupiers 
to investors, should improve affordability for owner-occupiers in most markets. 
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value homes. If the net duty burden from investors and owner-occupiers remains unchanged 
then shifting the duty burden from one to the other is unlikely to impact on property markets, but 
should help increase home ownership. These reforms are modelled in detail in Chapter 6. 
Box 4: Will increasing tax on investment properties increase rent? 
3.3.2 A simple and transparent transition to a broad-based recurrent property tax 
The case for making a gradual transition from transfer duties to a broad-based land tax is clear. 
Having implemented the administrative reforms (outlined in Chapter 4) and simplified the 
transfer duty base (described in Chapter 5), state governments should commit to making a 
gradual transition to a broad-based recurrent property tax (i.e. a land tax using CIV). While 
described in greater detail in subsequent chapters, such a tax should have the following 
features: 
 It should be a single, broad-based low rate tax based on the value (CIV + HB) of all 
residential property with the same tax-free threshold as the simplified transfer duty (outlined 
in Chapter 5) to ensure the annual tax burden is a low as possible and is progressive by 
property value. 
 Collection and administration of the tax should be integrated with local government rates (as 
per existing emergency service levies). 
 In the interests of simplicity and transparency the property tax should be applied to all 
dwellings (rather than existing owners being exempt or ‘grandfathered’), but introduced 
gradually to avoid excessive double taxation. 
 Revenue from the broadened property taxation regime will be used to fund a reduction in 
transfer duty rates, and deferral provisions would be available to owners eligible under 
mitigating circumstances. 
As has been argued elsewhere, a broad-based property tax will help achieve a number of the 
broader goals of housing tax reform. It will:  
 encourage residential mobility 
 discourage speculation and overcapitalisation by both investors and owner-occupiers 
 put downward pressure on property prices 
 counter intergenerational and housing inequality. 
Despite widespread recognition of the benefits of gradually replacing property-related transfer 
duties with a broad-based recurrent tax, there are two fundamental barriers to reform. 
1 As with any base-broadening reform (especially if reform is designed, as ours are, to be 
revenue neutral), it is unavoidable in the absence of compensation that most households will 
have to pay slightly more tax in the short term. It is essential that governments are 
It has been argued (ABC 2016) that if the tax burden on investors increases, lower after tax 
returns would reduce rental property supply and inflate rental prices. However, Daley and 
Wood (2016) highlight that historical evidence, as well as economic theory and research, 
show that rent increases as a response to changes in taxes are both slow to take effect and 
modest in impact. As Eslake (2013) notes, the markets for investors and owner-occupiers 
are linked and any decline in rental supply would be offset by increased supply for owner-
occupiers. More would-be home buyers would become home owners and demand for rental 
properties would subsequently be reduced; having little net effect on supply and demand. 
Thus, in the longer term it is important to recognise that if, for tax reasons, a property is sold 
by a landlord to an owner-occupier, both rental supply and demand will fall. 
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transparent about this and promote the longer-term social and economic benefits of reform 
including housing affordability dividends and the fact that prospective first home buyers will 
benefit from lower prices and a reduced lifetime property tax (transfer duty and recurrent 
charges) liability. 
2 The second fundamental challenge concerns management of the transition between a 
transfer duty regime and a recurrent property tax. There are two broad approaches: 
 The first is a ‘next transaction’ or a ‘grandfathered’ approach under which land taxes 
would only be imposed on properties purchased after the abolition of transfer duties. This 
approach would avoid ‘double taxation’ in that purchasers would not have to pay both a 
transfer duty and recurrent property tax. However, there are a number of problems with a 
‘grandfathered’ approach. State governments would face a sustained and ongoing 
revenue shortfall given that, based on historic data, only about 5 per cent of properties 
would be added to the property tax base each year. The approach would also be 
administratively complex and would deter residential mobility. 
 The second broad approach is an incremental or ‘phase out, phase up’ approach 
whereby all properties are included in the new recurrent property tax base, but the rate of 
the new tax is gradually increased from a very low rate with the revenue being used to 
incrementally phase out transfer duties over a 10 to 20 year period. This approach is 
simple, transparent, minimises double taxation and minimises budgetary risk to state 
governments. This is the approach adopted in the ACT and proposed in this report. 
A number of variations on these two broad approaches have been proposed in the Australian 
debate, but all involve significant trade-offs. One is to include all properties in the new property 
tax base, but to offer a credit to purchasers who have recently paid a transfer duty. While this 
approach would avoid double taxation, it would be expensive for state governments. Another 
variation, proposed by the Australian Greens, is for the Commonwealth Government to provide 
a long-term low interest loan to the states to fund the revenue gap associated with a next 
transaction approach. While feasible, this would require high levels of intergovernmental 
cooperation and increase both the complexity of the transition and the risk of cost shifting. A 
summary of recent reforms and transition models proposed in the Australian debate is provided 
in Table 11 below. 
The consensus among stakeholders is that an incremental transition strategy represents a fair, 
simple and politically viable strategy while limiting undue fiscal risks to state governments. Over 
a 10 to 20 year period, state governments can incrementally increase a low rate of recurrent 
property tax on all residential properties above a basic threshold with the precise reform 
trajectory determined by market conditions and political circumstances. Such a model is 
outlined and analysed in Section 6.2. An incremental approach may be the best strategy for 
reform, but it must be acknowledged that significant political challenges will remain. For 
example, notwithstanding the reduced disincentives to property ‘downsizing’, there will be an 
increase in recurrent property tax costs for asset-rich and cash-poor property owners, and in 
cases such as this, the design of deferred payment options may require consideration. These 
issues are analysed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
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Table 11: Summary of currently applied or proposed land tax reform transition models 
Proposal 
author 
Reform principles Key reforms or design choices Timelines and revenue implications 
Australian 
Capital 
Territory* 
 
Increasing revenue 
independence for ACT 
Improving efficiency and 
transparency 
Equality in the ACT 
taxation system 
Abolition of duty on conveyances 
Application of general rates as a broad-based land tax for 
revenue replacement 
Improvements to the progressivity of the revenue replacement 
base  
Abolishing of nuisance rates and adjustments to concession 
schemes to cushion reform impacts for key groups 
Applied in the ACT in the 2012–2013 Budget 
Phased transitions, with gradual abolition of 
transfer duty over a 20-year period 
In first five years, initiate structural change to 
system with a view to achieving revenue 
neutrality annually over this period 
Victoria* 
  
Improving affordability 
for first home-buyers 
Distributing housing 
price increases more 
evenly 
Abolition of transfer duty for first home buyers up to value of 
$600,000, with concessions for purchases up to $750,000 
Increase in investor transfer duty (on CIV) when buying off 
plan 
Vacant residential property tax applied to some properties in 
Melbourne  
Effective 1 July 2017 
Vacant land tax effective 1 January 2018 
Grattan 
Institute 
Relieving and repairing 
state budgets 
Prioritising efficiency and 
stability of taxes 
Spreading tax burdens 
more fairly 
Abolition of transfer duties 
Flat rate levy on property values with no fixed charge 
Levy deferral schemes for pensioners 
National application 
Different design choices affect revenue 
implications, e.g. rebates to first portions of 
property tax liability would reduce revenue for 
states 
Australian 
Greens 
 
Easing market lockout 
for first home buyers 
Ending tax breaks for 
investors and penalising 
vacant property owners 
Easing housing mobility 
constraints 
Abolition of transfer duties 
Replacement with broad-based land tax, particularly on high 
value land occupied by top 10 per cent of landholders 
Grandfathering of all current landholders 
National application 
Immediate transition 
Commonwealth loans to plug state shortfalls 
owing to transfer duty revenue loss 
Loans peak in 2020—thereafter rising land tax 
revenues enable loan payback by 2030 
Costed by the Parliamentary Budget Office 
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Proposal 
author 
Reform principles Key reforms or design choices Timelines and revenue implications 
Land tax benefits delayed by grandfathering 
current landholders (Collyer 2016)  
Possible perverse outcomes from long-term 
loans for states in a changing policy 
environment (e.g. CSHA loan schemes from 
the 1950s are still current, accruing further debt 
in some states, and constraining housing 
authority or treasury budgets) 
The 
McKell 
Institute 
Increased housing 
affordability and mobility 
and equity 
Reducing unemployment 
Increasing revenue for 
infrastructure funding 
Abolition of transfer duty 
Application of land tax to all property at a progressive rate with 
tax free threshold of $120 per square metre on unimproved 
land value 
Grandfathering of all current homeowners to avoid double 
taxation 
Application in NSW 
Immediate transition 
Initial revenue shortfall, debt peaking in the 
10th year, and paid off in the 23rd year 
Land tax benefits delayed by grandfathering 
current landholders  
Possible perverse outcomes from long-term 
loans for states in a changing policy 
environment (e.g. CSHA loan schemes from 
the 1950s are still current, accruing further debt 
in some states, and constraining housing 
authority or treasury budgets) 
KPMG (for 
NSW 
Business 
Council) 
Reducing high economic 
costs associated with 
current property taxes 
Broadening economic 
benefits through 
increased taxation 
efficiency 
Abolition of transfer duty 
Four scenarios modelled: 
(i) Minimalist: current land tax structure including current 
exemptions and progressivity, rates adjusted uniformly to 
retain revenue neutrality 
(ii) Ex-PPR: PPR removed from exemption, PPR land tax 
rates averaged to approximate current non-exempted 
residential land holders’ rates 
(iii) Ex-PPR and progressivity: as for (ii) but also removing 
progressivity currently existing, i.e. removal of land tax 
Application in NSW and nationally 
Immediate transition 
Each scenario modelled to achieve revenue 
neutrality  
Results indicate that most economic benefits of 
reform derive from the abolition of transfer 
duty—alternative land tax arrangements make 
little difference to results 
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Proposal 
author 
Reform principles Key reforms or design choices Timelines and revenue implications 
thresholds and applying uniform tax rate on all non-exempt 
sectors 
(iv) Broad: as for (iii) with removal of primary production 
exemption 
Removal of exemptions and progressivity 
increases gross state product both in NSW and 
nationally 
Source: Bagshaw, E (2017); The Greens (2017); Bentley and D’Cruz (2016), ACT Treasury Budget paper 2012–13; Daley and Coates (2015); State Revenue Office VIC (2017); NSW 
Business Chamber 2016; Collyer 2016. 
*Reform has been implemented. All others are proposals only. 
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3.4 Overview of analytical chapters 
The following three chapters provide in-depth analysis and discussion of the reform objectives 
presented in this chapter by stepping through the reform pathway in the short and long-term and 
modelling its implications. 
 Chapter 4 outlines administrative reforms relating to the definition of the land tax base and 
enhanced national coordination of data concerning the valuation of residential property, its 
ownership and use.  
 Chapter 5 develops revenue neutral strategies for developing a simpler and more equitable 
transfer duty regime for residential property as a foundation for more comprehensive reform.  
 Chapter 6 develops and analyses pragmatic long-term strategies for shifting i) the 
distribution of transfer duty liability between properties purchased for investment relative to 
those purchased by owner-occupiers; and ii) the mix between transfer duties and a recurrent 
property tax. 
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 Reforming the administration of property tax 
The lack of administrative coordination among governments in relation to property 
tax is a significant barrier to reform in Australia. 
This chapter outlines the broad administrative reforms to serve as the foundation 
for the property tax reforms outlined in the remainder of this report.  
Key areas of administrative reform include the development of a nationally 
coordinated approach to registering and valuing residential property. Over time 
such a register should include data on the residency status of beneficial owners as 
well as the use of the dwelling (owner-occupied, tenanted or vacant). The chapter 
also highlights the benefits of intergovernmental data sharing across jurisdictions, 
and the administrative integration of subnational government property tax 
collection regimes. 
4.1 The case for administrative reform  
A tax system is only as effective as its conceptual and administrative foundations (Bird and Zolt 
2003). Australia’s subnational property tax system is somewhat unique in that local and state 
governments share the property tax base, but do not share the administration or valuation of 
bases, rates or rate-structures, resulting in variations both between and among states and 
territories. Australia’s land tax regime has evolved in an ad hoc way since 1884 (Smith 2005), 
and now is one of the few countries in which different recurrent land and property taxes are 
imposed by two tiers of government with little coordination. State land taxes are narrowly 
applied to less than 20 per cent of all property (two-thirds of which is excluded due to the 
exemption of the principal place of residence). On the other hand, local government rates apply 
to 98 per cent of property and is genuinely broad-based (Mangioni 2016a, 34).  
As already noted, administrative complexity and duplication is a major barrier to property tax 
reform in the Australian federation. Academic specialists (e.g. Mangioni 2014, 2015, 2016a and 
b; Passant and McLaren 2011) and independent inquiries alike (e.g. Henry, Harmer et al. 2009; 
Commonwealth Government 2015; Daley and Coates 2015) have argued for a more coherent 
and consistent approach to defining subnational property tax bases and to reforming the 
structures for administrating these taxes. However, in the absence of a consistent approach to 
conceptualising and administering subnational property taxes in the Australian federation, 
unilateral reform efforts are unlikely to succeed (Mangioni 2016c). Moreover, discussion about, 
and agreement on, administrative reforms could provide a foundation for intergovernmental 
cooperation on more significant policy reform. 
The barriers underlying reform concern both the design and administration of residential 
property taxes. Some of these challenges are conceptual and relate to basic tax principles such 
as equity, and the appropriate basis for assessing property values for the purpose of taxation. 
For example, given residential property is both a necessity and a repository of wealth, how do 
we tax the principal place of residence (PPR)? The complexity of these issues is germane to 
property tax reform, especially from a distributional and equity perspective; there is a growing 
number of asset rich yet income poor Australians who would clearly struggle to pay additional 
recurrent property taxes.  
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Other issues considered in this chapter are administrative and relate to the diversity of technical 
systems used to collect taxes at different levels of subnational government. While recurrent 
property taxes are generally understood to be one of the most efficient taxes in Australia 
(Commonwealth Government 2015: 149), the prospects of expanding the use of such taxes are 
diminished by a number of challenges, including: 
 The nature of the current dual system whereby state and local governments both impose a 
recurrent tax on land in most jurisdictions in Australia (except the Northern Territory which 
imposes local council rates but not a territory land tax) is an outdated system. In the case of 
other advanced OECD countries (e.g. the U.S, Canada and New Zealand—see Table 12 
below), recurrent land and property taxes are predominately collected by local government 
authorities using nationally coordinated approaches (Mangioni 2016a), thereby maximising 
administrative efficiency.  
 The range of variation in how property tax is defined and calculated, including the 
determination of land tax rates bases (which are often contingent on land use and 
landholding aggregation rules), and how properties are valued. These variations exist both 
between and across local government and state government land tax areas of administration 
(see Chapter 2).  
 There is insufficient data concerning the beneficial owners of residential property and the use 
of properties by owner-occupiers and investors.  
These factors combine to inhibit the efficiency of property tax in Australia, particularly in light of 
principles of good tax design. According to Mangioni (2016c: 59), these challenges undermine 
the ‘functionality, the efficiency, equity and acceptability of the tax by the taxpaying public’. As 
such, there is ample room to improve the efficiency of property tax, including improving revenue 
collection, system transparency, addressing vertical fiscal imbalances, and improving data 
sharing between all levels of government. Not only is administrative reform required to improve 
the efficiency of property tax design, we argue that it will be essential to implement the 
administrative measures outlined in this chapter if the substantive policy reforms described later 
in this report are to achieve their objectives. 
Table 12: Levels of government imposing recurrent property taxation 
Country 
Collecting 
authority 
Revenue 
ownership 
Valuation methods 
Land value 
taxation 
UK Central Local Residential improved values 
and income from businesses 
No 
Denmark Central Local, state Improved land and building 
value 
Yes 
US Local Local Improved value No 
Canada Local Local Improved No 
Australia Local, state Local, state Land value and unimproved 
value 
Yes 
New Zealand Local Local Improved in urban areas and 
land value in non-urban areas 
Non-urban 
areas only 
Source: Bird and Slack (2002) and McClusky and Franzsen (2005) in Mangioni 2010. 
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Proposed administrative reforms 
This chapter describes the broad administrative reforms that serve as the foundation for the 
property tax reforms outlined in the remainder of this report. There are two dimensions to the 
reforms we propose. The first is to develop a nationally consistent approach to the 
conceptualising and measuring of property valuations and establishing a national register of 
property owners. The second relates to further improving intergovernmental cooperation and 
data sharing in relation to property ownership, use and taxation between relevant local, state 
and Commonwealth agencies to promote property tax compliance and enhance administration. 
Successful administrative reforms in countries such as Denmark clearly demonstrate both the 
feasibility and benefits of reforms. Denmark provides an example of a nationally-scaled and 
sequenced reform agenda, addressing property taxation through a root-and-branch rethink of 
the system as a whole. The reform agenda was shaped by a national strategy including the 
creation of a new system of allocating tax-raising powers. The result of this process is that 
Denmark has been able to implement and refine meaningful reforms to the current land and 
property tax system, paying particular attention to property valuation for residential property and 
key related complexities such as taxing holiday homes (Mangioni 2016a: 290) (see Box 5). 
Focusing on the administrative foundations of a longer program of property tax reform will also 
enhance the political viability of the agenda by fostering collaboration on technical issues and 
prompting stakeholders to consider and hopefully agree on principles of tax design prior to 
embarking on a debate about specific policy proposals. 
The key elements of reform proposals, discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this 
chapter, include: 
 establishing a national ownership register for residential property including the residency 
status of owners 
 assessing the potential to create a national approach to residential property valuation based 
on rapidly improving automated valuation modelling (AVM) techniques—common valuation 
measures could be used and shared by state and local government (It should be noted that 
detailed analysis presented in Chapters 5 and 6 is based on grouped contemporary 
valuations of all residential properties in Australia provided by CoreLogic.) 
 further improve data sharing between federal and state tax agencies to establish the change 
in ownership and use of properties in an accurate and timely manner 
 promoting the integration of state and local rates and land and property tax collection using 
common valuations.  
AHURI report 291 45 
Box 5: Denmark: national root and branch property tax reform 
4.2 National register of beneficial owners including foreign owners 
The first step toward significant reform of property tax administration in Australia is to establish a 
national database of property and land information. Currently, each state and territory has its 
own Land Registry managed through land and property titles offices (e.g. IPI NSW or DELWP 
Victoria). These operate under a Torrens registration system (named after Sir Robert Richard 
Torrens, and referring to a systematic method of recording and registering land ownership and 
interests) in which details such as land ownership, possession and rights are recorded (DELWP 
2017). However, data and compliance issues continue to plague all regimes. In particular, 
difficulties policing the principal place of residence exemption from state land tax are salient; in 
one state, the declaration of holiday homes as the principal place of residence is expected to 
net $90 million dollars over a current 3–4 year period (Mangioni 2016a). 
There have been overtures toward more centralised Australian property registers in recent 
years. For example, the ATO has taken responsibility to establish a national register related to 
foreign ownership of residential real estate from 1 July 2016. This has been associated with 
new rules for foreign resident capital gains withholding, which apply to vendors disposing of 
certain taxable property under contracts entered into from 1 July 2017 (ATO 2017). Together 
Denmark established a ‘revolutionary’ approach to recurrent property taxation in 2002, 
which has enhanced the stability and efficiency of the national tax system. Key elements of 
this system include (unless specified, Mangioni 2010: 9): 
 Three tax types: a land tax levied on all land; a property value tax levied on principal 
place of residence and holiday houses; and a service tax imposed on business property 
use. 
 Valuations based on 2001 assessments with a 5 per cent supplement and frozen as an 
upper valuation ceiling indefinitely, unless current values are lower in which case the 
lower value is used. More recently (see below), new reforms are exploring moves toward 
CIV and HBU (Mangioni 2016a: 287, 290). 
 Central government is responsible for taxes, valuations and information databases, while 
the administration is devolved to states to ensure equity and consistency in how the tax 
is imposed nationally. 
 Taxes are collected every second year as a ‘direct tax’ (deducted directly from income), 
with assessments for private property in uneven years (and company or business 
property in even years) (SKAT 2016). There is a single tier collection point for all three 
taxes, and the beneficiary of all property taxes is local and county government (3.8% of 
total tax collected in Denmark). 
 The system has been strengthened by a reduction in the number of municipalities from 
271 to 100 to improve service frameworks. This has increased already strong data 
collection mechanisms around property information and analysis. 
 More recently, Denmark implemented a new recurrent property tax system in the 2015–
16 tax year, in response to the 2001–02 freeze on property values. The Tax Ministry 
engaged an independent commission to design a better model after finding that more 
than 75 per cent of property evaluations were either over or under-valued. New changes 
include ceasing the ongoing general assessments of real property as they carry no 
practical significance to determining the tax base, and a new model for assessing new 
residential constructions and commercial properties (Mangioni 2016a: 283–290). 
AHURI report 291 46 
these rule changes suggest that the ATO is tightening compliance measures associated with 
foreign residential (and other) ownership; in part as a response to concerns within the wider 
Australian community that the government should have access to adequate information about, 
and oversight of, foreign ownership in Australia (Barbour 2016). Additionally, some private 
companies offer centralised land information by aggregating state land registry files and offering 
this information to paying clients. Examples of these include the ‘National Property Ownership 
Search’ offered by InfoTrack, or the ‘National Property Information’ database offered by 
GlobalX, which both provide clients with information about Australian property owned by 
individuals, trusts and companies.  
However, these registries are partial developments at best and do not go far enough to provide 
a comprehensive national register of beneficial owners of property (including foreign owners). 
The benefit of such a registry is that it would offer distinctive insights into the distribution of 
property ownership and wealth in Australia and would provide a solid platform to implement a 
layered property tax regime in which it is possible to impose a differential taxation based on 
ownership and use. A national register would also improve compliance across a range of state 
and federal taxes. There are some international exemplars of the use of national or centralised 
registries to pursue the above goals, most notably in Denmark (see Box 5) and New Zealand 
(see Box 6). In Denmark (and similarly in Finland), a national database of property information 
collates applications for new property registrations, transfers of land, and boundary changes. In 
both cases, updating the register is a requirement, and compliance is ensured as only 
properties that are properly registered in this way are eligible to be used as a security for a 
mortgage loan (NLS 2017; DGA 2017). 
Box 6: New Zealand: a leading OECD property tax system 
 
New Zealand is known for its simple and efficient tax system. The central government holds 
constitutional status and tax-raising powers, while local government often acts as its operational 
arm. Hallmarks of the system include (unless specified, Mangioni 2016a: 297–300): 
 Simplified types of taxation; national land tax was abolished in 1992, and transfer duty in 1999. 
Local government has recaptured much of this revenue through local rate (levy) increases, 
whereby two of the four types of rates may apply to land charges. This includes a general land 
tax rate, and a universal or fixed general charge based on each rateable unit. The two other 
rates are targeted to particular services, such as waste removal and water supplied.  
 Valuation occurs through a rating system whereby local governments may adopt one of three 
bases of value (land, capital, and annual). The four main cities all use a capital improved value 
(CIV) base, and assessments are made on a three-yearly cycle. 
 Central government holds tax-raising powers, but local governments are responsible for 
implementation, including maintaining authority over which bases of value to adopt in order to 
rate property for levies.  
 Local governments have authority to collect rates, which are a dominant tax revenue source 
(now up to 60%).  
 Amendments to the Land Transfer Act in 2015 now requires Land Information New Zealand 
(LINZ) to collect a tax statement from all buyers and sellers in the course of property transfers. 
This includes information about tax residency, citizenship or visa status, and information about 
dwellings and buildings on the property. The data does not constitute a register of foreign 
ownership, and while it provides valuable information about citizenship and tax residency, it 
cannot specify whether properties have been purchased for investment (LINZ 2017). 
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4.3 A national approach to property valuation 
There is a long running debate about the conceptual basis for taxing land in general, and 
residential property in particular. The issue of the tax treatment of the principal place of 
residence is a source of political contestation in many countries (Mangioni 2016a: 283, 304). 
Part of the unease in the Australian context, as noted, is because land and property tax involves 
three tiers of government, including the Commonwealth. Consequently, creating a standard 
definition and operation of value ‘is the key to determining a more consistent, simple and 
transparent land tax in Australia’ (Mangioni 2015: 12). 
Establishing a more consistent approach to residential property valuation would have a number 
of dividends. First, at the local government level, any efficiencies associated with the 
introduction of recurrent property taxes can quickly be undermined by differences in rate bases 
and valuation methods. If states and local government were to adopt a nationally consistent 
approach to property valuation, there would be both administrative savings and less confusion 
among property owners in relation to the method used to value their property for taxation 
purposes. Establishing a simpler, consistent and more intuitive method for valuing residential 
property will be particularly important if, over the longer term, recurrent taxes based on the 
value of residential property are increased to fund the abolition of property-based transfer duties 
(Chapter 6).  
There is broad agreement that a consistent approach to property valuation and the 
administration of property-related taxes is desirable, but there is less consensus when deciding 
what the conceptual basis of a national property value regime should be. Traditionally, following 
the approach of Henry George, land taxes have been based on the unimproved value of land as 
this taxes the windfall economic rent associated with the scarcity of land and spill over benefit of 
infrastructure and other value enhancing investment (Ingles 2016). At a more pragmatic level, 
contemporary proponents of using unimproved land values as the basis for recurrent property 
taxes do so on the basis that taxing the capital improved value of land (CIV) acts as a 
disincentive to developing land and increasing housing supply (Daley and Coates 2015; 
Productivity Commission 2017b, 151) 
There may be a historic preference to base property taxes on unimproved land values, but for 
the reasons outlined below there is a growing international trend towards using CIV6 valuations 
as a basis for taxation (Table 10 above). The case for using CIV methods to establish the basis 
for residential property taxes was outlined in the report of the NSW Independent Pricing and 
Regulatory Tribunal’s 2016 review of the local government rating system. This report argues 
that CIV is, in general, more consistent with good tax principles, and that it also ensures that the 
value of medium and high-density developments can be captured. It also notes that revenue 
would not be affected by the switch to CIV (where not already used), and that local government 
revenue would increase due to growth in CIV in line with new residential or business 
developments while simultaneously ensuring rates per household would not rise in real terms 
(IPART 2016). Finally, we propose that aggregating the values of properties owned by the same 
landlord for the purpose of assessing land tax liabilities be abolished because existing 
aggregation provisions may deter institutional investment and constrain the supply of residential 
rental properties.  
Reflecting recent trends in property taxation informed by both pragmatic considerations and 
principles of tax design, we advocate a shift towards a CIV valuation regime based on the broad 
                                               
 
6 CIV refers to the capital improved value of a property where the value of land includes any dwelling or 
improvements made to the property. 
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proviso that the property is being used for its ‘highest and best value’, or use (HBU)7. In most 
cases this (CIV + HBU) approach to valuation will approximate the market value of a residential 
property, rather than an imputed rent, which is intuitive for property owners. Conceptually a 
recurrent property tax based on CIV + HBU valuation acts as a pragmatic compromise between 
a pure land tax designed to capture unearned economic rents and a more general wealth tax. 
Advantages of the CIV + HB valuation for residential property include that it: 
 is less abstract and contestable than a tax based on unimproved land values 
 approximates the market value of a residential property and provides a sound basis for a tax 
on property wealth 
 is neutral with respect to the taxation of detached housing vs units 
 can be modelled in an accurate and cost-effective manner using automated valuation 
techniques. 
Research carried out by Mangioni and Viitanen (2014) highlights that where CIV + HBU is used 
in highly urbanised settings as a property valuation starting point, a more consistent land value 
is achieved by a range of valuers, adding to the case for this system. Daley and Coates (2015) 
argue that CIV has lower economic costs with simpler application due to being easier to 
determine and track. Because effective property taxes require current, transparent and accurate 
property data, particularly in dense urban areas where there is little unimproved land to 
measure property value, CIV is the best valuation method.  
A further element of a reformed national valuation regime is the adoption of nationally consistent 
automatic valuation methods (AVM). Modelling of CIV from like sales is becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and accurate. AVM is becoming widely used by both financial institutions, real 
estate monitoring companies and governments beyond Australia (sometimes named 
‘Computer-assisted mass appraisal’, or CAMA, see McCluskey, Davis et al. 2012). AVM is both 
cost effective and benefits include that property values are contemporaneous, cost-effective, 
readily accessible, broad-based and comprehensive both in terms of current and historic data; it 
operates within a reasonable margin of error for most properties; and it allows for multiple 
analyses from local neighbourhood through to state and (if implemented) national levels (e.g. 
see CoreLogic 2017, Hometrack 2017; Australian Property Monitors 2017). The CoreLogic data 
that forms the basis of the recurrent broad-based property tax modelled in Chapter 6 uses 
values derived from their most sophisticated AVM model. 
4.4 Intergovernmental data sharing 
Effective property tax administration requires systematic data sharing between local, state and 
Commonwealth governments. Data sharing has the potential to reduce compliance costs on 
taxpayers, administrative costs on government, and should enhance the integrity of the regime. 
Effective data sharing between governments and revenue authorities is especially important if 
property taxes vary based on the ownership (residents vs non-residents) and use (investors vs 
owner-occupiers) of a property. Significant progress towards information exchange between 
government agencies to enhance compliance systems has been made in recent years, but tax 
administrators interviewed for this project believed that more systematic, nationally coordinated 
data sharing regarding the beneficial ownership and use of residential properties in Australia is 
required. For example, information sharing between the ATO and offices of state revenue is 
                                               
 
7 HBU is ‘the reasonable, probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property, which is physically 
possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value’ (Duncan and Brown 
2017). 
AHURI report 291 49 
used to identify eligibility for some tax exemptions, including land tax and duty concessions 
(GrantThornton 2015).  
Specific intergovernmental data sharing initiatives would include making ATO and immigration 
data available to state revenue authorities to help establish the use and ownership of residential 
properties. This may also, for example, require information sharing with regard to utilities, 
Medicare, taxation or electoral data to verify residential occupancy. This would enhance 
identification of tax observance breaches and action to increase compliance of taxpayers. An 
example includes the identification of when property owners declare a property as a PPR, but 
(without ownership of another property) reside in another state or outside Australia. The same 
would apply in the case of owners declaring one property as a PPR while also owning and 
residing in another property elsewhere in Australia (Mangioni 2016a: 109).  
4.5 Integration of state and local government property tax 
administration 
In addition to the case for adopting a consistent recurrent property tax base, we also stress the 
importance of integrating the administration and operationalisation of property taxes between 
tiers of government. This requires all jurisdictions working together towards ‘setting, reviewing 
and achieving benchmarks needed for this tax to operate as efficiently and seamlessly across 
national jurisdictions’ (Mangioni 2010: 17). This would require the streamlining of recurrent 
property tax and administration and the joint billing of rates and recurrent property taxes. 
Introducing both common valuation methods to calculate bases for rates and taxes, as well as 
joint billing arrangements was a key recommendation in the Henry Review (Recommendation 
121, Henry and Harmer, et al. 2009: 103).  
We argue that:  
 all properties should receive an annual valuation with their local government rates and 
recurrent state property tax notice; with the capacity to easily identify each (state and local) 
component 
 with respect to the PPR, this (joint) statement should outline the magnitude of the recurrent 
property tax exemption  
 local governments would retain the right to impose rates on a common valuation, and 
 state recurrent property tax and levies would be collected jointly with local government rates, 
with shared administration between local and state jurisdictions. 
This approach is not new—it reflects the role that local governments already perform as 
collection agents for state and territory governments in the case of fire and emergency service 
levies. However, extending the principle of recurrent property tax integration with existing local 
government systems and drawing on common valuation methods would both reduce 
administrative and compliance costs nationally and do so without the need to develop new 
administrative systems.  
There are arguments against a broader base property tax, including that in some cases property 
owners would incur a ‘double tax’ (Stewart 2011), or that the tax burden for asset-rich but low-
income Australians will be higher under the proposed reforms. In the case of the former, the 
incremental transition to reform outlined in this report is designed to minimise instances of 
double taxation on most property owners. In the case of asset-rich but low-income Australians, 
there are deferred payment or exemption procedures that should be developed as part of the 
reform agenda. These may include exemption on compassionate grounds, or application for 
deferral on the basis that the taxpayer would experience further detrimental circumstances 
(including financial, personal or otherwise) if the rates and taxes were enforced (e.g. 
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Government of Tasmania 2017a). Taxpayers could also apply, as per the Postponement of 
Rates Scheme in South Australia, to finance their payments by unlocking the value of home 
equity and accruing debt with interest that is payable when the property is sold or transferred to 
someone else (Daley and Coates 2015).  
4.6 Conclusions: implications for policy  
In this chapter, we have made a case for adopting a consistent property valuation method 
(across state and local government levels), linked with a national land registry, 
intergovernmental data sharing, and joint billing of local and state government rates and 
recurrent property tax .  
Currently in Australia there is little consistency in valuation methods or administration of 
property taxes between tiers of government. We argue that Australia needs to put in place 
measures to improve its tax effort with respect to property, and that the basis of this effort 
should be reforms to the administration and coordination of the taxes at a national and 
subnational level. We argue that these measures would provide a solid and necessary 
foundation for the broader reform agenda described in this report. Clarification of the roles and 
functions of different tiers of government will bring greater alignment to valuation and collection 
methods within the subnational property tax system and facilitate national reforms to property 
and land information collection and data-sharing. Importantly, shifting what is currently a 
fragmented, overly complicated and inefficient system into a secure tax base and reliable 
source of revenue will enhance the political viability of further reforms that are sustainable, 
efficient and equitable into the longer term. 
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 Reforming the design of property transfer duty 
Transfer duty is a problematic source of government revenue but has some 
advantages. 
There are wide variations in how state governments in Australia apply transfer 
duty. The system is complex and, in some cases, insufficiently progressive, and 
exemptions and concessions are ad hoc rather than systematic. 
This chapter proposes a simplified transfer duty regime, with a generous tax-free 
threshold and a flat rate imposed on properties above the threshold. Under these 
reforms, the system could be more progressive (depending on the rate and 
threshold selected), and purchasers of lower value properties, which would include 
large numbers of first home buyers, will pay less duty than they do currently. 
This new, simplified regime offers a basis for other reforms that would meet wider 
housing policy goals. 
5.1 The aims of transfer duty reform  
Transfer duties are a significant source of revenue for all Australian states and territories. 
However, the design of the tax, in relation to both its base and schedules, has become 
increasingly complex and contrary to best practice in tax design. The combination of substantial 
increases in property prices in recent years and a lack of indexation of transfer duty schedules 
has produced a relatively ‘flat’ duty regime while, as discussed in Chapter 2, concessions and 
exemptions have been applied on an ad hoc and incremental basis to tackle affordability issues. 
There are also anomalies, such as in Victoria where marginal rates of duty actually decrease 
with rising property values.  
As stated earlier, the first step in this process is to simplify the structure of transfer duty regimes 
by creating a single rate of duty with a relatively large tax-free threshold, ensuring that lower 
value properties are subject to lower average amounts of duty (while assuming no behavioural 
response). This regime is detailed in Section 5.2 below.  
The approach has been modelled to ensure revenue neutrality, meaning that the new system 
would raise the same transfer duty revenue on residential property in each state as the current 
policy settings. This new, simplified model then serves as a base for further reform options 
explored in the subsequent chapters. The reform agenda as a whole rests on the twin 
foundations of improved property tax administration and simplified design. Retaining transfer 
duties does fly somewhat in the face of theoretical orthodoxy, but in the short to medium term, 
we argue that transfer duties have an important role to play in Australia’s tax system because of 
their capacity to generate revenue and to temper housing markets. Introducing reform gradually 
is also politically more feasible and builds on reforms already being undertaken by the states, 
such as the introduction of surcharges and differential rates for particular categories of 
purchaser.  
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5.2 Simplifying transfer duty design 
5.2.1 The current system 
As noted in Chapter 2, there is considerable variation in transfer duty schedules across the 
states, but all use a similar principle of levying duty based on property value (see Table 6, 
Chapter 2.3.2). The marginal duty rate increases with the value of the property, although the 
thresholds involved range considerably from state to state, reflecting in part the large 
differences in housing markets that are evident from the differences in each state’s median 
property price. 
The schedules are slightly progressive, as can be seen in Figure 7 below, which shows the 
amount paid by property value for each of the states. However, the schedules are complex and, 
given a lack of indexation, are flat in most states for properties above median value. This is 
illustrated in Figure 8 below, which shows the marginal transfer duty rate paid in each state by 
property value. 
Figure 7: Transfer duty paid by property value, all states 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data.  
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Figure 8: Marginal transfer duty rate by property value, all states 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
5.2.2 Proposed reforms 
This section outlines the first step of a proposed reform agenda, directed at simplifying the 
transfer duty regime by introducing a single flat rate with a tax-free threshold set as a 
percentage of the median property price in each state. This simplified regime can also serve as 
the basis for other reform options, such as varying transfer duties according to the use of a 
property (see Section 6.1) or the gradual transition from transfer duties via the introduction of a 
recurrent property tax with a broadened base that includes principal places of residence (see 
Section 6.2).  
The basic structure of the proposed reform is depicted in Figure 9 below. 
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Figure 9: Proposed reform: duty free threshold and flat rate of transfer duty 
Source: Authors. 
The modelling results outlined below have been prepared based on the following principles: 
 residential property is the focus (although a similar approach could be extended to other 
classes of property) 
 the new regime raises the same amount of revenue as existing stamp duties in each state 
 the three scenario rates chosen (5%, 6% and 7%) broadly replicate the average rates in 
existing regimes—although a higher rate (7%) will result in a larger threshold and a more 
progressive structure. 
Table 13 below shows the threshold property values needed to achieve revenue neutrality in 
each state for each of the given transfer duty rates. These are provided in dollar values and as 
a percentage of the median property value in each state. No transfer duty would be applied 
below the threshold with the marginal rate applied on values above the threshold. There are no 
tapering provisions. In New South Wales, for example, for a 6 per cent rate, the tax-free 
threshold can be set at 37.6 per cent of the median state-wide property price (i.e. $245,529) and 
the revenue raised would be the same as that under the current transfer duty regime. 
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Table 13: Thresholds ($ value and percentage of median property price) required to 
achieve revenue neutrality at different rates of transfer duty 
State 
Median 
property 
price ($) 
Rate: 5 per cent Rate: 6 per cent Rate: 7 per cent 
Threshold Threshold Threshold 
($) (%) ($) (%) ($) (%) 
NSW 653,697 128,451 19.7 245,529 37.6 335,804 51.4 
VIC 635,872 3,412 0.7 110,905 21.1 189,332 36.1 
QLD 424,966 160,000 37.7 220,983 52.0 267,006 62.8 
WA 481,605 138,221 28.7 213,351 44.3 268,736 55.8 
SA 381,059 63,827 16.8 127,274 33.4 173,839 45.6 
TAS 283,886 103,618 36.5 143,078 50.4 173,738 61.2 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
As can be seen from Table 13, a higher rate of transfer duty will fund a higher tax-free 
threshold. It will also result in a more progressive regime. This is a matter of political choice for 
individual state governments. 
For the purposes of comparison, the case study in Box 7 below presents an alternative reform 
that does not incorporate a tax-free threshold. 
Box 7: Case study: a simplified tax structure that does not meet housing policy goals 
 
  
Instead of using a moving threshold with a flat rate of duty (set at either 5, 6 or 7% ) to 
determine transfer duty levies, we modelled removing the tax threshold on all residential 
properties to determine what the tax rate would be if transfer duty was paid from the first 
dollar. Again, the goal was to achieve a simple structure, and revenue neutrality in each 
state as per current policy settings. 
The results showed that, compared to the current system: 
 The flat rate required to achieve neutrality in this case was generally lower than in other 
scenarios (from 3.5 to 5% across the states), and arguably, tax was distributed more 
equally solely on the basis of property ownership.  
 However: 
 purchasers of lower (including the lowest) value properties would be required to pay 
significantly more from the first dollar 
 all states and territories would experience an early ‘spike’ (see the pattern in the 
case of Victoria in Figure 9 below) with the lowest value purchasers (who could be 
expected to include many first home and lower income buyers) paying more from the 
first dollar in contrast to the relative progressivity of the alternative proposal outlined 
above.  
This scenario provides an example of a reform agenda that aligns with some goals of 
reform such as simplicity, but not with other goals of increased equity and revenue 
sustainability. It also highlights the value of the threshold in determining better housing 
affordability outcomes for taxpayers. 
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5.2.3 Distribution: winners and losers 
Figures 10–12 below show the results of modelling the difference in transfer duty, by property 
value, to be paid under the new system as compared to the existing duty regime in the 
Australian state. For a given property price, a value over zero, or above the x axis, on the graph 
indicates that a purchaser would be paying more under the new system than they would have 
under the old; a value below zero, or below the x axis, on the graph indicates that the purchaser 
would be paying less under the new system than under the old. 
The results in Figure 10 below are for a flat transfer duty rate of 5 per cent. The results suggest 
a rate of 5 per cent is only slightly progressive by property value and in one case delivers a 
regressive outcome. The significant case here is Victoria, because with a 5 per cent rate, 
purchasers of lower value properties will be paying more under the new system while 
purchasers of higher value properties will be paying less. This is because in Victoria, existing 
transfer duty rates for most property values are in excess of 5 per cent8. 
Figure 10: Transfer duty paid by property value under a flat transfer duty rate of 5 per 
cent, less transfer duty paid by property value under the existing system, all states 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
As Figures 11 and 12 below indicate, increasing the transfer duty rate improves the relative 
progressivity of the new system against the old, because the purchasers of lower value 
properties will be paying less while the purchasers of higher value properties will be paying 
more.  
                                               
 
8 In general, the anomaly in amounts paid for properties valued at around $550,000 in the case of Victoria arises 
because the modelling takes into account the current Victorian concession for principal places of residence 
valued at below this amount. Removal of this concession as part of the simplification to a flat rate produces the 
effective ‘jump’ in the schedule when the current and proposed regimes are compared. 
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Figure 11: Transfer duty paid by property value under a flat transfer duty rate of 6 per 
cent, less transfer duty paid by property value under the existing system, all states 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Figure 12: Transfer duty paid by property value under a flat transfer duty rate of 7 per 
cent, less transfer duty paid by property value under the existing system, all states 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
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5.2.4 Beneficiaries of the new system 
This proposed rate schedule, especially with a flat rate of 7 per cent, is progressive by property 
value in that purchasers of high value properties will pay marginally more transfer duty, but a 
majority of home purchasers will pay less. This is reflected in the representation of ‘tipping 
points’ provided in Table 14 below, which shows the property values at which purchasers would 
pay less duty relative to the existing regime in their state. These figures are distinct from the 
thresholds in Table 13 above, which show the tax-free threshold required to achieve revenue 
neutrality. Table 13 indicates that at a 6 per cent flat rate, purchasers of properties valued under 
$245,529 in New South Wales will pay an effective transfer duty rate of 0 per cent. This 
threshold is only a third of the New South Wales median. However, Table 14 indicates that at a 
6 per cent rate, purchasers of properties valued up to $682,500 would still be paying less than 
they do under the existing system. Given the distribution of purchases with respect to the 
median property price, this means that 62.3 per cent of purchasers in New South Wales would 
be paying less. 
Table 14: ‘Break even’ points under new regime—percentage of purchasers paying less 
and maximum property value below which purchasers would pay less 
State 
Rate: 5 per cent Rate: 6 per cent Rate: 7 per cent 
Purchasers 
(%) 
Value 
($) 
Purchasers 
(%) 
Value ($) 
Purchasers 
(%) 
Value 
($) 
NSW 26.4 384,000 62.3 682,500 66.4 760,500 
VIC 1.6 6,000 17.6 303,000 55.0 523,500 
QLD 48.1 429,000 58.6 468,000 63.3 590,500 
WA 26.8 370,500 63.3 546,000 67.1 571,500 
SA 24.3 204,000 61.8 397,500 66.3 426,000 
TAS 53.2 312,000 60.6 327,000 60.6 337,500 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Note: Figures are approximate with an error rate of between 1–2 per cent due to the use of grouped data 
There is variation among the states as to the percentage of purchasers and property values 
below the ‘break even’ point in broad terms. However, under the highest rate of 7 per cent and 
the thresholds calculated above in Table 14, between 55 per cent and 67 per cent of purchasers 
would pay less under the new, simplified and more progressive regime outlined here, while 
state governments would still obtain the same amount of revenue. 
5.3 Conclusions: implications for policy  
Establishing a simpler and more progressive transfer duty regime, as outlined above, is an 
important housing tax reform in and of itself, but the most significant justification for the 
proposed change is that it provides a foundation for more significant reforms. 
Transfer duties have a poor reputation among economists and tax specialists because, it is 
argued, they distort market incentives and, in the case of housing, hinder residential mobility. 
However, like most ‘bad’ policies, there are some benefits to transfer duties that are increasingly 
being recognised. The imposition of an upfront cost of transactions hinders speculation and 
property ‘flipping’; as described in Chapter 2, reforms in Singapore, Hong Kong and British 
Columbia show that transfer duty can serve as an effective and targeted instrument for 
controlling housing bubbles. In reality, most Australian states are already moving in this 
direction with localised responses such as concessions and surcharges adopted to respond to 
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the affordability challenges affecting many Australian housing markets. We argue that if this 
approach is to continue, it should do so in a more systematic and coordinated manner to 
minimise the risk of perverse outcomes and maximise the benefits. Achieving this more 
systematic, coordinated approach will be easier if governments commence the reform process 
from an administratively simple and progressive base, such as the one proposed here. 
The next chapter explores some of the options that can be built on the basic reform outlined 
here. This includes the ways in which a simplified transfer duty design could be used to tackle 
housing speculation and property price inflation without compromising residential mobility, and 
how the transfer duty to land tax switch could be accomplished in a revenue neutral way. 
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 Pathways to housing tax reform: options for changing 
the state property tax mix 
This chapter presents modelling of the revenue and distributional implications of 
two distinct but complementary approaches to housing tax reform designed to meet 
policy objectives described in Chapter 3.  
Each approach draws on different policy settings and instruments while supporting 
similar affordable housing policy goals: 
 Approach one: maintaining transfer duty revenue levels, but with revision of the 
tax-free thresholds (option no.1) and rates (option no.2) to increase transfer 
duties paid by investors but reduce them for owner-occupiers.  
 Approach two: introducing a broad-based recurrent property tax to either fully 
(option no.3) or partially replace transfer duties (option no.4).  
In light of significant political and fiscal challenges to tax reform, the revenue-
neutral, simplified and incremental regime outlined in this chapter offers a 
pragmatic and feasible range of options for redesigning property tax in Australia. 
This chapter builds on the framework developed in Chapter 5 by outlining how the combination 
of a simplified transfer duty regime and a more consistent and efficient approach to property tax 
administration can provide a foundation for more comprehensive property tax reform in the 
Australian federation. 
The chapter describes two distinctive approaches to housing tax reform which, by using 
different policy settings and instruments, support the broader policy goal of a housing tax 
system contributing to more affordable, sustainable housing for all Australians. The reforms 
proposed below assume the prior adoption of the simplified transfer duty regime outlined in 
Chapter 5, while the distributional analysis presented below uses existing 2015–16 transfer duty 
schedules (see Section 2.3.2) as the comparison point. As noted in Section 1.4, all scenarios 
are designed to be revenue neutral for individual states so that, ceteris paribus, reforms will not 
impact on state budgets. This is reasonable in the short term since a no behavioural response 
assumption is what states will adopt when assessing the initial budget impact of any change. 
Once the behavioural response is better understood, states can then respond in subsequent 
budgets by fine-tuning their policy settings. This has been the approach by the ACT since it 
began in 2012 its transition away from land transfer duties towards a greater role for a recurrent 
land tax. The simplified transfer duty regime proposed involves maintaining transfer duties at 
their current level, but adjusting thresholds (option no. 1) and rates (option no. 2) so that 
investors pay proportionally more relative to owner-occupiers. This shift has the potential to 
improve housing affordability and mobility over the longer term (see Section 6.1.1 below), but 
does not incur the political challenges involved in implementing a new, broad-based recurrent 
property tax. These reforms should be regarded as an intermediate step towards a transfer 
duty-recurrent property tax switch. 
The second approach is the implementation of a recurrent property tax, either as a full 
replacement for transfer duty, which would be abolished (option no. 3) or as a partial 
replacement, with transfer duty remaining but levied at a lower rate (option no. 4). 
AHURI report 291 61 
This chapter presents detailed modelling of the revenue and distributional implications of each 
reform based on the comprehensive CoreLogic data set of all residential property transactions 
and values in Australia for 2015–16. The use of this data means that the analysis is arguably 
the most comprehensive and sophisticated modelling of transfer duties across Australian states 
but, as is the case with all transaction taxes, future revenues are highly dependent on market 
conditions. 
The analysis highlights both the complexity of subnational property taxation in Australia and the 
very real political challenges associated with shifting the distribution of property taxation among 
households. However, such a reform strategy, based on a simplified transfer duty regime, will 
enable state governments to gradually make clear and transparent steps towards lowering the 
transfer duty charges. For example, the ‘phase in, phase up’ approach outlined in option no. 4 
provides a simple, transparent strategy that minimises double taxation and minimises budgetary 
risk to state governments. This incremental approach offers the most promising pathway to 
housing tax reform which, over the longer term will achieve the policy objective set out in 
Chapter 1: 
 improve the simplicity and consistency of the property tax system 
 provide a revenue neutral reform pathway for each of the states  
 establish an incremental, adaptable framework designed to minimise political disruption and 
problematic market consequences 
 improve the fairness of the property tax system over time by gradually reducing the relative 
transfer duty paid by purchasers of low value properties contribute to gradually increasing 
home ownership rates by shifting liability for transfer duty from owner-occupiers to investors  
 contribute to housing affordability, residential mobility and the efficiency of the national tax 
system by replacing transfer duties on residential properties with a broad-based recurrent 
property tax. 
6.1 Changing the mix: transfer duty 
6.1.1 Reasons to reform  
As argued in Section 5.2.2, gradually shifting the mix in the transfer duty system so that 
investors pay proportionally more and owner-occupiers pay proportionally less is likely to 
support the housing tax policy goals outlined in Chapter 1 over the longer-term. This argument 
is based on certain assumptions. 
 Reductions in duty for lower-value properties purchased as principal places of residence are 
unlikely to be capitalised into higher prices because, in most sub-markets, increased 
demand from owner-occupier purchasers will be offset by reduced demand from investors—
this is not the case with first home buyers’ grants, which tend to increase net demand in key 
markets leading to rising price increases (Wood, Ong et al. 2010; Eslake 2013). 
 The proposed policy changes will not have a significant impact on rental affordability. While 
the supply of rental stock may decline, this will be offset by falling demand for rental housing 
as home ownership rates increase. As Eslake (2013) argues in relation to negative gearing, 
if a rental property is sold into owner-occupation, there is no net impact on housing supply, 
just a change in use. 
 At the margin, increasing the transaction cost of buying and selling investment properties will 
encourage investors to hold properties for longer periods of time, which will increase security 
for tenants. We also note that type of ownership (private vs institutional landlord) may have a 
significant impact on tenant security (Wood, Ong et al. 2010; Wood, Stewart et al. 2010). 
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In addition to housing affordability and sustainability outcomes, there are other advantages to 
reforming rather than replacing transfer duty. The parameters of such a system can be easily 
set to promote progressivity based on property value. States would not, in the short-term at 
least, have to confront the political challenge of extending the land tax base to the family home 
(Johnston 2016). As noted in Chapter 2, elements of the layered model advocated in this report 
are already being adopted in some jurisdictions—for example, New South Wales and Victoria 
are already providing transfer concessions to owner-occupiers purchasing lower value 
properties, and to first home buyers in particular. A simplified transfer duty regime also 
maintains a coherent base upon which an incremental transition to a land tax can be introduced, 
should state governments wish to do this at a later date. 
The two options for incrementally shifting the transfer duty burden from owner-occupied 
property to investment properties analysed in this section are: 
 Option no. 1: Adaptation of the simplified transfer duty regime outlined in Chapter 5 by 
removing the duty-free threshold for investment properties, with the revenue gained used to 
fund an increase in the duty-free threshold for purchasers who are intending owner-
occupiers. 
 Option no. 2: Retaining the same threshold for all purchasers, but introducing a different 
transfer duty rate depending on the use of the property, so that investors pay a rate that is 
one percentage point higher (although the rate differential could vary) than that paid by 
owner-occupiers. The rates would be calibrated so as to raise the same amount of revenue 
as the baseline model. 
6.1.2 Modelling changes to the transfer duty mix 
Option no. 1: Remove the duty-free threshold for investment properties  
With a duty charged using a flat rate of 6 per cent, the modelling suggests (see Table 15 below) 
an additional $5.4 billion in transfer duty revenue would be raised across Australia if the duty-
free threshold outlined in Chapter 5 was abolished for investment properties. This additional 
revenue would be used to fund an increase in the duty-free threshold for owner-occupiers, 
meaning that they would be paying proportionally less than residential property investors.  
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Table 15: Thresholds and ‘break-even’ points under Reform Option no. 1, compared to 
baseline reform 
State 
Median 
($) 
Baseline reforma 
(6% rate) 
Reform option 1 
(6% rate, investor threshold of zero, revenue 
diverted to increase owner-occupier 
threshold) 
Threshold 
($) 
Break-
even 
value 
($)b 
Revenue 
($m) 
PPR 
threshold 
($) 
PPR break-
even value 
($) 
PPR 
paying 
less 
(%) 
NSW 653,697  245,529  682,500 2,245 313,000 950,000 66 
VIC 524,872  110,905  303,000 815 113,000 
0–304,500  
550,000-
1,300,00c 
N/A 
QLD 424,966  220,983  468,000 1,501 313,000 786,000 85 
WA 481,605  213,351  546,000 488 288,000 986,000 88 
SA 381,059  127,274  397,500 267 163,000 717,000 85 
TAS 283,886  143,078  327,000 94 188,000 473,000 81 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data 
a As outlined in Chapter 5. 
b As in Chapter 5, the ‘break-even’ value refers to the property price below which the purchaser would be paying 
less under the new regime compared to the old. 
c As illustrated in Figure 12, the Victorian case is complex due to the interaction of PPR concessions. The majority 
of home buyers will be better off although a set of buyers between $304,500 and $550,000 would be slightly worse 
off. This model would have to be adapted for the Victorian case. (See existing schedule in Table 6.) 
Again, as with the modelling results in Chapter 5, the Victorian case is a partial exception to the 
overall pattern because the Victorian transfer duty schedule approximates the reform scenario 
being modelled here. For the other states, however, the general effect is to substantially 
increase the threshold and the ‘break-even’ point for owner-occupiers and overall progressivity, 
as can be seen in Figure 13 below. 
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Figure 13: Transfer duty paid by owner-occupiers: baseline reform (with 6% rate) and 
Reform Option 1, each compared to current schedule 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Reform option 2: Impose a transfer duty surcharge on investment properties 
An alternative approach to creating differential treatment of investors and owner-occupiers is to 
retain thresholds for both categories of purchaser but introduce what is effectively a transfer 
duty surcharge on investors relative to owner-occupiers. This would have two distributional 
implications: 
1 Relative to Reform Option 1, the incidence of higher transfer duty charges will fall on higher 
value investment properties (see Figure 14 below).  
2 There is scope to vary the quantum of revenue raised (and the magnitude of the difference in 
treatment of investors and owner-occupiers) by varying the size of the transfer duty 
surcharge. In other words, the reform is scalable.  
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Figure 14: Distributional effect of Reform Options 1 and 2 on investors relative to 
baseline reform 
Source: Authors. 
In practical terms, Option 2 involves retaining the duty-free threshold for all property while 
charging different transfer duty rates according to the use of the property. In the modelling 
below, the threshold that applies under the baseline reform (with a 6% rate) has been retained, 
but the transfer duty rates for investors and owner-occupiers have been adjusted so that (i) the 
same amount of revenue is raised and (ii) the investor rate is one percentage point above the 
owner-occupier rate. As shown in Table 16 below, in the case of New South Wales, both 
investors and owner-occupiers would receive a duty-free threshold of $246,000, but on the 
value in excess of this amount, owner-occupiers would pay a transfer duty rate of 5.88 per cent 
and investors would pay one of 6.88 per cent. For a median value property, this means that 
investors would pay $3,588 more than under the baseline reform, and owner-occupiers would 
save an additional $490. The reduction in transfer duty for owner-occupiers is modest because, 
according to ATO data, the overwhelming majority of investment properties are valued at below 
the median property price in each state.  
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Table 16: Duty-free thresholds and different transfer duty rates under Reform Option 2, 
compared to baseline reform 
State 
Median 
($) 
Baseline reform 
(6% rate) 
Reform option 2 
(same threshold for all properties but 
investors pay 1 p.p. higher rate) 
Threshold 
($) 
Break-even 
value ($) 
Threshold 
($) 
PPR rate 
(%) 
Investor rate 
(%) 
NSW 653,697  245,529  682,500 246,000 5.88 6.88 
VIC 524,872  110,905  303,000 111,000 5.85 6.85 
QLD 424,966  220,983  468,000 221,000 5.86 6.86 
WA 481,605  213,351  546,000 213,000 5.85 6.85 
SA 381,059  127,274  397,500 127,000 5.85 6.85 
TAS 283,886  143,078  327,000 143,000 5.91 6.91 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Other options: layering  
This section has contained the results of modelling for two reform options, both of which involve 
shifting the transfer duty mix so that those buying property in which to live (owner-occupiers) 
pay less duty than those buying property as an investment. The rationale for these reforms is 
that a gradual shift in mix of this nature will contribute to achieving overall housing policy goals 
such as improved affordability and greater security for tenants.  
The layered approach means that state governments may choose to impose transfer duty 
surcharges on particular classes of purchasers, such as non-resident foreign buyers or buyers 
of especially high-value or ‘premium’ properties, or to extend additional concessions (beyond 
the standard threshold) to others, such as first home buyers. A number of state governments 
are already doing this (see Table 6 in Chapter 2), but arguably on a more ad hoc basis. A 
layered regime offers a more coherent framework within which different rates can be assessed 
on their merits and ensure that complexity added to the system by their introduction is offset by 
their advantages with regard to policy outcomes. 
6.1.3 Making the transition: implementation and administration 
In this section we have outlined some of the potential benefits of a simplified model that treats 
investors differently to owner-occupiers, as well as the distributional consequences for each 
group. However, subjecting investment properties to higher transfer duty relative to owner-
occupiers does create certain risks. There have long been concerns that investment-fuelled 
property price bubbles enhance the incentives for individuals to ‘game’ the system (Laurence 
2004). For example, there are concerns that some property investors systematically exploit CGT 
deductions and exemptions (Cross 2014). The reform options outlined above may create 
incentives for investors to misrepresent the intended use of a property at purchase or to change 
its use shortly thereafter, although implementation of a national register as outlined in Chapter 4 
would minimise this risk.  
The financial incentive to do so may be considerable, particularly at the higher end of the 
market. Table 17 below presents for each of the states the hypothetical example of a residential 
property worth one and a half times the median price. As can be seen, the differences in duty 
paid by owner-occupiers versus investors are in many cases substantial—under option 1 in 
New South Wales, investors pay over $18,000 more than owner-occupiers while in Tasmania, 
an investor would pay close to twice the amount paid by an owner-occupier. The difference is 
not so marked under option 2, but it is not negligible. 
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Table 17: Duty paid by owner-occupiers and investors for a property valued at 1.5 times 
state-wide median value, Reform Options 1 and 2 compared to baseline reform, all states 
State 
1.5 x 
median 
property 
price ($) 
Duty paid, 
baseline ($) 
Duty paid, Option 1 ($) Duty paid, Option 2 ($) 
Owner-
occupiers 
Investors 
Owner-
occupiers 
Investors 
NSW 980,545 44,073 40,053 58,833 43,221 50,566 
VIC 787,308 40,578 40,458 47,238 39,571 46,334 
QLD 637,449 24,987 19,467 38,247 24,383 28,548 
WA 722,407 30,564 26,064 43,344 29,795 34,889 
SA 571,588 26,675 24,515 34,295 25,995 30,441 
TAS 425,829 16,970 14,270 25,550 16,710 19,538 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
There are precedents for imposing different rates of transfer duty depending on the use to be 
made of the property after purchase (see Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia in Table 8 
in Chapter 2). However, compliance with these regimes is dependent on the capacity of State 
Revenue Offices being able to verify the use of a property, both in terms of having the 
necessary resources to carry out appropriate audits, and in terms of having access to the data 
needed to detect potential non-compliance. Regimes that use a combination of self-reporting 
complemented by data-matching with the ATO would protect the integrity of the regime. 
There are circumstances in which a change of use soon after purchase may be reasonable and 
even desirable and there needs to be capacity within the system to accommodate the resulting 
changes in liability if an owner-occupied property becomes an investment property or vice versa 
within a short timeframe. In these cases, an appropriate approach would be a pro-rata 
arrangement similar to that used with Victoria’s principle place of residence transfer duty 
concession (SROVic 2017), whereby owners become liable to either pay or be refunded a 
percentage of the difference in transfer duty paid, with the percentage based on how long since 
purchase the change in use occurred; after 12 months, the percentage would be 80 per cent 
and would drop by 20 percentage points per annum until it reached zero. 
6.2 Changing the mix: transfer duty and recurrent property tax 
6.2.1 Reasons to reform 
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, there are well-established arguments for replacing transfer duties 
on residential property transactions with a recurrent land tax and such a shift has long been 
proposed as a reform priority in Australia (Henry, Harmer et al. 2009: 417; ACT Treasury 2012; 
Bentley and D’Cruz 2016; Daley and Coates 2015; Wood and Winter 2012; Productivity 
Commission 2017b). All state governments have actively reviewed this option in recent years 
and, as described in Section 3.4, various proposals for managing the transition have been 
developed and considered. However, while the vast majority of economists, tax and housing 
policy experts support it, such a change in the tax mix presents formidable political and 
budgetary challenges, and these barriers have become even more acute as state dependence 
on transfer duty revenue has increased in recent years (Johnson 2016; Bentley and D’Cruz 
2016; Eslake 2015). Given the political economy of a transfer duty to land tax transition, it is not 
surprising that the ACT is the only jurisdiction that has actually begun to implement it although 
all state governments are using emergency service and other hypothecated levies as de facto 
property taxes (see Box 8 below). 
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6.2.2 Modelling changes to the transfer duty and recurrent property tax mix 
As argued in Chapter 4, any switch from transfer duty to land tax should be imposed on the 
broadest base possible and use a Capital Improved Value plus Highest and Best Use valuation 
method (Daley and Coates 2015; Kelly, Hunter et al. 2013; IPART 2016; Mangioni and Warren 
2014). The existing state land tax is levied on too narrow a base. A better approach is to use the 
local government rates base, although a necessary precondition of this would be the 
establishment of a consistent, state-wide system of valuations (Henry, Harmer et al. 2009: 
71,103). Collection of the expanded property tax should be integrated with local government 
rates and administered on a state-wide basis, using existing emergency service levies as a 
model (see Table 9 in Chapter 2). Ideally, existing land taxes would be integrated into a new 
broad-based property tax, but this is not essential.  
The reform options modelled in this section are designed to be layered onto the existing land 
tax regime and both assume that the baseline reform has been implemented. To assist in 
distinguishing between the existing and proposed regimes, we adopt from here the term 
‘recurrent property tax’ to describe our reforms. 
The two options analysed in detail are: 
 Option no. 3: Abolition of transfer duty and replacement with a recurrent property tax that 
raises the same amount of revenue. As with transfer duty, a tax-free threshold would apply, 
with a flat rate levied on the property value above this amount. 
 Option no. 4: An incremental reduction in transfer duty rates, funded by a broad-based 
recurrent property tax set at a rate that raises the equivalent amount of revenue. 
Reform option 3: Full replacement of transfer duty with recurrent property tax 
The modelling indicates that the cost of abolishing existing transfer duty on residential property 
in the six Australian states in 2015–16 is $12.7 billion. As noted in Chapter 1, this figure differs 
from revenues reported in state budget papers because the total duty reported in those applies 
to all classes of property, including residential, commercial and primary production among 
others. Table 18 below shows the recurrent property tax rate needed to raise sufficient revenue 
to cover the full cost of the transfer duty abolition. A tax-free threshold applies, of the same 
value as that used in the baseline reform (with a transfer duty rate of 6%). The recurrent 
property tax rates shown are levied on property values over the threshold. As in the baseline 
reform case, a higher threshold would produce a more progressive land tax structure. 
Table 18: Recurrent property tax rates required to fully fund transfer duty abolition, and 
annual property tax payable according to property value, all states 
State 
Current transfer 
duty revenue ($m) 
Threshold ($) 
Required recurrent 
property tax rate (%) 
NSW 5,413  245,529  0.3171 
VIC 3,987  110,905  0.3062 
QLD 1,834  220,983  0.3828 
WA 829  213,351  0.2476 
SA 653  127,274  0.3417 
TAS  127   143,078  0.3349 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
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The recurrent property tax payable under these rates for each state is shown in Figure 15 
below. 
Figure 15: Recurrent property tax paid by property value under Option 3, all states 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Table 19 below compares the annual property tax payments that would apply in each state at 
different property price points to the nominal annual cost of transfer duty, calculated on the 
basis of the annual property turnover rate in each state. It can be seen that below, at and above 
the median, the difference in annual liability is negligible; owners would be effectively paying the 
same, but in the case of transfer duty, the payment is a lump sum paid up front, while in the 
case of the recurrent property tax, it is spread out over time. 
Table 19: Nominal annual transfer duty and annual recurrent property tax compared for 
selected price points relative to the median, all states 
State 
Averag
e 
turnove
r rate 
(%) 
Total transfer duty 
($) 
Annual transfer duty ($) 
over average holding 
period 
Annual recurrent property 
tax ($) 
Median 
1.5 x 
median 
0.5 x 
median 
Median 
1.5 x 
median 
0.5 x 
median 
Median 
1.5 x 
median 
0.5 x 
median 
NSW 5.29  24,490  
 
44,101  
4,879  1,296 2,333  258 1,296 2,331  258  
VIC 5.10 24,838  40,584  9,092  1,267  2,070  464  1,267  2,071  464 
QLD 6.38 12,239  24,988  0  781  1,594 0  781  1,594  0 
WA 4.13 16,095  30,543  1,647  665  1,261  68 665  1,260  68 
SA 5.69 15,227  26,659  3,795  866  1,517 216 868  1,518  216 
TAS  5.58 8,448  16,965  0  471  947 0 472  947  0 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
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Although property owners who hold properties for an average period of time are no worse off, 
significant political and economic challenges remain: 
 In the absence of complex grandfathering and transition compensation, there remains a risk 
of double taxation of recent property buyers who were subject to full transfer duty. 
 There is redistribution from those who transact property regularly (and incur high transfer 
duties) to those who hold properties for longer than average rates, which may effectively 
penalise those investors offering longer-term leases to tenants. 
 The recurrent property tax (in excess of $2,000 per annum for properties above the median 
price in Victoria and NSW) will have a significant impact on household cash flows and pose 
particular challenges for ‘asset-rich, income-poor’ households, including pensioners whose 
family homes are located in suburbs where there have been recent substantial property price 
appreciation.  
At the Commonwealth level, consideration would need to be given to whether investors could 
deduct the cost of this additional layer of property tax against their federal income tax liability. 
Finally, as with the earlier changes canvassed, there would be behavioural responses that 
would need to be considered. Given these challenges, a more politically pragmatic approach, 
that would also minimise the risk of market disruption, would be to incrementally phase out 
transfer duties on residential property purchases using an approach similar to that adopted in 
the ACT in 2012. Reform option 4 models the property tax rates required to fund a gradual 
phasing out of transfer duties on residential properties. 
Box 8: Property tax reforms in the ACT 
Sources: ACT Treasury (2013), McLaren (2013) and Murray (2016). 
In the 2012–13 budget, and echoing many recommendations in the 2010 Henry Tax review, 
the ACT Government committed to undertake significant reform of its land tax system. The 
reforms, which include long-term structural reform over a transitional period of 20 years, 
advance the proposal that states and territories will benefit over the longer term by shifting 
their revenue sources to more efficient land value taxes (LVTs). In the unique context of 
having no local government, the practical basis of this initiative includes the application of a 
progressive rate of land tax in the form of general rates to all owner-occupied homes, and a 
reduction in land tax on investment and commercial properties. With this additional revenue, 
the territory government will substantially reduce and gradually abolish transfer duties on 
conveyances. Key social and economic objectives included increasing revenue independence 
to the territory and improving both efficiency and transparency, as well as better equality in the 
territory’s taxation system. 
In a staged approach to reform, key elements of the land tax reform included: 
 the abolition of duty on conveyances 
 the application of general rates as a broad-based land tax for revenue replacement 
 improvements to the progressivity of the revenue replacement base (i.e. general rates) 
 abolishing of nuisance rates, for example duty on insurance 
 adjustments to concession schemes to cushion reform impacts on key groups, e.g. general 
rates pension rebate increases, increases to threshold for home buyer concession scheme 
by 25 per cent, and provisional eligibility for a rates deferral scheme extended to non-
pensioners. 
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Reform option 4: Partial replacement of transfer duty with land tax 
In the ACT, rather than introducing a full transfer duty/property tax switch in a single reform, an 
incremental phase in/phase out strategy has been adopted (see Box 8 above). The fourth 
reform option to be reviewed here is based on a similar principle. The proposal modelled is to 
reduce the transfer duty rate and to fund this reduction through the introduction of a broad-
based recurrent property tax (assuming no behavioural response). Because under an 
incremental approach the amount required to attain revenue neutrality would be significantly 
less than under Reform Option 3, the required recurrent property tax rate would also be lower. 
Once states have established a recurrent residential property tax framework integrated with the 
administration of local government rates, it is possible to reduce transfer duty rates 
incrementally. Starting from a transfer duty rate of 6 per cent (while retaining the thresholds 
outlined for that rate in Chapter 5), if transfer duty cuts were implemented on an annual basis 
over a decade, then the annual rate cut required per annum would be 0.6 percentage points. 
The rate of recurrent property tax required to fund an 0.6 percentage point reduction in transfer 
duty in each state, and the resulting amount of property tax on median value properties is 
presented in the following Table 20. 
Table 20: Recurrent property tax rate required to fund 0.6 percentage point reduction in 
transfer duty and resulting annual property tax paid on median value properties, all 
states 
State 
Threshold 
(baseline reform, 
6% rate) 
Required rate of 
recurrent property 
tax to reduce transfer 
duty rate by 0.6 p.p. 
Median ($) 
Annual recurrent 
property tax paid 
on median-priced 
property ($) 
NSW  245,529  0.0317 653,697 129.24 
VIC  110,905  0.0306 524,872 126.64 
QLD  220,983  0.0383 424,966 78.12 
WA  213,351  0.0248 481,605 66.61 
SA  127,274  0.0342 381,059 86.88 
TAS   143,078  0.0335 283,886 47.28 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Table 20 indicates the incremental cost of a gradual process that winds transfer duty back from 
6 per cent to zero over ten years (excluding any behavioural response). The cost of a more 
dramatic reduction is shown in Table 21 below. With the same starting transfer duty rate of 6 
per cent, the proposed recurrent property tax rates shown in Table 21 would be sufficient to 
halve the rate of transfer duty to 3 per cent. Table 21 also contains the annual property tax and 
nominal annual transfer duty applied in each state for a property valued at the median property 
price (again, assuming no behavioural response).  
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Table 21: Rate of recurrent property tax required to reduce transfer duty rate from 6 per 
cent to 3 per cent and indicative annual payments for both, all states 
State 
Threshold 
(baseline reform, 
6% rate) 
Required rate of 
property tax to 
reduce transfer 
duty rate to 3% ($) 
Annual transfer 
duty paid on 
median-priced 
property (3% rate) 
($) 
Annual recurrent 
property tax paid 
on median-priced 
property ($) 
NSW 246,000 0.1586 12,231 647 
VIC 111,000 0.1531 12,416 634 
QLD 221,000 0.1914 6,119 390 
WA 213,000 0.1238 8,058 333 
SA 127,000 0.1708 7,622 434 
TAS  143,000 0.1674 4,227 236 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Once the framework supporting a broad-based recurrent property tax is in place, governments 
can gradually increase the rate and earmark the proceeds to providing corresponding 
reductions in transfer duty. As noted in Table 21 above, an 0.6 percentage point reduction in 
transfer duties can be funded with a recurrent property tax of between $47 and $129 per annum 
on medium value property. Such an approach does not lock states into a particular trajectory 
but allows for adaptation to circumstances. Rates can be modified depending on behavioural 
responses and wider market conditions, thereby minimising risk, both to government budgets 
and to housing market stability. It must also be stressed that this is a long-term reform agenda 
and is not designed to rapidly improve housing affordability. As outlined in Box 8 above, this is 
essentially the approach that has been adopted in the ACT. 
6.2.3  The political economy of the transition to recurrent property tax  
The efficiency dividends of a broad-based recurrent tax on property are well understood (Daley 
and Coates 2015; Henry, Harmer et al. 2009; Mangioni 2016a). There are also a number of 
political barriers to reform. The most prominent concerns in the Australian debate which were 
analysed in Chapter 3 include: 
 double taxation of those owners who have recently purchased and paid full transfer duty, 
although this can be managed through a gradual transition as discussed above 
 cash flow challenges—given that a recurrent property tax is a tax on wealth deferral, 
provisions have to be developed for ‘asset-rich, income-poor’ property owners, such as 
pensioners living in the family home 
 visibility—a political advantage of a one-off transfer duty is that it is embedded in transaction 
costs whereas a recurrent property tax is visible to the taxpayer. Administrative strategies for 
addressing this issue were outlined in Chapter 4 and include the collection of local 
government rates and state-level property taxes. Longer term strategies include the 
collection of property taxes through the national income tax withholding regime. 
Distributional considerations 
What is less well appreciated is that, from a life course perspective, revenue neutral transition 
from transfer duty to land tax will mean that owners who buy and sell properties regularly will be 
advantaged over those who hold properties for longer periods. Yet longer-term property 
investment is recognised to be an important pre-condition for increasing the length of tenancies 
and thus, for improving security for tenants. We also note that a number of strategies are 
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required to improve tenant security including law reform and addressing barriers to institutional 
investment in rental property.  
From a modelling perspective, the critical determinants of the property tax rate required to fund 
a given reduction in transfer duty are both the value of the housing stock and the frequency with 
which it is transacted (i.e. the turnover rate, or the percentage of housing stock that is sold in 
any given year).  
The distribution of the frequency of sales across property values is not a uniform one. Figure 15 
below shows that the distribution is essentially bimodal. This reflects the differences in prices for 
houses and units. These data demonstrate that there are more lower-valued properties, and 
that transactions relating to them account for a larger share of the total value of transactions in 
any given period. More analysis is required to know whether, in any given period (say, ten 
years), a higher valued property is likely to change hands more often than a lower-valued 
property. A related argument, which also requires more detailed analysis, is that younger 
owner-occupiers tend to buy and sell more regularly as they trade up the property ladder from 
small units to larger detached homes (Olsberg and Winters 2005). This suggests that moving to 
a recurrent property tax may benefit younger, first home buyers and help improve 
intergenerational equity. 
Figure 16: Proportion of sales by property value, all states 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
This report has included detailed analysis of historical turnover rates, which have revealed 
significant differences in average turnover rates in different states. These range from 6.38 per 
cent in Queensland down to 4.13 per cent in Western Australia (see Table 21 above for other 
states). A higher turnover rate and high property values together mean transfer duty will yield 
significant revenue and a higher property tax rate will be required to achieve a revenue neutral 
transition. Queensland also has the highest proportion of rental property of any of the 
jurisdictions which helps to explain its higher turnover rate. 
Because a revenue neutral transfer duty to property tax switch will benefit those owners who 
buy and sell more regularly, a detailed analysis was undertaken to identify which properties (by 
state, value and type) have a turnover rate above the state average and which would therefore 
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benefit from this kind of transition. The aim was to establish the general trends, but the analysis 
identified significant variations among states and between houses and units. This variation is 
visually represented in Figure 17 below. 
Figure 17: Visual representation of turnover rates on different property values and types, 
by variation from state average, all states 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Notes:  
- H indicates houses, U indicates units.  
- Red shading indicates a turnover rate below the state average for that property type at that property value; green 
shading indicates a turnover rate above the state average.  
- Caution is needed in interpretation as data is unweighted. This means that individual data points are misleading, 
especially at the extreme ends of property value. 
- Dash indicates state median property price. 
The degree of variation and its lack of consistency suggests that the factors determining 
turnover rates are complex and extend beyond price and property type (Leal, Parsons et al. 
2017).  
While it is difficult to draw general conclusions based on price there are likely to be generational 
and life cycle effects of relevance to reform options. For example, first home buyers may benefit 
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from a transition to recurrent property tax and a reduction in transfer duty because they may 
make more property purchases than a more mature, higher income household. It is also 
possible that purchasers in more expensive markets, such as capital cities, will also benefit 
because they are less likely to be able to enter the market by purchasing a family home, but will 
instead ‘trade-up’ from smaller units into larger houses.  
More analysis is required on the spatial distribution of any reforms, but as noted above, lowering 
transfer duty rates may improve intergenerational equity by reducing barriers to entry into home 
ownership. On one hand, such reform has the potential to encourage speculation in property by 
both investors and owner-occupiers if it is not countered with other measures, such as capital 
gains tax reform. This is, however, the subject of another project in this AHURI Inquiry, and 
beyond the scope of this report. 
Intergovernmental incentives and equalisation 
It is also important to consider the intergovernmental dimension of any transition to a recurrent 
property tax. The Commonwealth Government will benefit from an efficiency dividend 
(Eccleston, Woolley et al. 2013), and part of this windfall could be used to encourage state 
governments to undertake reforms. This strategy was central to the successful implementation 
of national competition policy in the early 1990s while a more recent OECD study of successful 
subnational tax reforms also highlighted the importance of national leadership (Blochliger and 
Vammalle 2012). As noted in Chapter 4, Commonwealth Government leadership will also be 
required to advance data collection and standardisation protocols to underpin the reforms 
proposed in this report.  
Australia’s system of fiscal equalisation via GST distribution to the states and territories, 
administered by the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) and under review at the time of 
writing, will also influence the total revenue available to states following the transition from 
transfer duty to a recurrent tax on residential property. The Productivity Commission’s 
Horizontal Fiscal Equalisation Draft Report (2017: 98) specifically notes that Australia’s 
horizontal fiscal equalisation regime is not policy neutral and a unilateral decision by one state 
to broaden its land tax base to fund a reduction in stamp duties would likely result in a 
significant reduction in GST share. The fact that impacts are much smaller in the case of 
multilateral reform again highlights the need for a nationally coordinated reform strategy. 
Table 22: Impact of transfer duty to recurrent property tax transition on equalisation 
payments (2014–15 data) 
State 
Change in GST grant 
($ per capita) ($ million) (%) 
NSW 35 262 1.7 
VIC −41 −239 −1.8 
QLD 134 638 5.2 
WA −105 −269 −11.1 
SA −162 −274 −5.0 
TAS −62 −32 −1.6 
NT −218 −84 −7.9 
ACT −4 −1 −0.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on CoreLogic data. 
Table 22 highlights the possible impacts identified by the Productivity Commission (2017a) and 
shows that replacing the current transfer duty in 2014–15 with a broad-based property tax as 
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outlined above has different implications across jurisdictions. The most significant factor driving 
this result is the widely varying property turnover rates. What causes the increase of $638 
million in the GST grant for Queensland is that property turnover rates there are some 19 per 
cent higher than the national average. The higher apparent transfer duty base in Queensland as 
estimated by the CGC will be replaced with a land tax that gives no attention to turnover, 
resulting in Queensland having a smaller share of the national base of land and therefore 
requiring a greater GST grant share. Put differently, in 2014–15, Queensland’s share of the 
transfer duty base was 18.8 per cent while its share of the land tax base is only 15.9 per cent. 
The importance of differences in property turnover rates across the federation will be 
compensated for through the GST grant, but will result in a redistribution of that grant across the 
federation. 
The more general implication of the analysis presented above is that when the CGC applies the 
principle of full horizontal fiscal equalisation when advising the Commonwealth Government on 
the distribution of the GST-based grant to states, the resulting redistribution of the grant can 
make it that much harder for individual states to justify such a major and controversial reform 
when gains can be distributed away while the political risk remains. Solutions do exist and ought 
to be examined. These include quarantining part of the new land tax revenue (and a similar 
amount of overall expenditure) or, as noted above, a Commonwealth supplementary grant or 
incentive payment additional to current grants which are also quarantined. Here the 
Commonwealth Government must recognise the challenge that states confront when 
implementing a transition from a transfer duty to a broad-based property tax and put in place 
policies to ensure that all states benefit from the long run financial dividends of such reform. 
6.3 Policy implications 
This chapter has built on the simplified transfer duty regime presented in Chapter 5, presenting 
four options through which this baseline reform can be developed to address wider housing 
policy goals.  
 Option no. 1 is to remove the duty-free threshold for investment properties, with the revenue 
gained used to fund an increase in the duty-free threshold for purchasers who are intending 
owner-occupiers. 
 Option no. 2 is to retain the same threshold for all purchasers, but introducing a different 
transfer duty rate depending on the intended use of the property, so that investors pay a rate 
that is one percentage point higher than that paid by owner-occupiers. The rates would be 
calibrated so as to raise the same amount of revenue as the baseline model. 
 Option no. 3 is to abolish transfer duty in full, replacing it with a recurrent property tax that 
raises the same amount of revenue. As with transfer duty, a tax-free threshold would apply, 
with a flat rate levied on the property value above this amount. 
 Option no. 4 is to reduce transfer duty rates (by approximately half), funding the decrease 
with a broad-based recurrent property tax set at a rate that raises the equivalent amount of 
revenue. 
Each of these reforms has different effects. For example, under Option 1, a higher proportion of 
transfer duty falls on investors with lower value properties, while in Option 2, it is investors with 
higher value properties who will pay more. Option no. 3 is simple and transparent, but would 
require considerable care in implementation owing to the political economy of such a significant 
shift in the taxation mix. Option 4 is a more incremental version of Option 3 but, like Option 3, 
may create an incentive for speculative investment in the market, which would be contrary to 
wider housing policy goals of improved affordability and security of tenure for renters. 
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The purpose of outlining these options and indicating their distributional impacts is to 
underscore to policy-makers how a simplified, administratively robust transfer duty regime can 
be used as a foundation for further, more ambitious and more nuanced reform. The policy 
implications are explored in greater detail in the following chapter. 
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 Policy development options: a pathway to subnational 
property reform 
There is a growing consensus across all levels of government that a coordinated approach to 
subnational housing tax reform would support a fairer and more sustainable housing system. 
Yet the dynamics shaping housing markets are complex, and it is increasingly clear that there 
are no simple solutions. A wide range of variables influence housing affordability and any 
policies which may place a downward pressure on property prices are highly contested. In part, 
this is because residential property is both the most significant store of household wealth and, at 
the same time, a basic right and social good that should be widely available at reasonable cost. 
In recent decades housing has become increasingly commoditised and regarded as an asset 
which should be used for wealth creation rather than a social good. Arguably government policy 
designed to promote home ownership and investment has contributed to this trend. Above all, 
this structural and ideational shift demands a re-conceptualisation of housing affordability and 
accessibility.  
Yet the politics of housing affordability have led to greater recognition of the social and 
economic costs of rising residential property prices. Despite decades of sustained policy efforts 
to incentivise home ownership, the costs of high property price inflation are becoming clearer 
and include: 
 a prolonged (half century) decline in home ownership rates in Australia  
 higher numbers of renters, especially among younger Australians 
 rising household debt  
 increases in vacant dwelling numbers, underutilisation and/or shortfalls in some types of 
housing supply  
 higher social housing waiting lists9 
 increased levels of speculative investment, at the expense of aspiring home owners. 
These housing policy challenges also interact with broader concerns such as the structural 
deterioration in Australia’s public finances over the last decade and questions over the capacity 
for governments to sustain and promote investment in housing supply in Australia. As 
Australia’s housing affordability predicament has been two decades in the making, it will 
consequently take a concerted effort using a wide range of policy instruments and strategies to 
address the challenge.  
The tax treatment of real property and the income derived have contributed to the recent decline 
in housing affordability and accessibility in Australia. Multiple national-scale reports reiterate that 
current tax settings have significantly contributed to inefficient and inequitable housing policy 
outcomes, and that subnational reforms are necessary to creating a fairer and more sustainable 
housing system in Australia. This is reiterated again in the recent release (October 2017) of the 
Productivity Commission’s five year Productivity Review (Productivity Commission 2017b: 8) 
which outlines the strain on Australian cities caused by the lack of access to suitable housing 
and employment, in turn exacerbated by transfer duties on residential housing constraining 
housing mobility and resulting in the retention of property that is under-utilised and 
unproductive. The report also highlights the cost of transfer duty to community welfare: every 
                                               
 
9 We acknowledge that there are other reasons for this, such as declining government spending on social 
housing (see Tomlinson 2017). 
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additional dollar collected through duty transfer taxes on residential properties reduces the living 
standards of Australian households by 72 cents10.  
This report directly addresses the housing challenges facing the Australian community by 
setting out an incremental and politically sustainable subnational tax reform strategy that will 
create a fairer and more sustainable housing system in Australia. It does so through a revenue-
neutral strategy and a set of transition options which will provide government with flexibility to 
minimise political, fiscal and market disruptions. Moreover, if done systematically, subnational 
reform can facilitate the national coordination of property tax between local, state and 
Commonwealth governments as a foundation to build a modern and effective basis for fairer 
and sustainable tax administration in Australia. For this to happen, it will be important to 
establish a long-term (20 year) strategy for reforming subnational property taxes which consists 
of three sequential phases. This strategy demands specific short (1–3 year), medium term (3–
10 year) and long-term objectives, which are outlined in this report. Based on evidence 
gathered for this project, we believe that this long-term incremental approach will minimise the 
risk of short-term political and housing market disruption. The key principles and strategies 
related to the design of these reforms, including our findings of the scenario modelling and their 
implications for policy development, are detailed in the following sections. 
7.1 Principles of subnational property tax reform 
Existing mechanisms for raising property tax revenue in Australia are fragmented, complicated, 
and administered in a consistent or systematic way. State government budgets currently rely 
heavily on transfer duty revenues, which are known as an inefficient and volatile tax, whereas 
efficient, recurrent taxes on property values are only narrowly applied. This report sets out some 
key strategies necessary to reform the current system through a staged approach including the 
design of a coherent and coordinated administrative base and valuation regime; the 
simplification of the current transfer duty regime; and a longer-term strategy to transition into a 
broad-based recurrent tax on property and the gradual removal of transfer duty for purchasers 
of residential property. 
These reforms are supported by a number of broadly applied principles. First, the property tax 
system we have outlined is based on administrative foundations that will enhance the 
effectiveness of subsequent reforms. To be successful, all levels of government need to 
commit to greater administrative cooperation and increased harmonisation with respect 
to valuation methods and property tax bases. While this raises political and other 
challenges, intergovernmental cooperation forms the backbone of the strategy and will 
determine the extent to which the reforms are implemented. At the same time, states should 
retain the right to determine or vary property tax rates and thresholds on the basis of their 
revenue needs or policy priorities and/or timing of reforms. While integrated administration 
systems and harmonised valuation methods are necessary, we acknowledge the importance of 
states’ independence with respect to revenue-raising and policy-setting agendas.  
Second, given current state governments’ reliance on property taxation generally and transfer 
duties in particular, the reforms outlined in this report are all framed as being revenue 
neutral to avoid the political challenges associated with having to increase non-property 
taxes to fund reform. Some recent proposals to replace state transfer duties with a recurrent 
property tax (see Section 3.4) require the Commonwealth Government to fund or underwrite 
any-short term revenue gap experienced by the states. While technically feasible any reform 
                                               
 
10 Due to lower investment and mobility effects (Productivity Commission 2017b: 8 citing a recently released 
Treasury working paper). 
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strategy which requires direct financial assistance from the Commonwealth Government is less 
likely to succeed than an approach which individual state governments can implement 
unilaterally (albeit within a national framework) without having a detrimental impact on their 
budgets.  
A third principle, building on a revenue neutral strategy, is that states should commit over the 
medium to long term to significantly reduce transfer duties (especially on lower value 
owner-occupied property) by increasing revenue from a broad-based property tax. The 
long-term strategy to remove transfer duties from the Australian property tax system and 
replace it with a broad-based recurrent property tax acknowledges the current inefficiencies in 
the transfer duty system. In its place is will be a framework that provides revenue sustainability, 
stability and efficiency through a recurrent property tax, with a simple and progressive structure 
that distributes tax burdens more equitably from a housing affordability perspective. 
Finally, despite being designed to balance technical policy goals with political imperatives, any 
tax reform strategy requires significant leadership. The Commonwealth Government should 
commit to assisting with and engaging in the coordination of property tax reforms, 
encouraging states and territories through various incentives to act in a coordinated and 
strategic manner.  
7.1.1 Short-term policy objectives: 1–3 years 
The policy objectives of the first phase of the strategy focus on improving the administration of 
subnational property tax systems and simplifying transfer duties applied to residential property 
transactions. Administrative measures include clarification of the roles and functions of different 
tiers of government, as well as increased coherence and consistency between national, state 
and local governments with respect to data sharing and the alignment of property valuation and 
tax collection methods.  
 The short-term objectives related to administrative reform include: 
 The development of a consistent national approach to land valuation and establishing 
a national register of residential property (as per Research Question 1). A key reform 
objective is to promote consistency between different government levels and jurisdictions in 
the methods used to value and assess properties in Australia. Based on research evidence, 
we propose that a consistent approach to valuation is achieved by a valuation regime based 
on capital improved value (CIV) where the property is being used for its highest and best use 
(HBU). In addition, a national level database of property ownership and values provide a 
solid administrative foundation from which to build a scheduler property tax regime. The 
adoption of automated valuation methods (AVM), as is occurring in other jurisdictions, is 
advantageous to a national system given it values property in a cost-effective, 
contemporaneous and comprehensive manner.  
 Increasing the sharing of property-related data across all levels of government (RQ1). 
The key advantages to data sharing between local, state and Commonwealth governments 
is its potential to minimise both compliance costs on taxpayers and administrative costs for 
governments, improving the integrity and transparency of the regime. 
 Integrating the administration and collection of local and state property taxes (RQ1). 
Extending current local governments’ role as collectors of state government taxes (e.g. fire 
and emergency services levies), recurrent property taxes should be collected jointly with 
local government taxes, involving sharing of administration between government tiers and 
the use of common valuation methods.  
The second element of the short-term reform agenda is the simplification of the current duty 
transfer system as an incremental but important first step towards broader property tax 
reform (RQ3). While retaining transfer duty is not often advocated by property tax reform 
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proponents, the tax does raise significant revenue and can serve to moderate housing markets. 
Moreover, establishing a fairer and simpler transfer duty regime will provide a foundation for 
more substantive reform. Initially, and alongside increased consistency in property valuation 
methods, changes should include the simplification of existing transfer duties through the 
implementation of a generous tax-free threshold on residential property and a flat rate applied to 
any property with a value above the threshold. This will serve to reduce the incidence of transfer 
duties on lower value owner-occupied properties.  
7.1.2 Medium-term policy objectives: 3–10 years 
Property tax reform strategies for the medium and longer-term reflect a layered approach that 
takes advantage of different policy settings and instruments. Building on the twin foundations of 
administrative restructuring and a simplified duty regime, they include an increase in transfer 
duty levies for investors relative to owner-occupiers followed by the implementation of a broad-
based land tax as a partial replacement of transfer duties. 
Medium-term policy objectives include: 
 Shifting incurred costs of transfer duty from owner-occupied properties to investment 
properties by gradually increasing the transfer duty rate differential between investors 
and owner-occupiers (RQ3). Reforming (rather than replacing) transfer duty in the medium 
term is a strategic approach that will augment housing affordability and sustainability 
outcomes while tempering political challenges associated with extending land taxes to 
residential properties. This can be done by removing duty-free thresholds for investment 
properties, or by retaining the same thresholds for all buyers while increasing the transfer 
duty rate by one percentage point for investors than owner-occupiers. Under the first of 
these two scenarios modelled in this report removing the duty-free threshold for investment 
properties using a 6 per cent flat rate, an additional $5.4 billion in transfer duties revenue 
would be raised across Australia. The surplus revenue would fund an increase in the duty-
free threshold for owner-occupiers, with substantial differences in the price paid by investors 
(e.g. more than double in Tasmania or $18,000 more in NSW) over owner-occupiers. 
 Consideration by states to impose supplementary taxes on high value or foreign-
owned properties with these revenues being used to fund further reductions in 
transfer duties (RQ3). The simplified and transparent scheduler regime creates further 
opportunities for state governments to introduce additional and even flexible approaches to 
transfer duty regimes. For example, options may include duty surcharges based on the type 
of buyer or value of property (e.g. non-resident foreign buyers or buyers of premium 
properties) or conversely extend concessions to others such as first home buyers.  
 Introduce a broad-based recurrent property tax as a partial replacement of transfer 
duty with land tax (RQ1, RQ2). Property tax would be broadened to include owner-
occupied residential property and based on state-wide systems of CIV HBU valuation 
methods and administered jointly with the local government rate base. In the first instance 
this would fund a 0.6 per cent reduction in transfer duty rates with an average annual 
recurrent property tax of between $66 and $139 on medium value residential properties.  
 Commonwealth-funded incentives for states to engage in reform (RQ4). The 
Commonwealth Government, who will be the main beneficiary of the efficiency dividend 
when states undertake property tax reforms, should consider offering incentives for state 
governments who undertake property tax reforms. Providing incentives through the 
equalisation regime administered by the Commonwealth Grants Commission equalisation 
could provide an avenue for the Commonwealth Government to encourage states and 
territories to transition from transfer duty to recurrent property taxes. 
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7.1.3 Long-term policy objectives: 10 plus years 
The longer-term policy objectives are to complete the tax mix switch from transfer duties to a 
broad-based recurrent property tax. Policy objectives include: 
 Transfer duty on owner-occupied properties to be abolished within 20 years (RQ2, 
RQ3). By extending the medium-term measures (outlined above), it will be possible to 
gradually reduce transfer duties on an annual basis until it is removed altogether. The 
recurrent property tax is commensurately increased to fund the transfer duty reductions. This 
gradual reform model can be adapted by individual states to cater for budgetary and political 
circumstances and would enable states to adapt to market conditions. An incremental 
approach will reduce concerns over double taxation.  
 Developing deferral and withholding strategies to manage increases in recurrent 
property taxes (RQ2, RQ3). Reducing transfer duty suggests that over the longer term 
revenues raised through recurrent property taxes will increase significantly. This will, over 
time, require the adoption of appropriate deferral measures to mitigate the effects of higher 
tax burdens on asset-rich, but income-poor, Australians. Similarly, it will be advantageous to 
develop efficient withholding systems to collect recurrent property taxes. 
The reforms proposed in this report have been designed to meet the objectives of the housing 
tax reform agenda, combining principles of good tax design (Musgrave and Musgrave 1976) 
with housing policy aims while accounting for existing political and structural constraints to 
achieving them. The politicisation of housing tax reform in Australia necessitates an incremental 
approach to reform whereby the initial focus of reform is on improving property tax 
administration and the structure of the transfer duty base. While the approach proposed in this 
report is designed to minimise the political costs of reform, it is inevitable that gradually 
increasing the tax burden on millions of Australian property owners does involve political risks 
and challenges. Ultimately, political leaders will have to argue that the wider benefits of housing 
tax reform for the Australian community and economy outweigh any minor economic costs.  
7.1.4 What are the tax design advantages of these reforms? 
The housing tax reform strategy proposed in this report directly addresses a number of widely 
acknowledged deficiencies in the Australian property tax system as detailed in Chapter 2. It 
outlines a long-term strategy for the removal of transfer duty—a tax well known for its volatility 
and inefficiency—and its replacement with a broad-based property tax in line with the more 
efficient taxes used in other OECD countries. A key political concern in dismantling transfer duty 
taxes is the revenue cost to state governments, who stand to lose a significant source of 
revenue by doing so. This strategy adopts the principle of revenue-neutrality as a key design 
feature, to mitigate the risks to state budgets usually associated with a property tax switch and 
thus remove this deterrent to reform. While not a move usually advocated by housing tax reform 
advocates, retaining transfer duty in the short term does act to dampen speculation on 
investment properties due to its increased tax burden on real estate transactions. Retaining 
transfer duty as a progressive and partial function of a wider property tax system can therefore 
contribute to wider housing affordability goals while reducing the short to medium-term fiscal 
burden associated with a full switch to a broad-based recurrent property tax. 
A central feature of the reform strategy is its incremental approach to a property tax mix shift, 
including shorter, medium and longer-term reforms over a period of up to 20 years. This 
approach to reform allows governments to adapt to behavioural and market impacts, as well as 
maintain some alignment with individual policy goals and responsiveness to changing political 
conditions. From a fiscal perspective, a longer-term transitional arrangement is also calculated 
to provide the Australian economy with significant economic dividends, in the order of adding $9 
billion a year to GDP (Daley and Coates 2015). It is important to note that the proposed reforms 
are not intended as piecemeal, but are designed to integrate with cognate national tax reforms, 
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particularly those addressing housing affordability outcomes. For example, on the one hand 
intergenerational equity may improve by removing transfer duty on home purchases because it 
reduces barriers to entry to home ownership. On the other hand, reductions in transfer duty 
incidence may encourage speculation in property by owner-occupiers (although this has not 
been evident in the ACT (Murray 2016), which highlights the need for reforms to be coordinated 
with tax measures such as capital gains tax reform to dampen speculation. 
7.1.5 How will these reforms contribute to a fairer and more affordable housing 
system?  
An obvious question related to housing property tax reform is whether it will increase equitable 
access to affordable and appropriate housing. The analysis in this report explores the reform 
options most likely to do this. While not directly an affordable housing outcome as such, 
foundations of cooperation between tiers of government and integration of subnational valuation 
systems provide a necessary foundation to reforms that will do exactly that. By simplifying the 
subnational property tax system through administrative reforms such as intergovernmental data 
sharing and coordination of state and local government property valuation methods, we 
envisage greater system-wide transparency and accountability, a fairer, more accurate and 
consistent base for property valuations, and an increased compliance to the payment of tax 
levies and associated reduction in related tax-payer costs.  
In addition, the layered approach outlined in this report is designed specifically to reduce 
transfer duty burdens on lower value owner-occupied housing while increasing costs on 
investment properties. These reductions, we argue, are not likely to be capitalised into higher 
prices and nor will they have a perverse impact on rental affordability.  
Finally, the tax switch from transfer duty to a broad-based recurrent land tax addresses some of 
the key inefficiencies in the current system, such as the costs of discouraging resident and 
business mobility; the inequitable burden it incurs on those who must sell regularly and the 
consequence of these factors on the underutilisation of existing housing stock. Moreover, 
establishing a recurrent tax based on the value of residential properties over the longer term will 
put downward pressure on prices as this taxation liability is capitalised into prices. The removal 
of transfer duty on owner-occupied property, for example, will release purchasers from large, 
up-front costs associated with moving, increasing housing mobility and opportunities to follow 
employment or to better use appropriate housing for generational and life-style needs.  
7.2 Concluding remarks 
This report draws on existing analyses of subnational property taxation in the Australian 
federation to develop and present indicative modelling of a long-term pathway to a fairer, more 
efficient and sustainable tax system. 
The modelling presented, using grouped CoreLogic data of all residential property transactions 
in 2015–16, is arguably the most comprehensive and contemporaneous analysis of its kind 
conducted thus far. However, there are a number of limitations. Given the focus on housing 
markets and affordability, the research attends specifically to issues related to residential 
property transactions, but we acknowledge that this represents a little over 60 per cent of the 
national transfer duty base. The modelling also makes parameter assumptions about housing 
turnover rates and the value of investment properties based on ATO data. These assumptions 
are detailed in Appendix 3. Finally, property markets are notoriously cyclical and volatile and a 
range of exogenous and behaviour factors will influence both property market dynamics and 
revenue outcomes. In this respect, the modelling is indicative and demonstrates likely outcomes 
of specific reform scenarios. The benefit of an iterative approach to reform is that it will allow 
state governments to adapt to market conditions and budget changes.  
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The analysis and reform proposals in this report constitute only one, albeit significant, element 
of a broader study of housing tax reform to improve the fairness and sustainability of Australia’s 
housing system. Finally, it is important to reiterate that the housing challenges facing Australia 
demand a nationally-coordinated approach built on a shared commitment to improve housing 
affordability and accessibility over the longer term. The challenge of course is that any strategy 
which improves housing affordability will have some financial consequences for existing home 
owners. It is therefore incumbent on Australia’s political representatives to highlight the broader 
social and economic benefits associated with a housing system in which a wider range of 
Australians can access secure and affordable housing in the communities in which they live. 
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Appendix 1: CoreLogic data format, 2015–16 
Table A 1: 3-way disaggregation of Corelogic data 
Variable Description Variable descriptor 
State State/Territories, 9 regions State 
Property type The property is defined as 'Houses’ or 'Units’. House 
Date*  YYYYMMDD — the last day of the month for 
previous six- month period 
 six_mth_end  
Source: Summary of data supplied by CoreLogic. 
Table A 2: Variable available for 3-way disaggregated Corelogic data 
Median sales 
price,6 months 
Median sales price of all sales in the last 6 months median_price_6mths 
Number of 
sales, 6 months 
Total number of sales over the last 6 months number_sold_6mths 
Average AVM 
value 
The average value of all properties across the 
geography based on the Automated Valuation 
Model 
avm_value_mean 
Total number of 
dwellings 
The number of dwellings recorded; data as at the 
most recent month end (no history is available) 
total_dwellings 
Average sale 
price, 6 months 
Average sales price of all sales in the last 6 
months 
Average_price 
Count of AVMs The total number of automated valuations that 
have been run 
AVM_count 
Average AVM 
value 
The average value of all properties across the 
geography based on the Automated Valuation 
Model. 
avm_value_mean 
Property stock Count of property stock by AVM value Presented in 25K 
ranges from $0 to 
$600,000, 50K ranges 
from $600,000 to $2m, 
100K ranges from $2m 
to $3m and 250K ranges 
from $3m to $4m 
Properties sold Count of Properties by sold value 
Source: Summary of data supplied by CoreLogic. 
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Appendix 2: Transfer duty and land tax schedules, all states and territories (summary), 1996–97 
and 2015–16 
Table A 3: Transfer duty, 2015–16 
 NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT 
Marginal 
rates are 
applied per 
$100 or 
part of the 
excess 
above the 
lower limit 
of the 
range 
unless 
explicitly 
specified. 
Rate for 
the highest 
value 
range is 
underlined. 
General duty 
rates 
$0–$14,000: 
1.25% (min $2), 
$14,001–
$30,000: 
$175+1.50%, 
$30,001–
$80,000: 
$415+1.75%, 
$80,001–
$300,000: 
$1,290+3.50%, 
$300,001–
$1,000,000: 
$8,990+4.50%, 
Over 
$1,000,000: 
$40,490+5.50%. 
For residential 
property 
General duty rates 
$0–$25,000: 1.40%, 
$25,001–$130,000: 
$350+2.40%, 
$130,001–
$960,000: 
$2,870+6.00%, 
Over $960,000: 
5.50% of total 
value. 
Duty rates for 
principal place of 
residence 
purchases 
$0–$25,000: 1.40%, 
$25,001–$130,000: 
$350+2.40%, 
$130,001–
$440,000: 
$2,870+5.00%, 
From 
21 Sept. 20
12 
General 
duty rates 
$0–$5,000: 
Nil 
$5,000.01–
$75,000: 
1.50% 
$75,000.01–
$540,000: 
$1,050+3.50
% 
$540,000.01
–
$1,000,000: 
$17,325+4.5
0% 
Over 
$1,000,000: 
General duty 
rates 
$0–$80,000: 
1.90%, 
$80,001–
$100,000: 
$1,520+2.85%, 
$100,001–
$250,000: 
$2,090+3.80%, 
$250,001–
$500,000: 
$7,790+4.75%, 
Over $500,000: 
$19,665+5.15%
. 
Duty rates for 
residential 
property 
$0–$120,000: 
1.90%, 
$0–$12,000: 
1.00%, 
$12,001–
$30,000: 
$120+2.00%, 
$30,001–
$50,000: 
$480+3.00%, 
$50,001–
$100,000: 
$1,080+3.50%, 
$100,001–
$200,000: 
$2,830+4.00%, 
$200,001–
$250,000: 
$6,830+4.25%, 
$250,001–
$300,000: 
$8,955+4.75%, 
$300,001–
$500,000: 
$0–$3,000: $50, 
$3,001–
$25,000: 
$50+1.75%, 
$25,001–
$75,000: 
$435+2.25%, 
$75,001–
$200,000: 
$1,560+3.50%, 
$200,001–
$375,000: 
$5,935+4.00%, 
$375,001–
$725,000: 
$12,935+4.25%
, 
Over $725,000: 
$27,810+4.50%
. 
Payments due 
within 3 months 
$0–$525,000: 
Duty calculated by 
the formula: 
D=(0.06571441V2
)+15V 
Where 
D = duty payable 
in $ 
V = 1/1000 
dutiable value 
$525,000–under 
$3,000,000: 
4.95% of dutiable 
value. 
$3,000,000 and 
over:  
5.45% of dutiable 
value. 
Payments due 
within 60 days of 
instrument being 
From 3 June 2015 
$0 to $200,000: 
$20 or $1.80 per 
$100 whichever is 
greater. 
$200,001 to 
$300,000: 
$3,600 plus $3 per 
$100 or part 
thereof. 
$300,001 to 
$500,000: 
$6,600 plus $4 per 
$100 or part 
thereof. 
$500,001 to 
$750,000: 
$14,600 plus $5 
per $100 or part 
thereof. 
$750,001 to 
$1,000,000: 
$27,100 plus 
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The general 
duty rate 
schedule 
applies except 
for properties 
valued at over 
$3,000,000 
where duty is 
charged as 
follows: 
150,490+7.00% 
is charged.  
Payment is due 
within 3 months 
of the transfer of 
dutiable 
property or, 
where the 
transfer is 
effected by 
written 
instrument, 
within 3 months 
of execution of 
the instrument. 
For off-the-plan 
purchases, 
payment may 
be delayed by 
up to a further 
12 months, 
$440,001–
$550,000: 
$18,370+6.00%, 
$550,001–
$960,000: 
$28,070+6.00%, 
Over $960,000: 
5.50% of total 
value. 
Foreign purchases 
of residential 
properties 
3% of the greater of 
market value and 
purchase price.  
Payments are due 
within 30 days of 
execution of 
instrument. 
$38,025+5.7
5%. 
Payments 
are 
generally 
due within 
30 days of 
the date of 
assessment. 
$120,001–
$150,000: 
$2,280+2.85%, 
$150,001–
$360,000: 
$3,135+3.80%, 
$360,001–
$725,000 
$11,115+4.75%
, 
Over $725,000 
$28,453+5.15%
. 
Documents to 
be lodged within 
2 months of 
execution and 
payment 
required within 
1 month of the 
issue of the 
assessment 
notice. 
$11,330+5.00%
, 
Over $500,000: 
$21,330+5.50%
. 
Payments due 
within 2 months 
of execution of 
instrument. 
after the liability 
to pay the duty 
arises. 
executed, except 
for eligible 
conditional 
agreements 
where payment is 
due from the 
earliest of: (a) 
60 days upon 
which all relevant 
conditions are 
satisfied; (b) 
60 days from date 
conveyee has 
right to 
possession of 
property; (c) 
60 days from a 
sub-sale; (d) date 
specified by 
written notice by 
the 
Commissioner; (e) 
(i) 24 months after 
execution for off-
the-plan or 
subdivision 
agreement; or (ii) 
12 months after 
agreement first 
executed. 
$6.50 per $100 or 
part thereof. 
$1,000,001 to 
$1,454,999: 
$43,350 plus $7 
per $100 or part 
thereof. 
$1,455,000 and 
over:  
A flat rate of $5.17 
per $100 applied 
to the total 
transaction value. 
Documents to be 
lodged and 
payment required 
within 90 days of 
the liability arising. 
Duty for an ‘off the 
plan’ purchase 
agreement is 
payable within 
14 days after one 
of the following 
events happens: 
(a) the agreement 
is completed; (b) 
the whole, or any 
part, of the 
purchaser’s 
AHURI report 291 99 
pending 
completion or 
sale of the 
property. 
interest under the 
agreement is 
assigned; (c) the 
following period, 
beginning on the 
date of the 
agreement, ends: 
(i) for a purchase 
agreement for a 
declared 
affordable house 
and land 
package—2 years; 
(ii) for any other 
‘off the plan’ 
purchase 
agreement—
1 year; (d) a 
certificate of 
occupancy has 
been issued. 
Source: NSW Treasury TRP 16-01; NSW Treasury TRP 96-5. 
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Table A 4: Land tax, 2015–16 
 NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT 
Tax scale: 
Marginal 
rates apply to 
excess above 
the lower limit 
of the range 
unless 
explicitly 
specified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tax 
free threshold is 
calculated by 
averaging the past 
three annual 
thresholds. The 
annual threshold is 
indexed each year 
by growth in State-
wide land values 
as determined by 
the 
independent Value
r-General. If 
aggregate land 
value growth is 
negative, the 
indexation factor is 
zero. 
Taxable land value 
is the average of 
the current year 
valuation and the 
previous two 
years. The 
minimum land tax 
payment is $100. 
For 2016 land tax year 
General: 
Less than $250,000: Nil, 
$250,000–$599,999: 
$275+0.20%, 
$600,000–$999,999: 
$975+0.50%, 
$1,000,000–$1,799,999: 
$2,975+0.80%, 
$1,800,000–
$2,999,999:$9,375+1.30%, 
$3,000,000 and over: 
$24,975+2.25%. 
Trusts: 
Less than $25,000: Nil, 
$25,000–$249,999: 
$82+0.375%, 
$250,000–$599,999: 
$926+0.575%, 
$600,000–$999,999: 
$2,938+0.875%, 
$1,000,000–$1,799,999: 
$6,438+1.175%, 
For 2015–16 
land tax year 
For resident 
individuals: 
Less than 
$600,000: Nil, 
$600,000–
$999,999: 
$500+1%, 
$1,000,000–
$2,999,999: 
$4,500+1.65%, 
$3,000,000–
$4,999,999: 
$37,500+1.25%, 
$5,000,000 and 
over: 
$62,500+1.75%. 
For 
Companies, 
trustees and 
absentees: 
Less than 
$350,000: 
Nil, 
For 2015–16 
land tax year 
$0–$300,000: Nil, 
$300,001–
$420,000: $300 
$420,001–
$1,000,000: 
300+0.25%, 
$1,00,001–
$1,800,000: 
$1,750+0.90%, 
$1,800,001–
$5,000,000: 
$8,950+1.80%, 
$5,000,001–
$11,000,000: 
$66,550+2.0%, 
Over 
$11,000,000: 
$186,550+2.67%
. 
The 
Metropolitan 
Region 
Improvement 
Tax (MRIT) is 
For 2015–16 land 
tax year 
$0–$323,000: Nil, 
$323,001–
$593,000: 
0.50%, 
$593,001–
$862,000: 
$1,350+1.65%, 
$862,001–
$1,078,000: 
$5,788.50+2.40%, 
Over $1,052,000: 
$10,972.50+3.70%
. 
From 1 July 2011, 
all tax thresholds 
are indexed 
annually in line with 
average site value 
increases as 
determined by the 
(South Australian) 
Valuer-General. 
$0–$24,999: Nil, 
$25,000–
$349,999: 
$50+0.55%, 
$350,000 or 
more: 
$1,837.50+1.50
%. 
For 2015–16 
Land tax 
assessment for 
each property 
owner in 2015–16 
is based on a 
fixed charge of 
$945 and 
marginal tax rates 
that are applied to 
the Average 
Unimproved 
Value (which is a 
rolling three-year 
average of the 
2013, 2014 and 
2015 unimproved 
land values). 
Up to $75,000: 
0.41%, 
$75,001–
$150,000: 
0.48%, 
$150,001–
$275,000: 
0.61%, 
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For 2015 land tax 
year (from 1 Jan) 
$0–$432,000: Nil, 
$432,001–
$2,641,000: 
$100 + 1.6%, 
Over $2,641,000: 
$35,444 + 2.0%. 
For 2016 land tax 
year (from 1 Jan) 
$0–$482,000:Nil, 
$482,001–
2,947,000: 
$100 + 1.6%, 
Over $2,947,000: 
$39,540 + 2.0%. 
In the 2016 land 
tax year non-
concessional 
companies and 
special trusts will 
be taxed at the flat 
rate of 1.6% to 
$2,947,000, plus 
2.0% for value 
over $2,947,000. 
(In the 2015 land 
tax year the 
$1,800,000–$2,999,999: 
$15,838+0.7614% (a), 
$3,000,000 and over: 
$24,975+2.25%. 
(i) Surcharge on trusts 
effectively phased out for 
land holdings valued 
above $1.8m; Above $3m, 
no surcharge applies. 
Since 1 July 2004 land tax 
has been payable on 
electricity transmission 
easements (from 2007, 
with a top rate of 5% 
instead of 2.25%). 
Absentees: 
0.5% of site value in 
addition to any land tax 
payable. 
The Metropolitan Parks 
Charge is levied annually 
on all metropolitan 
properties via water bills. It 
is calculated by multiplying 
the property’s 1990 Net 
Annual Valuation by a rate 
in the dollar. 
$350,000–
$2,249,999: 
$1,450+1.70%, 
$2,250,000–
$4,999,999: 
$33,750+1.50%, 
$5,000,000 and 
over: 
$75,000+2%. 
levied on the 
unimproved 
value of land 
situated in the 
metropolitan 
region at the rate 
of 0.14% for land 
valued over 
$300,000. The 
MRIT will be 
expanded from 1 
July 2016 to 
regional areas 
where a region 
scheme is in 
place. This 
includes areas 
within the Peel 
Region Scheme 
and the Greater 
Bunbury Region 
Scheme. 
A 50% cap on 
annual growth in 
land value 
applies for land 
tax and MRIT 
purposes. 
 
Over $275,000: 
1.23%. 
Commercial 
properties 
marginal rates: 
Land tax on 
commercial 
properties was 
abolished from 
1 July 2012. 
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premium threshold 
was $2,641,000.) 
The minimum yearly Parks 
Charge in 2015–16 is 
$72.56. 
Reference 
period: 
Based on the 
three-year average 
of unimproved 
land values at 
1 July, if owned at 
midnight 
31 December of 
the previous year. 
Based on aggregate value 
of land owned as at 
midnight 31 December of 
the previous year to the 
assessment year. 
Based on three-
year average of 
land values at 
midnight on 
30 June. The 
land tax value is 
the lesser of the 
value at 
30 June or the 
average of the 
values at 
30 June over 
the last three 
years. 
Based on the 
aggregated 
unimproved 
value of land (as 
determined by 
the Valuer-
General) as at 
30 June of the 
previous year. 
Based on 
aggregate value of 
land as at midnight 
on 30 June 
immediately 
preceding the 
financial year. 
Based on 
aggregate value 
of land as at 
1 July of the 
assessment 
year. 
Based on the 
rolling three year 
average of 
unimproved land 
values. 
Liability is 
assessed 
quarterly based 
on the rental or 
ownership status 
of the property on 
the liability dates 
of 1 July, 
1 October, 
1 January and 1 
April. 
Exemptions 
(Note: 
Generally 
charitable, 
religious and 
educational 
bodies are 
exempt with 
conditions.) 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt except if 
owned or part-
owned by a 
special trust or 
company. 
Primary 
production land: 
Exempt if 
Primary residence: 
Exempt, except if owned 
by a company or by certain 
trusts. 
Primary production land: 
Exempt with conditions. 
Other: Exemptions for 
aged care facilities, 
supported residential 
services, rooming houses 
Primary 
residence: Full 
exemption 
available for 
land owned by 
individuals who 
use it as a 
home and land 
owned by trusts 
where all 
beneficiaries of 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt, except 
principal places 
of residence 
owned by 
companies and 
trusts. 
Primary 
production 
Primary 
residence: 
Principal place of 
residence at 
30 June exempt. A 
waiver or refund is 
also available in 
some 
circumstances 
where land 
becomes a 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt. 
Primary 
production 
land: Exempt. 
Other: 
Landowners, 
who, at June 
30, have 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt, apart 
from parcels of 
land that are 
rented or owned 
by a corporation 
or trust. 
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rural/non-urban 
zoning, otherwise 
exempt if meet 
business test. 
Other: Exemption 
for child care 
centres, aged care 
facilities and 
caravan parks 
used for retirement 
purposes. An 
exemption also 
exists for an owner 
of a primary 
residence that 
does not rent their 
residence and 
moves into a 
nursing home. 
and caravan parks. 
Various other exemptions. 
the trust use the 
land as their 
home. 
Partial 
exemption 
available where 
part of 
residence used 
for non-
residential 
purposes. 
On and from 
midnight 30 
June 2014, full 
exemption is 
available for 
land that does 
not receive a 
home 
exemption 
because the 
owner is in the 
process of 
selling their old 
home and 
moving into a 
new one, where 
appropriate 
conditions are 
met. 
land: Exempt, if 
certain conditions 
are met. 
Other: 
Exemption for 
private aged care 
providers and 
caravan parks. 
Various other 
exemptions also 
apply. 
principal place of 
residence after 
30 June. 
Additional criteria 
apply where a 
business activity is 
conducted from the 
principal place of 
residence (full or 
partial exemption 
may apply). 
Extends to motels, 
hotels, services 
apartments and 
other similar 
accommodation (if 
conditions met). 
Primary 
production land: 
Exempt, if certain 
conditions are met. 
Other: Exemptions 
(some with 
conditions) for 
various 
associations; land 
used for benefit of 
Aboriginal people; 
caravan parks; 
supported 
purchased a 
new principal 
place of 
residence but 
have not yet 
sold their 
current principal 
place of 
residence, may 
apply for a 
rebate (a 
transitional 
rebate) on their 
land tax. Land 
tax would 
normally be 
payable for the 
residence not 
being used as a 
principal place 
of residence on 
1 July of the tax 
year. 
Landowners 
may apply for 
the transitional 
rebate whether 
or not the land 
tax has actually 
been paid. 
Where a 
principal place 
Primary 
production land: 
Exempt. 
Other: 
Residential land 
used as a 
retirement village, 
nursing home, or 
by a religious 
institution to 
provide 
accommodation 
to a member to 
perform their 
duties, is exempt 
from land tax.  
Other exemptions 
from land tax 
include: broad-
acre subdivision; 
a property with a 
guardian or 
manager for a 
person with a 
legal disability; 
residential land 
owned by a 
trustee under a 
will of a deceased 
person and 
occupied by a life 
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Primary 
production 
land: Exempt. 
Other: 
Exemption for 
certain caravan 
or residential 
parks where 
more than 50% 
of all sites 
occupied or 
available for 
occupation for 
residential 
purposes for 
periods of more 
than 6 weeks at 
a time. Various 
other 
exemptions. 
residential facilities; 
retirement village 
or retired persons’ 
relocatable home 
park that is a 
person’s principal 
place of residence; 
residential aged 
care facility, real 
property making up 
the principal place 
of residence of the 
beneficiary within a 
Special Disability 
Trust. 
of residence is 
built on vacant 
land owned as 
at 1 July of a 
financial year, a 
rebate up to the 
amount of the 
land tax paid or 
payable can be 
claimed. 
tenant; residential 
land owned by a 
trustee or a 
guardian on 
behalf of a person 
with a legal 
disability; and 
residential land 
owned by a not-
for-profit housing 
corporation. 
Source: Source: NSW Treasury TRP 16-01; NSW Treasury TRP 96-5. 
Note: Northern Territory not included because land tax is not applied in this jurisdiction.  
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Table A 5: Transfer duty, 1996–97 
TAX NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT 
Tax scale: 
Marginal rates are 
applied per $100 or part 
of the excess above the 
lower limit of the range 
unless explicitly 
specified. Rate for the 
highest value range is 
underlined. 
 
$0–$14,000: 
1.25% (min 
$2) 
$14,001–
$30,000: 
$175+1.5% 
$30,001–
$80,000: 
$415+1.75% 
$80,001–
$300,000: 
$1,290+3.5% 
$300,001–
$1m: 
$8,990+4.5% 
over $1m: 
$40,490 + 
5.5% 
Liability 
includes 
contents of 
buildings. 
Payments 
are due 
within 60 
$0–$20,000: 
1.4% 
$20,001–
$100,000: 
$280+2.4% 
$100,001–
$760,000: 
$2,200+6% 
over 
$760,000: 
5.5% of total 
value. 
Payments 
are due 
within 3 
months of 
execution of 
instrument. 
$0–$20,000: 
1.5% 
$20,001–
$50,000: 
$300+2.25% 
$50,001–
$100,000: 
$975+2.75% 
$100,001–
$250,000: 
$2,350+3.25% 
$250,001–
$500,000: 
$7,225+3.5% 
above 
$500,000: 
$15,975+3.75% 
Payments are 
due within 30 
days of the 
date of 
assessment. 
$0–$80,000: 
1.75% 
$80,001–
$100,000: 
$1,400+2.5% 
$100,001–
$250,000: 
$1,900+3.25% 
$250,001–
$500,000: 
$6,775+4% 
above 
$500,000: 
$16,775+4.25% 
Documents to 
be lodged 
within 3 months 
of execution 
and payment 
required within 
3 months of the 
issue of the 
assessment 
notice. 
$0–$12,000: 
1% 
$12,001–
$30,000: 
$120+2% 
$30,001–
$50,000: 
$480+3% 
$50,001–
$100,000: 
$1,080+3.5% 
$100,001–
$1m: 
$2,830+4.0% 
above $1m: 
$38,830+4.5% 
Payments due 
within 2 
months of 
execution of 
instrument. 
$0–$1,300: 
$20 
$1,301–
$10,000: 
$20+1.5% 
$10,001–
$30,000: 
$150+2% 
$30,001–
$75,000: 
$550+2.5% 
$75,001–
$150,000: 
$1,675+3% 
$150,001–
$225,000: 
$3,925+3.5% 
Over 
$225,000: 
$6,550+4% 
Payments 
are due 
within 60 
$0–$500,000: 
Duty calculated 
by the formula: 
D=(0.065V2)+21V 
where 
D = duty payable 
in $ 
V = (total 
value/1000) 
Above $500,000: 
5.4% of total 
value 
Payments are 
due within 60 
days of 
exchange. 
$0–$14,000: 
1.25% or 
$20 
whichever is 
greater 
$14,001–
$30,000: 
$175 + 1.5% 
$30,001–
$60,000: 
$415 + 2% 
$60,001–
$100,000: 
$1,015 + 
2.5% 
$100,001–
$300,000: 
$2,015 + 
3.5% 
$300,001–
$1m: 
$9,015 + 
4.5% 
Over $1m: 
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TAX NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT ACT 
days of 
exchange. 
days of 
exchange. 
$40,515 + 
5.5% 
Documents 
to be lodged 
within 30 
days and 
payment 
required 
within 30 
days of the 
date of the 
assessment 
notice (90 
days for 
lodgement 
of contracts 
executed 
interstate). 
Source: NSW Treasury TRP 16-01; NSW Treasury TRP 96-5. 
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Table A 6: Land tax, 1996–97 
TAX NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT 
Tax scale: 
Marginal rates 
apply to excess 
above the lower 
limit of the range 
unless explicitly 
specified. 
 
0–$160,000: Nil. 
Above 
$160,000: 
$100+1.65%. 
(Temporary until 
31 December 
1998, then 
1.5%) 
 
Below 
$200,000: Nil. 
$200,000–
$539,999: 
$60+0.2% 
$540,000–
$2,699,999: 
$740+3% 
$2,700,000 & 
over: 
$65,540+5%. 
The above rate 
scale is subject 
to the condition 
that land tax 
payable by any 
taxpayer in 
1997 will be 
limited to plus 
50% of the tax 
that would have 
been payable 
on the same 
landholdings on 
1993 land 
$160,000 exemption for 
all natural persons 
(otherwise exemption of 
$60,000 for companies 
and trustees, and 
$40,000 for absentees*). 
Up to $3,999: 0.20% 
$4,000–$5,999: 
$8+0.36% 
$6,000–$9,999: 
$15.20+0.52% 
$10,000–$29,999: 
$36+0.70% 
$30,000–$49,999: 
$176+0.87% 
$50,000–$199,999: 
$350+1.03% 
$200,000–$349,999: 
$1,895+1.20% 
$350,000–$499,999: 
$3,695+1.37% 
$500,000–$649,999: 
$5,750+1.54% 
$650,000–$799,999: 
$8,060+1.71% 
$0–$10,000: Nil 
$10,000–
$70,000: 
$15+0.15% 
$70,000–
$130,000: 
$105+0.25% 
$130,000–
$190,000: 
$255+0.45% 
$190,000–
$260,000: 
$525+0.8% 
$260,000–
$600,000: 
$1,085+1.2% 
$600,000–
$1,100,000: 
$5,165+1.6% 
over $1,100,000: 
$13,165+2.0% 
The Metropolitan 
Region 
Improvement Tax 
$0–$50,000: Nil 
$50,001–
$300,000: 0.35% 
$300,001–$1m: 
$875+1.65% 
Over $1m: 
$12,425+3.7% 
$0–$1,000: Nil 
$1,001–$15,000: 
$25.00 
$15,001–
$40,000: 
$25.00+0.75% 
$40,001–
$68,750: 
$212.50+1% 
$68,751–
$100,000: 
$500.00 
$100,001–
$125,000: 
$500.00+1.25% 
$125,001–
$170,000: 
$812.50+1.5% 
$170,001–
$210,000: 
$1,487.50+1.75% 
$210,001–
$250,000: 
$2,187.50+2% 
Up to $100,000: 
1% flat 
$100,001–
$200,000: 
1.25% flat 
Above $200,000: 
1.5% flat (upon 
unimproved 
value). 
Liability is 
assessed 
quarterly. 
AHURI report 291 108 
values and rate 
scales. 
 
$800,000–$949,999: 
$10,625+1.89% 
$950,000–$1,099,999: 
$13,460+2.01% 
$1,100,000–$1,249,999: 
$16,475+2.23% 
$1,250,000–$1,299,999: 
$19,820+2.44% 
$1,300,000–$1,349,999: 
$21,040+2.66% 
$1,350,000–$1,399,999: 
$22,370+2.87% 
$1,400,000–$1,449,999: 
$23,805+3.09% 
$1,450,000–$1,499,999: 
$25,350+3.30% 
$1,500,000 and over: 
1.8% Flat. 
* Resident natural 
persons receive a 
deduction of $160,000 
from the total 
unimproved value of 
land before arriving at 
the taxable value. 
is levied on the 
unimproved value 
of land situated in 
the metropolitan 
region at the rate 
of 0.15c per $1.  
$250,001–
$500,000: 
$2,987.50+2.25% 
Exceeding 
$500,000: 
$8,612.50+2.5% 
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Reference period: Based on value 
of land as at 1 
July held on 31 
December of 
the previous 
year. 
Based on value 
of land as at 31 
December of 
the previous 
year. 
Based on value of land 
as at 30 June of the 
previous year. 
 
Based on value 
of land as at 30 
June of the 
previous year. 
Based on value of 
land as at 30 
June of the 
previous year. 
Based on value 
of land as at 30 
June of the 
previous year. 
Based on value 
of land as at 1 
January of the 
previous financial 
year. 
Exemptions: 
 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt 
Primary 
production 
land:  
Exempt 
 
Primary 
residence: 
Liable 
(concession for 
pensioners)  
Primary 
production 
land:  
Exempt with 
conditions 
Primary residence:  
Exempt with conditions 
Primary production 
land:  
Exempt with conditions 
 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt 
Primary 
production land: 
Exempt 
 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt 
Primary 
production land: 
Exempt 
 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt 
Primary 
production land: 
Exempt 
 
Primary 
residence: 
Exempt 
Primary 
production land: 
Exempt 
 
Source: NSW Treasury TRP 16-01; NSW Treasury TRP 96-5.  
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Appendix 3: Summary of key modelling parameter assumptions using Corelogic data 
Table A 7: Summary of key modelling parameter assumptions using Corelogic data 
Parameters Range Distribution of total to range e.g. NSW  
Property turnover (% change)  0%   
Property price change (%)  0%   
Property supply  0%   
Stock mix (1) Domestic owner-occupied properties <1 x median price Residual 34.8%  
  1-1.5 x median price Residual 93.2%  
  >1.5 x median price Residual 100.0%  
  % of total stock    65.7% 
 Domestic investment properties <1 x median price 90.0% 57.5%  
  1–1.5 x median price 10.0% 6.4%  
  >1.5 x median price 0.0% 0.0%  
  % of total stock    30.3% 
 Foreign ownership <1 x median price 95.0% 7.8%  
  1–1.5 x median price 5.0% 0.4%  
  >1.5 x median price 0.0% 0.0%  
  % of total stock    4.0% 
Stock mix (2) <1 x median price Domestic owner-occupied properties Residual 35%  
  Domestic investment properties 90% 57%  
  Foreign ownership 95% 8%  
 1-1.5 x median price Domestic owner-occupied properties Residual 93%  
  Domestic investment properties 10% 6%  
  Foreign ownership 5% 0%  
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>1.5 x median price Domestic owner-occupied properties Residual 100% 
Domestic investment properties 0% 0% 
Foreign ownership 0% 0% 
Turnover mix (1) Domestic owner-occupier FHB: 
All<Median 
<Median 
10.0% 20% 
Domestic owner-occupier other: 
Residual 
<Median 
Residual 5% 
Domestic owner-occupier other: 
Residual 
>Median
Residual 80% 
Domestic investor: <Median <Median 30.0% 60% 
Domestic investor: >Median >Median 10.0% 20% 
Foreign ownership of SOLD 2015–16 <Median FIRB 15% 
Turnover mix (2) <Median Domestic owner-occupier FHB: 
All<Median 
10% 20% 
Domestic owner-occupier other: 
Residual 
Residual 5% 
Domestic investor: <Median 30% 60% 
Foreign ownership of SOLD 2015–16 FIRB 15% 
>Median Domestic owner-occupier other: 
Residual 
Residual 80% 
Domestic investor: >Median 10% 20% 
Criteria for reforms Properties below median price pay less and those above median pay more 
Revenue neutral within 1 year 
Source: Modelling assumptions using Corelogic data.
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